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Collaboration to enable participatory disaster impact reduction decision-making has become a 
political, policy and practice priority, for example, featuring in the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction.  However, divergent definitions of resilience, focussed either on preserving and 
restoring the built environment (“equilibrist resilience”), or on social change and adaptation 
(“evolutionary resilience”), have resulted in largely parallel bodies of literature and practice.  
While all communities benefit from participating in disaster impact reduction efforts to some extent, 
this participation is essential for remote communities at risk of isolation due to disaster impacts.  
Remote communities increasingly rely on distributed infrastructure to provide essential services and 
are relied upon to implement disaster resilience.  Moreover, if a remote community is isolated, 
community members will need to lead immediate response efforts in the absence of authorities, 
sometimes for considerable periods of time.  Therefore, in practice, both the reduction of disruption to 
essential services and socio-cultural transformation are necessary to build the resilience of remote 
communities. 
This doctoral project aims to address this gap in the field by developing and trialling an inclusive 
participatory, scenario-based approach to increase the resilience of a remote community to loss of 
essential services due to disaster damage to infrastructure, as an integrated component of wider 
initiatives to reduce inequities and effect social transformation.  This aim was achieved by 1) 
identifying factors that affect the resilience of remote communities at risk of isolation from disasters 
triggered by natural hazards; 2) developing a participatory approach to integrate disaster impact 
reduction planning across stakeholder domains, to increase the resilience of remote communities at 
risk of isolation from disasters triggered by natural hazards; and 3) partnering with community 
members from Franz Josef, New Zealand, practitioners and policymakers to apply the participatory 
scenario-based approach. 
This thesis addresses the fundamental divide between equilibrist and evolutionary resilience by 
demonstrating that it is possible to bridge the two disciplinary approaches.  By developing and 
applying an “evolutionary” participatory governance approach to bring together community members, 
practitioners, policymakers and researchers, the participating stakeholder groups were all able to 
better understand the likely disruption, resulting from disaster damage to distributed infrastructure 
networks, and to make decisions to reduce both that disruption and the social consequences of it.  
Through this approach, Franz Josef community members, infrastructure providers and emergency 
managers have enhanced practical measures to improve readiness, reduction, response and 
recovery for major natural hazard events in the West Coast region of New Zealand.  In doing so, the 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 A disaster resilience knowledge divide 
The 2015-2030 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction stresses the need to address social 
inequality to reduce exposure to disaster damage as a guiding principle: ‘Disaster risk reduction 
requires an all-of-society engagement and partnership.  It also requires empowerment and inclusive, 
accessible and non discriminatory participation, paying special attention to people disproportionately 
affected by disasters, especially the poorest.  A gender, age, disability and cultural perspective should 
be integrated in all policies and practices, and women and youth leadership should be promoted. In 
this context, special attention should be paid to the improvement of organized voluntary work of 
citizens’ (UNISDR, 2015b, 19d, p. 13). 
This emphasis on the use of inclusion, participation and empowerment to address social inequities is 
consistent with what White and O’Hare (2014) have recently identified as the “evolutionary” 
understanding of resilience that is common in academic planning and social science contexts.  The 
understanding that disasters first and foremost affect the people local to the disaster event has 
contributed to growing recognition of the need to involve community members in disaster resilience 
decision-making that is likely to affect them (Gaillard & Mercer, 2013).  “Evolutionary resilience” is 
consequently focussed on the use of adaption and transformation to address the social factors that 
increase the vulnerability of communities, and to respond to diverse and rapidly changing social, 
political and natural environments (White & O'Hare, 2014).  However, White and O'Hare (2014) have 
found that, in practice, this transformative potential is largely neutralised by the tendency in 
engineering, policy and other institutional spheres to use what they term “equilibrist” definitions of 
“resilience”.  Where “evolutionary resilience” emphasises social change and adaptation, “equilibrist 
resilience” is focussed on preserving and restoring the built environment, typically as part of “return to 
normal” approaches, in which top-down, techno-rational approaches are used to deliver universally 
applicable solutions (White & O'Hare, 2014).  For example, this “equilibrist” emphasis is evident in the 
Sendai Framework global target concerned with infrastructure resilience, which aims to ‘[s]ubstantially 
reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services’ (UNISDR, 2015b, 
18d, p. 12), and the associated priority for action, ‘Build Back Better’, which includes promoting ‘the 
resilience of new and existing critical infrastructure… to ensure that they remain safe, effective and 
operational during and after disasters in order to provide life-saving and essential services’ (UNISDR, 
2015b, 33c, p. 21). 
The tendency to use the term resilience in one of two, opposed senses, identified by White and 
O'Hare (2014), can have an unhelpfully polarising effect on the conversation about disaster resilience.  
The benefits of inclusive, participatory approaches have been well established, and include: more 
empowerment of community members; more benefits to community members; reduced conflict; 
increased trust in government decision-making; greater perceptions that decisions are fair; better 
quality decisions; and better identification of disaster risk (Section 2.2.3) (see Reed, 2008, for a 
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summary).  It has also been well established that to function effectively, most communities are 
becoming increasingly reliant on essential services such as transport, electricity supply, and 
telecommunications (including calls, texts and data) (Gardner, 2015).  Damage to the infrastructure 
networks that provide these essential services, including that caused by natural hazards (e.g. 
landslides, flooding, earthquakes), can result in the partial and sometimes complete loss of a given 
community’s essential services for considerable periods of time, at significant social as well as 
economic cost. 
In practice, both socio-cultural transformation and the reduction of disruption to essential services are 
necessary to build the resilience of remote communities.  However, to date, the divide identified by 
White and O'Hare (2014) has resulted in largely parallel bodies of literature (and practice) focussed 
either on the relationship between infrastructure and community resilience, or on the use of 
participatory governance to build social resilience at the community level, with very little research 
combining these findings into more integrated, holistic resilience building approaches. 
This thesis has adopted the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR, 
2017) definition of “resilience”, since it clearly attempts to combine both evolutionary and equilibrist 
emphases: ‘the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, 
accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient 
manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and 
functions.’  Note, however, that restoring ‘essential basic structures and functions’ does not mean 
replicating pre-disaster structures and functions exactly, since these may have been the cause of 
vulnerability (Appendix B). 
There is a clear need for more integrated approaches to building resilience in practice, in which 
inclusive, participatory approaches are used at the community level to reduce the exposure of 
communities to essential service disruption due to disaster damage to infrastructure, as part of wider 
initiatives to reduce inequities and effect social transformation (e.g. Paton & Johnston, 2017).  This is 
particularly important for remote communities. 
1.2 Remote communities and disaster resilience 
Although specific definitions vary, most countries use (small) size and (large) distance from essential 
services (e.g. hospitals) and urban centres (geographic remoteness) when categorising the 
‘remoteness’ of regions and communities (e.g. Fiji Bureau of Statistics, n.d.; SARRAH, n.d.; Statistics 
Canada, n.d.; Stats NZ, n.d.).  The term “community” is often used to denote a group of people living 
or working in a geographic location, and particularly those who are involved to at least some extent in 
government or other administrative decision-making affecting the relevant location, as exemplified by 
all the articles identified in this review.  This use of the term “community” has been critiqued on the 
grounds that it implies a homogeneity that may not exist in practice, meaning that so-called 
“community based” initiatives that assume this homogeneity risk overlooking existing conflicts and 
entrenching existing, inequitable power relations (e.g. Cannon, 2014).  Acknowledging the validity of 
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this critique, and the essentially heterogenous reality of any population, the term “community” is used 
in this thesis to refer to the varied group of people who are (or are likely to be) exposed to the same 
disaster impacts through social, spatial and/or immediate economic links (Appendix B). 
Remote communities increasingly rely on essential services, such as electricity, transport, and 
telecommunications (including calls, texts and data), provided by distributed infrastructure, making 
them particularly vulnerable to disasters (Gardner, 2015).  The rapid expansion of distributed 
infrastructure (particularly transportation and telecommunication networks) has provided many remote 
locations with new development opportunities, such as tourism and modern agriculture (Gardner, 
2015).  At the same time, the management and provision of essential services have become 
increasingly centralised (Gardner, 2015).  Both new development opportunities and increasing 
centralisation have increased the dependence of many remote communities on distributed 
infrastructure to provide essential services.  This makes the resilience of distributed infrastructure to 
the impacts of natural hazards an important component of the resilience of many remote communities 
because a natural hazard event can cause distributed infrastructure damage which disrupts a 
dependent community, even if the community is not otherwise impacted by the event (Section 1.3).  
Increasing dependence on distributed infrastructure for the provision of essential services to remote 
communities also means that loss of essential services can cause much greater impacts. 
Remote communities are also particularly in need of participatory resilience-building initiatives.  
Involvement in disaster management decision-making is necessary because, if isolated, community 
members will need to lead immediate response efforts in the absence of authorities, sometimes for 
considerable periods of time (Gardner, 2015; Orchiston, 2013).  While consistent with the benefits of 
participation established in wider participatory governance literature (Section 1.4), this need is more 
acute in remote communities, at least in part due to the growing centralisation of essential services.  
In some communities, the need for cost efficiency in local government has meant that responsibility 
increasingly falls to community members and organisations, so that community members are relied 
upon for, and essential to, much of the success of disaster management (Remling & Veitayaki, 2016). 
1.3 Distributed infrastructure resilience 
Communities require critical services, such as electricity, transport, telecommunications (including 
calls, texts and data), water and sewerage to be able to function.  Infrastructure networks, such as 
electricity lines, roads, and fibre optic cables, normally provide these services, but can be impacted by 
both damage and network disruption.  Where there is low or no infrastructure redundancy, damage to 
only one part of an infrastructure network can result in substantial reductions to the service level being 
provided, and/or can make it impossible for undamaged parts of the network to function.  For 
example, a landslide blocking a road can require large detours or result in isolation of the remainder 
of the road network.  Moreover, infrastructure networks are usually highly interdependent, meaning 
that impact on one service is likely to have cascading negative consequences for other infrastructure 
networks, reducing the service level provided by other networks and increasing the time required to 
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repair them (Buldyrev et al., 2010).  Therefore, damage to infrastructure and consequent network 
disruption, often caused by natural hazards (such as earthquakes, flooding, and volcanic eruptions), 
can result in the partial and sometimes complete loss of a given community’s essential services for 
considerable periods of time, at substantial societal and economic cost. 
Accordingly, the modelling of infrastructure networks’ asset failure, interdependencies, and recovery 
is an ongoing focus of disaster management research worldwide (Hickford et al., 2018; Ouyang, 
2014).  However, while engineers have long worked to decrease the physical vulnerability of 
infrastructure assets, there is growing recognition of the need to address the societal implications of 
infrastructure damage and disruption in contemporary infrastructure studies (Chang, 2014) and in the 
2015-2030 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 2015b).  Although maintaining 
distributed infrastructure networks remains crucial, earlier emphasis on “asset-driven” resilience has 
shifted towards ensuring the provision of services.  For example, in New Zealand, ensuring that 
households and businesses are accessible is now prioritised over ensuring that the road network is 
not damaged (Chapter 3; National Infrastructure Unit, 2015). 
This shift in focus to the societal implications of essential services outages has necessarily led to 
more interdisciplinary research (Chang, 2014; Grabowski et al., 2017; Hansman et al., 2006; 
McDaniels et al., 2015; Paton & Johnston, 2017; Pescaroli & Alexander, 2016) and policy priorities 
(ODI & The World Bank, 2015; UNISDR, 2015a; World Bank, 2014).  There has been particular 
success from collaboration between infrastructure operators, both in response and pre-disaster 
mitigation.  Again using an example from New Zealand, an interdisciplinary collaboration in the late 
1990’s between local and regional government, private infrastructure providers and university 
researchers resulted in mitigation to Christchurch city’s power distribution network which progressed 
systematically each year and, in total, cost NZ$6 million (Centre for Advanced Engineering, 1997; 
Fenwick, 2012).  When the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence impacted the city, the 
mitigation programme was later assessed to have saved NZ$60-65 million in direct asset replacement 
costs alone, and it was noted that ‘the damage would have been greater and the response slower if 
the steps recommended in… preparatory work… had not been taken’ (Fenwick, 2012, p. ii; Giovinazzi 
et al., 2011).  Interdisciplinary research is expected to continue to increase into the future as studies 
build on research and collaborations concerning multi-hazard implications for service delivery (Centre 
for Advanced Engineering, 1997; Giovinazzi et al., 2011; IEM, 2013; Zorn & Shamseldin, 2015), the 
economic implications of essential services outages (Cavallo & Noy, 2009; Chang et al., 2007; 
Deligne et al., 2015; Fenwick, 2012; Robinson et al., 2015), and the effects of essential service 
outages on community responses to disasters (Bressler et al., 2012; Cauffman, 2015; Jones & 
Benthien, 2011; Orchiston et al., 2018; Zorn et al., 2018).  However, despite this trend, to date there is 
very little research that combines efforts to increase distributed infrastructure resilience and 
participatory efforts to increase the resilience of communities. 
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1.4 Participatory governance 
Increasingly, approaches to increase resilience by direct community involvement are grouped 
together under the term “participatory governance”, which has been defined as the direct involvement 
of community stakeholders in administrative decision-making and management processes, where a 
“stakeholder” is a person or organisation affected by the decision-making process and outcome (Aoki, 
2018; Reed, 2008; Yang & Pandey, 2011).  However, participatory governance involves substantial 
time and effort, and all stakeholders have limited time, resources and interest, restricting their 
capacity to participate in or facilitate additional activities (Reed et al., 2013).  For example, existing 
commitments such as work and family can limit community members’ abilities to participate, and 
limited time and resources can similarly discourage project leaders from facilitating intensive 
participation (Reed et al., 2013).  Further, while community members are often consulted as part of 
disaster impact reduction efforts, they are very rarely involved in collaborative decision-making, 
particularly where infrastructure resilience is concerned (Aoki, 2018; Broad et al., 2007; Cooke & 
Kothari, 2001). 
This thesis develops and applies an inclusive participatory approach in a collaboration between 
community members in Franz Josef, New Zealand, infrastructure providers, emergency managers, 
local government policymakers and researchers.  The approach uses a scenario as a boundary 
object, and aims to enable an increase in the disaster resilience of remote communities through both 
decreased essential services disruption from increased infrastructure disaster resilience, and 
enhanced social resilience through more informed and collaborative decision-making.  The intent of 
this thesis is to start to provide theoretical underpinning to this practical need.  The aims of this thesis 
are detailed in Section 1.6. 
Various typologies have been proposed to broadly categorise scenario planning projects (Bishop et 
al., 2007).  Börjeson et al. (2006) identify three scenario planning categories, according to whether 
they address probable, possible or preferable futures: predictive scenarios address “what will 
happen?”; explorative scenarios address “what can happen?”; and normative scenarios address “how 
can a specific target be reached?” (Bishop et al., 2007).  In scenario planning for natural hazards, 
normative foresight studies which have a pre-determined outcome and explore alternative paths used 
to reach this outcome, are less common (Wodak & Neale, 2015).  This disparity is not the focus of this 
project, but given the need for communities to decide their own futures, foresight studies where 
community members can describe their collective desired future and consider how to achieve this are 
a notable, currently underutilised, alternative for participatory governance.   
Further, while social power relations and dynamics are critical to community disaster preparedness 
(Blake et al., 2017) and indeed any participatory work, they are not the focus of this thesis.  Research 
into this topic was instead conducted in parallel, within a closely aligned research project (Hore et al., 
in review). 
Chapter 1.  Introduction. 
6 
1.5 Case study context: Franz Josef, New Zealand 
Franz Josef/Waiau is a remote community located in Westland district, within the West Coast region 
of the South Island of New Zealand (Figure 1).  The town is famous for its temperate maritime glacier, 
which descends from the Southern Alps to around 400 metres above sea level.  Kā Roimata o Hine 
Hukatere, later also named Franz Josef Glacier, was first shown to Europeans by Māori in the mid-
19th Century, and a settlement has existed for the purposes of showing the glacier to tourists since the 
late-19th Century, when tracks and bridges were also built to provide access onto the glacier (Glacier 
Country Tourism Group, 2018b; Langridge et al., 2016).  Subsequently, this settlement was named 
Franz Josef, after the glacier. 
Figure 1.  Maps of Franz Josef.  A: Franz Josef, and its location within New Zealand. 
B: Alpine Fault trace, FRAZ, rockfall & landslide zones (Tonkin + Taylor & EY, 2017, p. 26). 
C: 100-year modelled river flood with 6m bed aggradation (Tonkin + Taylor & EY, 2017, p. 29). 
Franz Josef’s visitor numbers have risen sharply over the last decade, driven largely by a desire to 
see the glacier (Mitchell & Williams, 2018; Wilson et al., 2014).  Franz Josef Glacier and the 
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Zealand in the same year (Tonkin + Taylor & EY, 2017).  For context, in 2016, international tourism 
expenditure contributed NZ$14.5 billion or 20.7% of New Zealand’s total exports of goods and 
services (Stats NZ, 2016).  This increase in visitors means that the number of tourists now dwarfs the 
number of residents in the town: approximately 6,000 people per day walked the Franz Josef Glacier 
track in peak season in 2018 (Morton, 2018), but the town has a resident population of approximately 
450 people (Stats NZ, 2013).  
Community members have identified that they need business expansion to cope with the current 
tourism “boom”, increased tourism in winter to improve sustainability, and business diversification to 
reduce the town’s dependence on the glacier, which is experiencing prolonged retreat, for the town to 
continue to prosper.  However, while the community wants to increase investment in Franz Josef and 
expand the town, development is presently constrained as it has been established that the town is 
directly exposed to natural hazards that include earthquakes, floods, landslides, landslide-dambreak 
floods, severe storms (including ex-cyclones) and tornadoes (Westland District Council, 2002) (Figure 
1).  Franz Josef was developed at the foot of the Southern Alps, on the northern bank of the Waiho 
(Waiau) River, across what was later recognised as the fault trace of the Alpine Fault (Langridge & 
Beban, 2011; Langridge & Ries, 2009; McSaveney & Davies, 1998; Wellman, 1953).  As a result, 
some buildings and critical infrastructure within the town are located directly on the fault trace (Figure 
1).  The Alpine Fault is an active fault considered capable of generating an Mw 8 earthquake (Stirling 
et al., 2012) and is late in its current seismic cycle, with an estimated ~30% probability of a major 
rupture in the next 50 years (Barnes et al., 2013; Cochran et al., 2017; De Pascale & Langridge, 
2012; Stirling et al., 2012).  The Waiho River poses a flood hazard due to considerable aggradation 
since the late-19th Century (Glacier Country Tourism Group, 2018a).  Currently, the majority of the 
town is located below the level of the Waiho river bed and is completely reliant on stopbanks (river 
levees) for flood protection, which have exacerbated aggradation and continue to do so (Langridge et 
al., 2016; McSaveney & Davies, 1998).  Development potential elsewhere in the vicinity is reduced 
due to several nearby secondary catchments (Docherty Creek, Tartare Stream, Stony Creek and 
Potters Creek) and its range-front location presenting a landslide risk (Langridge et al., 2016).  While 
this landslide risk presently requires intensive investigation, it is potentially devastating (Barth, 2013; 
Langridge et al., 2016). 
1.5.1 Franz Josef risk governance 
Franz Josef is under the jurisdiction of Westland District Council (WDC), West Coast Regional Council 
(WCRC) and the New Zealand Government.  The Resource Management Act (1991) tasks Councils 
with developing rules, objectives and policies to mitigate the effects from natural hazards.  
Specifically, regional councils are usually responsible for (amongst other responsibilities) regional 
policy statements, land use planning to avoid natural hazards, and ensuring sufficient development 
capacity for residential and business land to meet expected long-term demands of the region.  WCRC 
fulfils this obligation through the West Coast Regional Policy Statement (West Coast Regional 
Council, 2000).  District councils are usually responsible for (amongst other responsibilities) the 
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effects of land use and ensuring sufficient development capacity for residential and business land to 
meet expected long-term demands of the district.  WDC fulfils this obligation through rolling updates 
to the Westland District Plan (Westland District Council, 2002).  Councils must consult with their 
communities when they prepare or review plans or regional policy statements, or consider a change 
or variation, but consultation approaches vary (MfE, 2018).  In an evaluation of land use and 
emergency management plans for natural hazards in New Zealand, Saunders et al. (2015) find that 
information on the nature and location of natural hazards needs to be more accessible to the public, 
and more councils should implement a risk-based approach that engages with communities to 
determine levels of risk.  However, whilst best practice, these are not required by legislation. 
Management of Franz Josef’s natural hazard risks has been highly contentious in the town (Day, 
2003; Gough, 2001; Gough et al., 2001).  Effective disaster impact reduction is challenging in Franz 
Josef not only due to the complex hazardscape, but also due to its specific social, economic, cultural, 
and political context (Fischer, 2000; Gough, 2000; Gough et al., 2001; Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  
This already complicated situation has been compounded by previous risk management attempts, 
which have eroded trust between community members, emergency managers, and government 
(Section 4.2.1.1). 
Despite this recent history, Franz Josef community members continue to demonstrate a keen desire 
to participate in disaster impact reduction efforts.  In 2015, Franz Inc., Franz Josef’s business 
collective, invited academics from the University of Canterbury and the University of Auckland to 
assist them to develop a planning strategy to increase the resilience of the town.  Subsequently, a 
complex participatory disaster impact reduction process has developed.  Several participatory groups 
aiming to increase the resilience of Franz Josef have developed, including the community members’ 
and Universities’ collaboration and a process led by the district and regional councils, both including a 
wide range of stakeholders.  Up to the point of the activity described in this thesis, these processes 
have largely focussed on the direct impacts of flooding and earthquakes (Langridge et al., 2016; 
Tonkin + Taylor & EY, 2017). 
1.5.2 New Zealand infrastructure resilience 
Franz Josef’s dependence on the West Coast region’s linear distributed infrastructure for service 
delivery also increases the town’s vulnerability (Chapter 2; Appendix A).  The West Coast region has 
no network redundancy (except in towns) for over 400 kilometres, meaning Franz Josef is only 
accessible via ground transportation by a single road (State Highway 6) and is serviced by only one 
powerline and one telecommunications line (Figure 2) (National Infrastructure Unit, 2015; Tonkin + 
Taylor & EY, 2017; Willis, 2014). 
With no redundancy, any disruption to any part of the distributed infrastructure networks can result in 
the partial and sometimes complete loss of a given community’s essential services for considerable 
periods of time.  Depending on the duration of the outage and various contextual factors, this can lead 
to potentially substantial social and economic impacts.  The combination of low (or no) infrastructure 
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redundancy and high hazard exposure (including earthquakes, landslides, landslide dam-break 
flooding, river flooding, rockfalls, severe storms, tornadoes and tsunami) in the West Coast region 
compounds the vulnerability of remote West Coast communities, including Franz Josef (Appendix A), 
and means that community members will likely be isolated in the event of a major disaster in the West 
Coast region.  It has been identified by previous studies and the West Coast Civil Defence & 
Emergency Management (CDEM) Group that, when isolated, community members will likely be 
responsible for the immediate response efforts, including caring for stranded tourists who vastly 
outnumber residents and are unlikely to be prepared for a disaster (Orchiston, 2013; West Coast 
CDEM Group, 2016). 
 
Figure 2.  A map showing the South Island road network of New Zealand and the combined exposure 
of SH6 to earthquake rupture, landslide, debris flow and river flood (Appendix A, Figure 56). 
Under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (MCDEM, 2002), New Zealand 
government agencies at local, regional and national levels, infrastructure providers (often termed 
“lifeline utilities” or “lifelines”) and emergency services all have defined functions and responsibilities 
for disaster readiness, reduction, response, and recovery.  Section 60 requires every lifeline utility to 
be ‘able to function to the fullest possible extent, even though this may be at a reduced level, during 
and after an emergency’ (MCDEM, 2002, p. 40).  Lifeline utilities must also establish planning and 
operational relationships with their regional Civil Defence & Emergency Management (CDEM) Group 
under the Act.  In most regions, lifeline utilities predominantly fulfil their duties under the act by 
participating in regional lifelines groups, with national representation and coordination undertaken by 
the New Zealand Lifelines Council (est. 1999). 
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The West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group has undertaken a number of projects including natural 
hazards scenario planning and post-event debriefs to assess and improve the resilience of West 
Coast lifelines (e.g. McCahon et al., 2006,2017; West Coast Regional Council, 2014).  These projects 
and other work fostered or contributed to by the Group and its members have developed valuable 
inter-personal and inter-corporate relationships and have improved the infrastructure resilience of the 
West Coast region.  However, up to the point of the activity described in this thesis, community 
members have not been involved in these collaborative processes. 
The remote character of Franz Josef and the town’s dependence on distributed infrastructure means 
that there is an additional need for community participation, as community members in remote 
locations are relied upon to implement disaster resilience for cost efficiency (Remling & Veitayaki, 
2016) and when isolated, community members lead immediate response efforts in the absence of 
input from authorities (Gardner, 2015; Orchiston, 2013) (Section 1.2).  Therefore, this project aimed to 
enable collaboration between Franz Josef community members, infrastructure providers, emergency 
managers, local government decisionmakers and researchers.  While the immediate objective was to 
increase the resilience of Franz Josef to essential services disruption and isolation, this process was 
also designed to build trust between the participants, to enable ongoing collaboration (Eiser et al., 
2012). 
1.6 Thesis aims 
The aim of this thesis is to develop a participatory governance approach to increase the resilience of 
remote communities to natural hazards.  This thesis then aims to implement this approach in a 
collaboration between community members from the town of Franz Josef, New Zealand, infrastructure 
and emergency management stakeholders (including local government officials), and university 
researchers.  Many remote communities, including Franz Josef, are additionally vulnerable to natural 
hazards due to their dependence upon distributed infrastructure.  It has also been established that 
remote communities particularly require participatory governance to build disaster resilience because 
they are often relied upon to implement resilience measures.  However, to date, there is very little 
research that combines efforts to increase distributed infrastructure resilience and participatory efforts 
to increase the resilience of communities.  Therefore, the main aims of this thesis are to: 
1. Identify factors that affect the resilience of remote communities at risk of isolation from 
disasters triggered by natural hazards. 
Systematic review methodology and an impact assessment are used to achieve this aim.  
Systematic review methodology is used to bring together for the first time the research field 
concerned with the resilience of remote communities at risk of isolation following disasters 
triggered by natural hazards.  Analysis and synthesis of this research field are used to 
increase understanding of the current focus of relevant research to inform further research 
and support relevant planning initiatives.  An impact assessment of the 2016 Mw 7.8 
“Kaikōura” earthquake in New Zealand, which isolated several remote communities, was also 
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conducted.  Focussing on transport infrastructure, which was particularly disrupted in this 
event, the assessment highlighted lessons for distributed infrastructure resilience in relation to 
the resilience of remote communities.  This study is particularly useful for remote communities 
in New Zealand, and again can be relevant for planning initiatives. 
2. Develop a participatory approach to integrate disaster impact reduction planning across 
stakeholder domains, to increase the resilience of remote communities at risk of isolation 
from disasters triggered by natural hazards. 
Building on the findings of the literature review and “Kaikōura” earthquake assessment, this 
aim is achieved by developing an approach which combines efforts to increase distributed 
infrastructure resilience with participatory efforts to increase the resilience of communities.  A 
scenario-based participatory approach is developed, utilising a scenario as a boundary object, 
to enable relevant, credible and legitimate decision-making from all stakeholder groups by 
combining and sequencing various (existing) participation methodologies. 
3. Partner with a remote community to apply the participatory approach, and demonstrate its 
capacity to integrate autonomous initiatives driven by any of the participating stakeholder 
groups into the approach. 
The participatory approach was developed to increase the resilience of Franz Josef, New 
Zealand, and is applied in a “pre-disaster” collaboration between community members from 
the town, infrastructure and emergency management stakeholders, and university 
researchers.  An Alpine Fault earthquake scenario (the AF8+ scenario) is used as the 
boundary object.  Critically, it is demonstrated that the participatory approach allows 
stakeholders to understand other stakeholders’ contributions, enabling them to immediately 
utilise these contributions to assess existing and implement new resilience measures in the 
“real world”.  The approach is then integrated with an autonomous integrated infrastructure 
modelling framework, demonstrating the ability of participating stakeholder groups to 
iteratively build on improvements in shared understanding. 
1.7 Thesis structure and declarations 
The subsequent content of this thesis forms four core chapters written to be published as journal 
papers.  At the time of submitting this thesis, one manuscript has been published and one manuscript 
has been submitted to an academic journal for review. 
- Chapter 2 contains a version of a manuscript prepared for submission and addresses Aim 1 
of the thesis.  Systematic review methodology is used to increase understanding of, and 
critically appraise, the current extent, range and focus of research concerned with the 
resilience of remote communities at risk of isolation following disasters triggered by natural 
hazards.  This review brings together the research field for the first time to inform further 
research and support relevant planning initiatives.  This review identifies that, to date, there is 
very little research that combines efforts to increase distributed infrastructure resilience and 
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participatory efforts to increase the resilience of communities.  This research gap is the focus 
of the subsequent three thesis chapters. 
- Chapter 3 contains a version of a published manuscript and addresses Aim 1 of the thesis by 
investigating the impact of the 2016 Mw 7.8 “Kaikōura” earthquake in New Zealand.  The 
chapter focusses on impacts to transport infrastructure, which was particularly disrupted in 
this event, and the resilience of remote communities, several of which were isolated by 
impacts to distributed transport infrastructure.  The chapter evidences the advantage of the 
service-based (as opposed to asset-based) approach to infrastructure resilience adopted by 
New Zealand, but also evidences the vulnerability of remote communities in New Zealand to 
isolation from disasters triggered by natural hazards. 
- Chapter 4 contains a version of a manuscript prepared for submission describing the 
development and application of a participatory approach to combine efforts to increase the 
resilience of Franz Josef, New Zealand, and increase the resilience of distributed 
infrastructure.  Franz Josef is a remote community at risk of isolation from disasters triggered 
by natural hazards.  A scenario-based participatory approach is developed, utilising the 
“AF8+” Alpine Fault magnitude 8 earthquake scenario as a boundary object, enabled by 
combining and sequencing various (existing) participation methodologies.  The chapter 
successfully fulfils Aim 2, and also addresses Aim 3 of the thesis. 
- The final chapter of this thesis, Chapter 5, contains a version of a submitted manuscript which 
addresses Aim 3 of the thesis by demonstrating the ability of participating stakeholder groups 
to successfully integrate autonomous initiatives into the approach.  The modelling of 
infrastructure networks’ asset failure, interdependencies and recovery are ongoing foci of 
disaster management research worldwide, but these models are not well integrated and rarely 
incorporate community knowledge.  These research gaps are addressed by integrating an 
infrastructure modelling framework into the Franz Josef participatory approach detailed in 
Chapter 4. 
- The final chapter of this thesis, Chapter 6, summarises the key findings in relation to the 
original thesis aims.  Chapter 6 also outlines recommendations for future work, which are 
largely derived from the recent contributions to the discipline covered in this thesis. 
The content of all chapters in this thesis directly result from my own research and studies.  Co-authors 
made invaluable contributions and their associated inputs are declared in the signed co-authorship 
forms at the beginning of the thesis.  Others who assisted with the work are acknowledged in the 
acknowledgement sections of the individual chapters. 
The appendix contains one published conference paper, two co-authored manuscripts and 
appendices to the core thesis chapters. 
- Appendix A contains a lead-authored, published conference manuscript.  This conference 
manuscript investigated the multi-hazard exposure of distributed infrastructure in the West 
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Coast region.  While successfully providing a first multi-hazard exposure assessment for 
State Highway 6, the paper details the difficulty of including a vulnerability assessment 
following the decoupling of hazard exposure and hazard magnitude.  This investigation 
directed the PhD project towards the aims outlined above. 
- Appendix B contains a published manuscript, co-authored with Professor Tim Davies.  This 
manuscript discusses the need to increase communities’ disaster resilience through 
community adaptation, based on carefully selected impact scenarios derived by community-
expert-official collaborations. 
- Appendix C is an appendix to Chapter 3; a timeline of key transport events during the first 100 
days following the “Kaikōura” earthquake. 
- Appendix D is an appendix to Chapter 4; a detailed timeline of participatory governance in 
Franz Josef between 2016 and 2018. 
- Appendix E is an appendix to Chapter 4; a detailed diagram of risk governance actor 
arrangements in Franz Josef between 2016 and 2018. 
- Appendix F is an appendix to Chapter 4; the AF8+ advisory impact scenario maps.  This 
series of maps was developed and used in the participatory workshops. 
- Appendix G (G1 – G5) is a second appendix to Chapter 4; workshop notes.  The notes detail 
the conversations and activities within the participatory workshops. 
I am the lead-author of Appendix A, C, D, E, F and G.  I am the co-author of Appendix B.  My 
contributions to the content of the manuscripts (Appendix A and Appendix B) are outlined in the co-
authorship forms. 
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2. The influence of participatory governance and distributed infrastructure dependence 
on the disaster resilience of remote communities: a systematic review 
Note: Some of the material at the beginning of this chapter is repeated from Chapter 1 because this 
chapter forms the basis of a standalone paper. 
2.1 Abstract 
Remote communities are distant from urban centres (often by definition), and so can be required to be 
largely self-reliant for some time following disasters.  This paper systematically reviews and 
characterises scientific literature (n = 19 studies) concerned with the disaster resilience of remote 
communities.  The aim was to increase understanding of the current extent, range and focus of this 
field, in order to inform further research and support relevant planning initiatives.  The reviewed 
literature was sparse, recent, and dispersed across disciplines and countries, yet all the studies were 
concerned with disaster management decision-making, and nearly all (17/19) found that participatory, 
inclusive governance approaches were key to building resilience.  Rates of participation, trust and 
satisfaction were increased when participation methods: were tailored for specific communities; used 
a range of participatory methods; and sequenced the involvement of technical and administrative 
experts in the participatory process.  More than a third of publications (7/19) researched community-
led participation in remote indigenous communities. The other dominant theme concerned the 
growing dependency of remote communities on distributed infrastructure networks.  The reach of 
infrastructure networks well beyond the relevant community’s immediate vicinity and sphere of 
influence has greatly increased connectivity and productivity in remote communities, but thereby has 
also increased infrastructure exposure to disaster damage, and consequent abrupt isolation as 
remote communities lose essential services.  Although all studies were concerned with disaster 
management decision-making, and most focussed on participatory approaches, only one study 
documented a process that brought technical experts and government administrators together with 
communities to make decisions together.  No studies concerned participatory governance 
arrangements that included a focus on increasing the resilience of essential services. 
2.2 Introduction 
It has been well established that disruption of essential services due to infrastructure damage can 
exacerbate social and economic disaster impacts.  It is also widely recognised that since disasters 
first and foremost affect the people local to the disaster event, community members need to be 
involved in disaster resilience decision-making that is likely to affect them (Gaillard & Mercer, 2013).  
Both findings are particularly relevant for remote communities, where (small) size and (large) distance 
from urban centres can require self-reliance in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, sometimes for 
considerable periods of time.  Resilience to loss of essential services due to infrastructure damage 
can also be much lower, due to the growing geographical extent of distributed infrastructure networks 
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that provide essential services.  To improve understanding of the existing state of knowledge in this 
area, this article uses systematic review methodology to identify and assess current research 
concerned with the disaster resilience of such remote communities. 
2.2.1 Remote communities and disaster resilience 
Although specific definitions vary, most countries use (small) size and (large) distance from essential 
services (e.g. hospitals) and urban centres (geographic remoteness) when categorising the 
“remoteness” of regions and communities (e.g. Fiji Bureau of Statistics, n.d.; SARRAH, n.d.; Statistics 
Canada, n.d.; Stats NZ, n.d.).  The term “community” is often used to denote a group of people living 
or working in a geographic location, and particularly those who are involved to at least some extent in 
government or other administrative decision-making affecting the relevant location, as exemplified by 
all the articles identified in this review.  This use of the term “community” has been critiqued on the 
grounds that it implies a homogeneity that does not exist in practice, meaning that so-called 
“community based” initiatives that assume this homogeneity risk overlooking existing conflicts and 
entrenching existing, inequitable power relations (e.g. Cannon, 2014).  Acknowledging the validity of 
this critique, and the essentially heterogenous reality of any population, the term “community” is used 
in this article to refer to the varied group of people who are (or are likely to be) exposed to the same 
disaster impacts through social, spatial and/or immediate economic links (Appendix B). 
It is now widely recognised that remote communities need to become more actively involved in 
disaster impact reduction decisions if future disaster impacts are to be reduced.  For example, this 
need is spelled out in the following 2015-2030 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction all-of-
society guiding principle: ‘Disaster risk reduction requires an all-of-society engagement and 
partnership.  It also requires empowerment and inclusive, accessible and non discriminatory 
participation, paying special attention to people disproportionately affected by disasters, especially the 
poorest.  A gender, age, disability and cultural perspective should be integrated in all policies and 
practices, and women and youth leadership should be promoted. In this context, special attention 
should be paid to the improvement of organized voluntary work of citizens’ (UNISDR, 2015, 19d, p. 
13). 
This emphasis on the use of inclusion, participation and empowerment to address social inequities is 
consistent with the usages of the term “resilience” in academic planning and social science contexts 
recently identified by White and O'Hare (2014).  They found that this “evolutionary” use of the term 
“resilience” denoted adaption and transformation to address the social factors that increase the 
inequities of communities and in response to diverse and rapidly changing social, political and natural 
environments (White & O'Hare, 2014).  However, White and O'Hare (2014) have found that, in 
practice, this transformative potential is largely neutralised by the tendency in engineering, policy and 
other institutional spheres to use what they label “equilibrist” definitions of “resilience”. Where 
“evolutionary resilience” emphasises social change and adaptation, “equilibrist resilience” is focussed 
on preserving and restoring the built environment as part of a “return to normal”, in which top down, 
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techno-rational approaches are used to deliver universally applicable solutions (White & O'Hare, 
2014).  This “equilibrist” emphasis is evident in the Sendai Framework global target concerned with 
infrastructure resilience, which aims to ‘[s]ubstantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure 
and disruption of basic services’ (UNISDR, 2015, 18d, p. 12), and the associated priority for action, 
‘Build Back Better’, which includes promoting ‘the resilience of new and existing critical 
infrastructure… to ensure that they remain safe, effective and operational during and after disasters in 
order to provide life-saving and essential services’ (UNISDR, 2015, 33c, p. 21). 
The tendency to use the term resilience in one of two opposed senses, identified by White and O'Hare 
(2014), in effect has meant that conversations about disaster resilience either concern the restoration 
of the built environment, or focus almost exclusively on the use of inclusive, participatory approaches 
to increase social resilience.  The benefits of inclusive, participatory approaches have been well 
established, and include more empowerment of community members, more benefits to community 
members, reduced conflict and increased trust in government decision-making, greater perceptions 
that decisions are fair, better quality decisions, and better identification of disaster risk (Section 2.2.3) 
(see Reed, 2008, for a summary).  It has also been well established that most communities are 
becoming increasingly reliant on essential services such as transport, electricity supply, and 
telecommunications (including calls, texts and data) to function effectively (Gardner, 2015).  Damage 
to the infrastructure networks that provide these essential services, including that caused by natural 
hazards (e.g. landslides, flooding, earthquakes), can result in the partial and sometimes complete loss 
of a given community’s essential services for considerable periods of time, at significant social as well 
as economic cost. 
Although the Sendai Framework addresses societal and infrastructure resilience in completely 
separate sections (UNISDR, 2015), this divide is not apparent in the most recent UNISDR (2017) 
definition of the term “resilience”: ‘the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to 
resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely 
and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic 
structures and functions’.  This definition of resilience attempts to combine both evolutionary and 
equilibrist emphases, and so is adopted in this article (noting that we interpret this definition as not 
requiring the same structures and functions, as these may be the cause of decreased disaster 
resilience; Appendix B). 
Therefore, it is well established that both socio-cultural transformation and the provision of essential 
services are necessary to build the resilience of remote communities.  However, to date, the divide 
identified by White and O'Hare (2014) has resulted in largely parallel bodies of literature focussed 
either on the relationship between infrastructure and community resilience, or on the use of 
participatory governance to build resilience at the community level, with very little research combining 
these findings into more holistic approaches to build community resilience.  More integrated 
approaches to building resilience are required in practice, in which inclusive, participatory approaches 
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are used at the community level to increase the resilience of communities to loss of essential services 
due to disaster damage to infrastructure, as part of wider initiatives to effect social transformation. 
2.2.2 Distributed infrastructure resilience 
The rapidly expanding coverage of distributed infrastructure networks (particularly transportation and 
telecommunication networks) has provided many remote locations with new development 
opportunities, such as agriculture and tourism ventures (Gardner, 2015).  At the same time, the 
management and provision of the essential services that remote communities rely on to connect 
regionally, nationally, and internationally, have become increasingly centralised (Gardner, 2015).  
Increasing centralisation has combined with new development opportunities to increase the 
dependence of many remote communities on distributed infrastructure networks to provide essential 
services.  This makes distributed infrastructure resilience to the impacts of natural hazards an 
important component in the resilience of many remote communities, since an event can cause 
damage to distributed infrastructure that disrupts a dependent community not otherwise impacted by 
the event. 
Engineers have long worked to decrease the physical vulnerability of distributed infrastructure assets.  
Distributed infrastructure networks, however, are subject to both damage and disruption impacts.  
Where there is low or no distributed infrastructure redundancy, damage to only one part of a 
distributed infrastructure network can result in substantial reductions to the service level being 
provided, or make it impossible for undamaged parts of the network to function.  For example, a 
landslide blocking a road can result in large detours or isolation of the remainder of the road network.  
Moreover, distributed infrastructure networks are often highly interdependent meaning that impact to 
one service is likely to have cascading negative consequences for other distributed infrastructure, 
reducing the service level provided by other networks, and increasing the time required to repair the 
networks.  This has led to increased emphasis on network modelling to demonstrate distributed 
infrastructure interdependencies and vulnerabilities (Buldyrev et al., 2010). 
As a result of these findings, societal as well as technical implications of infrastructure outages are 
becoming a key focus in many contemporary studies (Chang, 2014), as well as the 2015-2030 Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 2015) (Section 1).  Bruneau et al. (2003, p. 736) 
categorise infrastructure resilience into three interrelated dimensions: 
- ‘Reduced failure probabilities 
- ‘Reduced consequences from failures, in terms of lives lost, damage, and negative economic 
and social consequences 
- ‘Reduced time to recovery (restoration of a specific system or set of systems to their “normal” 
level of performance)’. 
For example, although maintaining distributed infrastructure networks remains crucial in New 
Zealand, earlier emphases on “asset-driven” resilience has shifted towards ensuring the provision of 
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essential services, such as prioritising the delivery of power to households and businesses over 
ensuring the powerline is not damaged (National Infrastructure Unit, 2015).  Notably, there has been 
considerable success from collaboration between infrastructure operators, both in response and pre-
disaster mitigation.  Again using a New Zealand example, where collaboration between infrastructure 
operators and emergency managers is now a legislative requirement (MCDEM, 2002), an 
interdisciplinary collaboration in the late 1990s with government and private infrastructure providers 
resulted in mitigation before the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence estimated to have saved NZ$60-
65 million in direct asset replacement costs alone, and ‘the damage would have been greater and the 
response slower if the steps recommended in… preparatory work… had not been taken’ (Fenwick, 
2012, p. ii; Giovinazzi et al., 2011).  As this would suggest, the recent shift in focus onto the societal 
implications of service outages has necessarily led to more interdisciplinary research (Chang, 2014; 
Grabowski et al., 2017; Hansman et al., 2006; McDaniels et al., 2015; Pescaroli & Alexander, 2016), a 
trend expected to increase into the future as studies build on research and collaborations concerning: 
multi-hazard implications for service delivery (Centre for Advanced Engineering, 1997; Giovinazzi et 
al., 2011; IEM, 2013; Zorn & Shamseldin, 2015); the economic implications of service outages 
(Cavallo & Noy, 2009; Chang et al., 2007; Deligne et al., 2015; Fenwick, 2012; Robinson et al., 2015); 
and the effects of service outages on community response to disasters (Chapter 4; Chapter 5; 
Bressler et al., 2012; Cauffman, 2015; Jones & Benthien, 2011; Orchiston et al., 2018).  Despite this 
trend, to date, there is very little research that combines efforts to increase infrastructure resilience 
with participatory efforts to increase the resilience of communities. 
2.2.3 Participatory governance 
Direct community involvement in decision-making, focussed on increasing the community’s collective 
resilience to disaster impacts, is an effective way to build resilience at local, community levels 
(Maskrey, 2011; Pearce, 2003; Reed, 2008).  Increasingly these approaches are grouped together 
under the term “participatory governance”, which has been defined as the direct involvement of 
community stakeholders in administrative decision-making and management processes (Aoki, 2018; 
Reed, 2008; Yang & Pandey, 2011), where a “stakeholder” is a person or organisation affected by the 
decision-making process and outcome. 
Participation has been defined by Reed (2008, p. 2418) as: ‘a process where individuals, groups and 
organisations choose to take an active role in making decisions that affect them.’  Participation 
literature dates back decades; Cornwall (2011) notes at least 50 years of research into participation, 
while Rowe and Frewer (2005) note sporadic research interest in participation for centuries or longer.  
Reed (2008) summarises six broad phases of stakeholder participation over the last 60 years: 
1) pragmatic, anti-modernisation awareness-raising that the application of scientific rationality 
cannot solve all societal problems (late 1960s) (see Van Tatenhove & Leroy, 2003, for a 
review); 
2) incorporating community members’ perspectives in data collection and gathering (1970s); 
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3) development of techniques that recognised community members’ local knowledge (1980s); 
4) participation as a norm in the sustainable development agenda (1990s); 
5) critique of participation and disillusionment over its limitations and failings (early 2000s); and 
6) consensus over best-practice (late 2000s into 2010s). 
These developments have emerged in parallel in a range of disciplinary contexts and topic areas, 
including social activism, adult education, applied anthropology, complex systems science, natural 
resource management, and ecology (Reed, 2008). 
Reed (2008) has established that arguments for the inclusion of participatory processes in decision-
making can generally be classified into normative or pragmatic categories (see Reed, 2008, for a 
detailed summary).  Normative reasoning is based on the understanding that people have a right to 
participate in decision-making which affects them.  Pragmatic reasoning focusses on the capacity of 
participatory processes to deliver higher-quality outputs.  Again, the benefits of participation have 
been well established, and include: 
- increased likelihood that government decisions are perceived as fair (Richards et al., 2004); 
- increased trust in government (decisions) (Bohensky et al., 2011a; Bohensky et al., 2011b; 
Peterson et al., 2003; Ravera et al., 2011; Richards et al., 2004; Tress & Tress, 2003); 
- collaborative relationships, even following previous conflict (Kahane, 2012; Oteros-Rozas et 
al., 2013; Plieninger et al., 2013; Ravera et al., 2011; Stringer et al., 2006); 
- increased social learning (Blackstock et al., 2007; Volkery & Ribeiro, 2009); 
- participant education (Aoki, 2018; Hicks et al., 2014; Murphy et al., 2014; Orchiston et al., 
2013); 
- knowledge integration and co-generation (Bohnet, 2010; Kok et al., 2007; Tress & Tress, 
2003; von Wirth et al., 2014; Walz et al., 2007); 
- increased capacity to utilise (integrated and co-generated) knowledges, leading to 
empowerment (Greenwood et al., 1993; Kok et al., 2007; Macnaghten & Jacobs, 1997; Reed 
et al., 2013; Wallerstein, 1999; Walz et al., 2007); 
- participants gaining a sense of ownership over the process and outcomes (Richards et al., 
2004); 
- more robust research (Reed et al., 2008; Reed et al., 2006); 
- identification of new risks (including “root causes”), vulnerabilities, and “solutions” (Butler et 
al., 2016; de Andrade & Szlafsztein, 2015; Ellemor, 2005; Kok et al., 2007; Manuel-Navarrete 
et al., 2011; Murphy et al., 2014); 
- increased likelihood community members benefit from “solutions” (Butler et al., 2016; Dougill 
et al., 2006; Millennium Assessment Board, 2005; Palomo et al., 2011; Walz et al., 2007); 
- higher-quality decisions (Beierle, 2002; Fischer, 2000; Fritsch & Newig, 2012; Hill et al., 2010; 
Koontz, 2005; Newig, 2007; Palomo et al., 2011; Ravera et al., 2011; Tress & Tress, 2003); 
- reduced implementation costs (Reed, 2008). 
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However, disadvantages of participatory processes have also been documented.  When 
unsuccessful, participation processes can lead to unexpected negative interactions with existing 
power structures (Kothari, 2001), reinforce existing privileges (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Nelson & 
Wright, 1995), and cause participation fatigue (Burton et al., 2004; Cooke, 2004; Cosgrove & 
Rijsberman, 2000; Duane, 1999; Reed, 2008; Reed et al., 2013; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000).  These 
pitfalls are especially likely to manifest where some stakeholders do not have the capacity or power to 
respond (Arnstein, 1969; Reed et al., 2013).  For example, Broad et al. (2007) observed a process 
where participants chose between a narrow range of scenarios already developed by a risk-averse 
government agency, and the agency retained the right to overturn any decision made by the 
participants (Reed et al., 2013).  Further, while expert input is often an important part of the 
participatory process, expert authority carries the risk of biasing outcomes unless it is carefully 
balanced (Reed et al., 2013).  Participatory processes also require considerable time investment, 
which can limit the use of participation, and also means that there may not be time to address all of 
the project aims (Reed et al., 2013). 
Community participation that does not involve government decision-making and government 
decisions made without participation of non-state actors have both been found to be ineffective at 
successfully effecting change (Ackerman, 2004).  The clear benefits that participation brings to 
decision-making have contributed to a convergence between the participatory and governance fields 
beginning in the 1990s in response to ‘evident democratic deficits’ in high income countries (Cornwall, 
2011, p. xvii).  This convergence intensified in the wake of the landmark World Bank (1998) World 
Development Report 1998/1999 (Cornwall, 2011). 
While the importance of participation has moved up the political agenda, featuring for example in the 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 2015), in practice the development of 
effective participatory governance has lagged far behind (Ackerman, 2004; Díez et al., 2015; Howard, 
2018).  Rowe and Frewer (2005) have suggested that a contributing factor here may be the 
abundance of participation methodologies available.  Identifying and synthesising over 100 
methodologies to produce a typology of participation, they note that ‘there are undoubtedly more’ 
(Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 256).  Where Rowe and Frewer (2005, p. 252) suggest that this abundance 
has contributed to uncertainty concerning best practice, Fung (2006, p. 66) argues that the contexts in 
which participation methodologies are applied are so specific that there can be no ‘canonical form’, 
and that participation methodologies should be ‘legion’.  Both agree on the need for clarification 
concerning key methodological elements, including types of communication, recruitment and 
participants, to ensure advances in methodologies are better documented and used (Fung, 2006; 
Rowe & Frewer, 2005). 
Participation methodology typologies have been used since Arnstein (1969, p. 217) introduced her 
early and influential example, categorising types of participation methodology as a ‘ladder of citizen 
participation’ ranging from ‘nonparticipation’ through ‘degrees of tokenism’ to ‘degrees of citizen 
power’.  Subsequent typologies have become increasingly focussed on governance, with the Aoki 
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(2018, p. 231) adaptation of the Fung (2006) typology the most recent and comprehensive example 
(Figure 3).  This typology has been used to inform and guide critical analysis in this review.  Making it 
possible to break each methodology out into a series of subordinate typologies (including participant 
type and role, modes of recruitment and communication), this typology enables analysis of the wide 
range of different participatory methods required by the correspondingly diverse range of contexts 
within which they are applied (Aoki, 2018; Fung, 2006). 
 
Figure 3.  Typologies for understanding participation within the participatory governance sphere by 
Fung (2006) and Aoki (2018), including highlighted differences between the two typologies. 
Finding that the ‘scope of participation’ aspect of the Fung (2006) typology conflates ‘types of 
participants’ and ‘modes of recruitment’, Aoki (2018, p. 230) distinguishes these, introducing modes of 
recruitment as a fourth key component of participatory governance.  The ‘types of participants’ 
domain refers to ‘civicness, defined as the extent to which participants are close to the public sphere, 
as opposed to being close to authorities’ (Aoki, 2018, p. 230).  The ‘modes of recruitment’ domain 
refers to how voluntary or coerced the participation is (these are defined in detail by Aoki, 2018, p. 
230).  ‘Modes of communication’ provides a spectrum of communication defined in relation to the 
need for input from participants, while ‘roles of participants’ refers to the amount of influence the 
participants have on the participatory process and outcomes (Aoki, 2018, p. 230). 
Frameworks for unders tanding part ic ipat ion
Fung (2006) Aok i (2018)
Participant selection methods Types of participants
More exclusive Expert administrators More exclusive Expert administrators
Elected representatives Elected representatives
Professional stakeholders Professional stakeholders, hired by government
Lay stakeholders Organised interest groups (e.g. business associations)
Random selection Lay stakeholders
Open, targetted recruiting Concerned general public
Open, self-selection More inclusive Diffuse public sphere
More inclusive Diffuse public sphere
Modes of recruitment





Least voluntary Self-initiative by the participants themselves
Modes of communication and decision Modes of communication
Least intense Listen as spectator Least intense Listen as spectator
Express preferences Express preferences
Develop preferences Develop preferences
Aggregate and bargain Aggregate preferences and propose
Deliberate and negotiate Deliberate and negotiate
Most intense Deploy technique and expertise Most intense Deploy technique and expertise
Extent of authority and power Roles of participants
Least authority Personal benefits Lowest influence Passive audience
Communicative influence Active audience
Advise and consult Advocates
Co-governance Advisors and consultants
Most authority Direct authority Joint decision makers (co-governance)
Highest influence Sole decision makers
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Note that the application of this typology in a remote Japanese community meant that the Aoki (2018) 
paper was identified through this systematic review methodology as a part of the literature on the 
resilience of remote communities to natural hazards. 
2.2.4 Systematic review 
Systematic review methodology was used to identify and provide a critical appraisal of current 
research concerned with the resilience of remote communities at risk of isolation following disasters.  
Ford et al. (2011, p. 328) define a systematic review as ‘a summary and assessment of the state of 
knowledge on a given topic or research question, structured to rigorously summarize existing 
understanding’.  Systematic reviews use a strict, reproducible methodology.  Because they are useful 
for synthesising emerging, dispersed, and highly interdisciplinary research fields (Haddaway & Pullin, 
2014), systematic reviews have been integral to the medical field for many years.  More recently, the 
advantages of this methodology have been recognised and utilised in other research fields, although 
few systematic reviews have addressed the hazards field (Jurgilevich et al., 2017; Spector et al., 
2018).  In a relevant and recent exception, Spector et al. (2018) reviewed literature concerned with 
rural resilience in New Zealand. 
The application of this strict methodology distinguishes systematic reviews from other meta-analytic 
reviews, which also bring together and synthesise evidence from bodies of relevant literature to 
provide meta-analyses of broader research fields (Ford et al., 2011; Haddaway & Pullin, 2014).  
Keyword searching of electronic databases is used in all these methodologies, and also constitutes a 
recognised limitation.  Even in medical fields, where the use of key terms is highly consistent, it is not 
possible to use keyword searches that will capture all relevant articles in a systematic review 
(Jurgilevich et al., 2017).  This limitation can be greater in social science and interdisciplinary 
contexts, where there is far less agreement on the definitions of key terms, and a much wider range of 
terms can be used to describe similar phenomena.  To mitigate this potential limitation, this study 
used several terms that denote similar concepts.  The number of synthesis studies captured also 
helped to mitigate this limitation.  These include an early synthesis of the field by Ellemor (2005) and 
the more developed evidence bases concerning factors affecting the resilience of remote 
communities to natural hazards provided by Beeton and Lynch (2012) and Gardner (2015), as well as 
a recent synthesis of participation methodologies by Aoki (2018).  These synthesis studies help to 
reduce the potential shortcoming of keyword searching, and were particularly useful for, and 
influential within, the thematic analysis. 
2.3 Method 
To identify relevant peer-reviewed publications in the first step of this review, key terms were used to 
search online publication databases Scopus (www.scopus.com; provided by Elsevier) and Web of 
Science (www.webofknowledge.com; provided by Thomson Scientific), in March 2018.  Scopus, Web 
of Science and Google Scholar (scholar.google.com; provided by Google) are the three most popular 
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multidisciplinary databases (Waltman, 2016).  Google Scholar was not used because it does not have 
a defined coverage policy, includes non-peer-reviewed literature, and does not offer comprehensive 
advanced search capabilities, results refinement, or allow for large downloads of citation data, which 
are crucial for systematic reviews of any type (Halevi et al., 2017).  Scopus and Web of Science have 
complementary biases, so using these databases in combination can provide more comprehensive 
results than searching either in isolation (Meho & Yang, 2007; Waltman, 2016).  It is worth noting, 
however, that Google Scholar has been found to have better coverage of multidisciplinary subject 
areas and social sciences than Scopus or Web of Science (Halevi et al., 2017). 
The review was focussed on literature concerned with disaster resilience in remote communities.  
Because several terms are used to denote similar concepts, the first searches were conducted using 
various combinations of the following terms: ‘Communit*,’ ‘Remote’, ‘Isolat*’, ‘Disaster’, ‘Resilien*’ and 
‘Emergency’ (Table 1).  These searches yielded 78% of the total publications captured in Scopus and 
Web of Science searches (Table 1).  To reduce the risk of excluding studies focussed on specific 
hazards, searches were conducted with seven additional specific hazard terms (e.g. ‘Earthquake’ and 
‘Flood*’) replacing ‘Disaster’ and ‘Emergency’ in the search strings.  These searches yielded 6% of 
the total (Table 1).  After an early review of abstracts indicated a heavy emphasis on disaster 
management decision-making, a final search was conducted with search strings including the term 
‘Governance’, which yielded a further 9% of total publications.  In all, a variety of combinations of 13 
terms were used in to create 15 search strings (Table 1).  The use of multiple search strings was 
designed to decrease the potentially limiting effect of each specific search string.  Terms and search 
strings were reviewed by a second researcher. 
A combined total of 1,718 publications resulted from Web of Science and Scopus searches.  Of these, 
681 were duplicates, leaving 1,037 studies (Figure 4).  Studies were then excluded from the review if 
they were not: i) concerned with the resilience of human communities to disasters caused by natural 
hazards; and/or ii) focussed on remote communities at risk of isolation due to disaster impacts (Figure 
4).  Examples of articles excluded include: medical, psychological and ecological studies of individual 
and ecosystem resilience; studies discussing national or international-level policies only, with little to 
no discussion of the way that these policies might apply at specific local levels; and structural 
engineering studies.  To increase accuracy, a second researcher peer-reviewed both the list of 
studies included in the final review and the list of studies that had been removed following abstract 
screening.  Overall, only 19 studies were found to be concerned with resilience to natural hazards and 
focussed on remote communities at risk of isolation due to disaster impacts (Figure 4). 
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Table 1.  The number of articles returned from each database, by search string. 
Search terms 
Number of studies returned 
Scopus Web of Science 
Communit* AND Remote AND Disaster* 447 216 
Communit* AND Isolat* AND Disaster* 304 142 
Resilien* AND Isolat* AND Disaster* 98 74 
Resilien* AND Isolat* AND Emergency 43 23 
Governance AND Remote AND Disaster* 39 20 
Governance AND Remote AND Resilien* 36 34 
Governance AND Isolat* AND Resilien* 34 41 
Governance AND Isolat* AND Disaster* 28 20 
Resilien* AND Communit* AND Isolat* AND Flood* 27 23 
Resilien* AND Communit* AND Isolat* AND Earthquake* 17 17 
Governance AND Isolat* AND Emergency 12 7 
Resilien* AND Communit* AND Isolat* AND Volcan* 6 5 
Resilien* AND Communit* AND Isolat* AND Avalanch* 1 2 
Resilien* AND Communit* AND Isolat* AND Landslid* 1 1 
Resilien* AND Communit* AND Isolat* AND Rockfall* 0 0 
Total: 1,093 625 
   






Figure 4.  Visualisation of the systematic review process. 
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2.3.1 Data analysis 
A general inductive approach was used to analyse the 19 relevant studies, following Thomas (2006).  
Each study was read in full, and relevant quotes were compiled in a table.  The quotes were coded to 
relevant summary words or phrases and grouped into themes and categories in an iterative process.  
The themes and categories allowed easy sorting of the quotes for analysis, which in turn highlighted 
trends in the studies. 
Since most studies were focussed on participatory governance, the Aoki (2018) participation typology 
was used to guide the critical analysis (Section 2.2.3).  However, it is important to note that while all 
identified studies were analysed according to this typology, not all studies were concerned with 
participatory governance as defined by Aoki (2018).  For this review, we define “participatory 
governance” as involving the direct involvement of community stakeholders in administrative decision-
making and management processes, where a “stakeholder” is a person or organisation affected by 
the decision-making process and outcome (Section 2.2.3).  Aoki (2018, p. 226, emphasis added) 
defined participatory governance as requiring the ‘direct involvement of citizens’. 
Study meta-data, including year of publication, number of citations, publication title, lead-author 
institution, and location of lead-author were also considered.  In-text data were also identified 
according to primary author and study locations, sectors involved in research or publication, and 
primary hazard(s) studied.  Additionally, VOSviewer (www.vosviewer.com) software was used to 
visualise the reviewed field.  VOSviewer uses multidimensional scaling to construct and visualise 
bibliometric networks, so that the distance between items indicates the strength of relations between 
them (Van Eck & Waltman, 2007).  Developed by Van Eck and Waltman (2007), and termed the 
Visualisation Of Similarities (VOS) method, VOSviewer normalises data from a co-occurrence matrix 
using a similarity measure known as association strength (for details of this measure see van Eck and 
Waltman, 2010).  VOSviewer’s bibliographic Coupling Analysis was used to identify and visualise 
references shared between publications, while Citation Analysis was used to identify and visualise the 
number of times reviewed articles cited one another. 
2.4 Research field characteristics  
The systematic review yielded 19 studies concerned with the disaster resilience of remote 
communities.  The studies, including citation counts, are listed in Table 2.  All were published in or 
after 2006, and the majority after 2014 (Figure 5), reflecting the emerging nature of the field (Section 
2.4.1).  This is supported by citation analysis, which shows that although 15 of the articles share at 
least one reference, only one (of 19) cites another article also included within this review.  Although 
often building upon the same body of literature, these studies remain discrete.  The 19 reviewed 
studies were published within 17 different journals and one book (Table 2), and lead-authored from 18 
different institutions (Table 3).  This low connectivity is consistent with a converging interest in this 
topic area from a range of disciplines and research fields (Section 2.4.1). 
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Although the reviewed sample was too small to yield statistically significant findings, it is notable that 
only Australia, Canada, and New Zealand feature more than once as study area locations, with each 
featuring three or four times (Figure 6).  Further, all three studies focussed on Canadian communities 
(Amaratunga, 2014; Cox & Hamlen, 2015; Murphy et al., 2014) and two of the three studies focussed 
on Australian communities (Beeton & Lynch, 2012; Ellemor, 2005) involve or discuss indigenous 
communities, as do a study in Fiji (Remling & Veitayaki, 2016) and a study in the Soloman Islands 
(Otoara Ha’apio et al., 2018). 
All of the studies identified through the systematic methodology were not only concerned with the 
resilience of remote communities to natural hazards, but were also concerned with disaster 
management decision-making, and all but Orchiston et al. (2013) and Chapter 3 were concerned with 
participatory governance.  This was unexpected, because the majority of studies (17/19) were 
identified using key terms that did not refer to participation or governance, and this topic was not part 
of the inclusion criteria.  The consistency of this focus across diverse geographic study locations, 
sectors, hazards, disciplines, institutions, and countries, indicates a strong convergence towards 
participatory governance. 
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Table 2.  The 19 relevant studies, including Scopus citation counts (retrieved in July 2018), and a summary of the studies/rationale for their inclusion. 
Study Study title Publication title Citations Study summary 
Amaratunga 
(2014) 
Building community disaster resilience 
through a virtual community of practice 
(VCOP) 
International Journal of 
Disaster Resilience in 
the Built Environment 
3 Pre-disaster facilitation to increase the resilience of 
remote communities in Canada by encouraging 
cross-community communication. 
Aoki (2018) Sequencing and combining participation 
in urban planning: The case of tsunami-
ravaged Onagawa Town, Japan 
Cities 1 Post-disaster observation of community and 
stakeholder collaboration during recovery from a 
Tsunami in a remote Japanese community. 
Beeton and Lynch 
(2012) 
Most of nature: A framework to resolve 
the twin dilemmas of the decline of 
nature and rural communities 
Environmental Science 
& Policy 
17 Pre-disaster advocation of framework to improve 
conservation and remote community policies to 
ensure sustainability of both communities and 
nature in Australia. 
Blakely and 
Fisher (2017) 
Assessing non-metro recovery across 
two continents: issues and limitations 
Disasters 0 Post-disaster observation case studies of natural 
hazards affecting remote communities in Australia 
and the United States, and the response and 
recovery strategies used. 
Cox and Hamlen 
(2015) 
Community Disaster Resilience and the 
Rural Resilience Index 
American Behavioral 
Scientist 
12 Pre-disaster facilitation to increase the resilience of 
remote communities in Canada by encouraging 
cross-community communication. 
Davies et al. 
(2017) 
[Chapter 3] 
Transport infrastructure performance 
and management in the South Island of 
New Zealand, during the first 100 days 
following the 2016 Mw 7.8 "Kaikōura" 
earthquake 
Bulletin of the New 
Zealand Society for 
Earthquake Engineering 
7 Post-disaster observation case study of 
infrastructure recovery from an earthquake event 
in New Zealand, including implications for remote 
communities. 
Chapter 2.  The disaster resilience of remote communities: a systematic literature review. 
35 
 
de Andrade and 
Szlafsztein (2015) 
Community participation in flood 
mapping in the Amazon through 
interdisciplinary methods 
Natural Hazards 4 Pre-disaster facilitation to include community 
members in risk reduction planning through 
participation in flood mapping in Brazil. 
Ellemor (2005) Reconsidering emergency management 
and indigenous communities in Australia 
Global Environmental 
Change Part B: 
Environmental Hazards 
26 Pre-disaster advocation that working with 
indigenous communities to reduce disaster risk will 
improve emergency management in Australia. 
Espiner and 
Becken (2014) 
Tourist towns on the edge: 
Conceptualising vulnerability and 
resilience in a protected area tourism 
system 
Journal of Sustainable 
Tourism 
25 Pre-disaster observation of the vulnerability and 
resilience of remote communities in New Zealand. 
Gardner (2015) Risk complexity and governance in 
mountain environments 
Risk Governance: The 
Articulation of Hazard, 
Politics and Ecology 
2 Overview of risk complexity and governance of 
remote communities in mountain environments, 
through pre-disaster observation. 
Gupta and 
Sharma (2006) 
Compounded loss: The post tsunami 
recovery experience of Indian island 
communities 
Disaster Prevention and 
Management 
18 Observation of the post-disaster tsunami recovery 
of Indian island communities. 
Hicks et al. (2014) An interdisciplinary approach to volcanic 
risk reduction under conditions of 
uncertainty: A case study of Tristan da 
Cunha 
Natural Hazards and 
Earth System Sciences 
6 Pre-disaster facilitation to increase the resilience of 
Tristan da Cunha island community to volcanic 
hazards. 
Manuel-Navarrete 
et al. (2011) 
Critical adaptation to hurricanes in the 
Mexican Caribbean: Development 




49 Post-disaster observation of development visions, 
governance structures and coping strategies for 
remote communities vulnerable to hurricanes in 
the Mexican Caribbean. 
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Marin et al. 
(2015) 
Social capital in post-disaster recovery 
trajectories: Insights from a longitudinal 
study of tsunami-impacted small-scale 
fisher organizations in Chile 
Global Environmental 
Change 
6 Post-disaster observation of the importance of 
social capital for the recovery of remote 
communities following a tsunami in Chile. 
Murphy et al. 
(2014) 
Planning for disaster resilience in rural, 
remote, and coastal communities: 
Moving from thought to action 
Journal of Emergency 
Management 
3 Pre-disaster facilitation to increase the resilience of 
remote communities in Canada by encouraging 
cross-community communication. 
Orchiston (2013) Tourism business preparedness, 
resilience and disaster planning in a 
region of high seismic risk: The case of 
the Southern Alps, New Zealand 
Current Issues in 
Tourism 
16 Pre-disaster observation of tourism business 
disaster planning for remote communities in New 
Zealand. 
Orchiston et al. 
(2013) 
The 2009 New Zealand West Coast 
shakeout: Improving earthquake 
preparedness in a region of high seismic 
risk 
Australasian Journal of 
Disaster and Trauma 
Studies 
1 Pre-disaster facilitation of an earthquake disaster 
scenario exercise for remote communities in New 
Zealand. 
Otoara Ha’apio et 
al. (2018) 
Transformation of rural communities: 
lessons from a local self-initiative for 
building resilience in the Solomon 
Islands 
Local Environment: The 
International Journal of 
Justice and 
Sustainability 
0 Post-disaster observation of a community-led 
initiative for the relocation of a rural community in 
the Solomon Islands 
Remling and 
Veitayaki (2016) 
Community-based action in Fiji’s Gau 
Island: A model for the Pacific? 




4 Observation of pre-disaster community-based 
action, aiming to increase resilience to climate 
change for a remote island in Fiji. 
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2.4.1 An emerging interdisciplinary field 
Analysis of meta-data indicates that research into potentially-isolated communities is a recent 
phenomenon.  With the exceptions of Ellemor (2005) and Gupta and Sharma (2006), all publications 
(17/19) are from 2011 onward (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5.  A graph showing the number of relevant studies published by year. 
The 2018 bar only includes studies published by March 2018. 
The emergent nature of the field is also demonstrated by citation analysis, which reveals that most 
(15/19) of the relevant studies have at least one citation in common.  These links between studies 
indicate that the studies are drawing from and building on the same body of literature.  However, only 
one study (Cox & Hamlen, 2015) cites another study also included within this review (Murphy et al., 
2014), suggesting that this research field is emerging as a result of convergence from a range of 
disciplinary contexts, rather than developing from within a single discipline. 
Publication and authorship data are similarly indicative of disciplinary convergence as part of a wider 
trend.  The studies are published in 17 journals and one book (Table 2), with Global Environmental 
Change the only publication to feature more than once (twice) in the list of studies.  Global 
Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards also features once, effectively meaning Global 
Environmental Change features three times.  Authorship affiliation is similarly diverse, with lead 
authors affiliating to 18 institutions (Table 3).  The University of Otago (New Zealand), is the only 
institution to feature twice (the lead-author of both University of Otago studies is also the only lead-
author to feature twice in the list of studies).  All other (17) studies constitute the sole piece of 
research within this review by the relevant lead-author, as well as the sole piece of research affiliated 
to the relevant institution. 
Whereas the lead authors of these articles are affiliated to 18 different institutions, there is more 
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produced the most studies, at four each.  Three were produced in Australia, two in Sweden, two in the 
United Kingdom, and one each in Brazil, Fiji, India, and Singapore (Table 3, Figure 6). 
Table 3.  Lead-author institution, by country. 
Lead-author institution No. of studies Country No. of studies 
Emergency Management Australia 1 
Australia 3 University of Queensland 1 
University of Sydney 1 
Universidade Federal do Pará 1 Brazil 1 
Royals Road University 1 
Canada 4 
University of Manitoba 1 
University of Victoria 1 
Wilfrid Laurier University 1 
The University of the South Pacific 1 Fiji 1 
Socio Economic and Educational 
Development Society (SEEDS) India 
1 India 1 
Lincoln University 1 
New Zealand 4 University of Canterbury 1 
University of Otago 2 
National University of Singapore 1 Singapore 1 
Södertörn University 1 
Sweden 2 
Stockholm University 1 
King's College London 1 
United Kingdom 2 
University of East Anglia 1 
2.4.2 Study focus 
13 countries were studied within the 19 publications.  Although this make the study locations more 
geographically diverse than the nine countries of the lead-author institutions, 10 of the 20 study 
locations concern either New Zealand (4), Australian (3), or Canadian (3) (Figure 6).  The other 10 
study locations appear only once.  Note: Blakely and Fisher (2017) studied both Australia and the 
United States. 




Figure 6.  Graph showing locations of studies and locations of lead-authors. 
As settler colonies, Australia, Canada and New Zealand share a recent history of colonisation of 
indigenous communities.  Seven (of the 19) studies directly involve or discuss indigenous 
communities, including all three studies focussed on Canadian communities (Amaratunga, 2014; Cox 
& Hamlen, 2015; Murphy et al., 2014), two of the three Australian studies (Beeton & Lynch, 2012; 
Ellemor, 2005), and the studies concerned with Fiji (Remling & Veitayaki, 2016) and the Solomon 
Islands (Otoara Ha’apio et al., 2018).  Note that the three Canadian studies all result from the same 
targeted government research funding initiative (Amaratunga 2014).  While this sample size (of 19) is 
too small to draw strong conclusions, the predominance of studies from the three contributing post-
colonial countries is suggestive.  It is possible that recent histories of colonisation have contributed to 
an emerging focus on the cultural and economic importance of remote communities, and their 
exposure to isolation following disasters (Section 2.4.2).  As the subordination of one nation by 
another, colonisation by definition has resulted in loss of autonomy for indigenous communities, who 
continue to experience political oppression and excessive bureaucratic control (Kirmayer et al., 2011).  
In Australia and Canada, moreover, this historical process has often included the forcible removal and 
or restriction of indigenous people to remote locations (Cox & Hamlen, 2015; Ellemor, 2005; Murphy 
et al., 2014), where resilience has been further eroded by the devaluation of traditional local 
knowledges, practices and responsibilities tied to specific locations or regions (Ellemor, 2005).  
Engaging with such communities with sensitivity has the potential to revalue well-developed 
indigenous environmental discourse that is of great value for work focussed on building socio-cultural 
and environmental resilience (Beeton & Lynch, 2012).  Notably, no studies were identified that 
focussed on the disaster resilience of remote indigenous communities in New Zealand.  This is 
surprising, given that New Zealand is the most highly represented study location, and the country has 
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This finding is, however, consistent with Spector et al. (2018), whose systematic approach similarly 
failed to identify literature concerned with the resilience of indigenous rural communities in New 
Zealand, indicating that further study in this area is needed. 
Other possible factors in the predominance of study locations in Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
include the often sparsely populated geography of these countries, and the prevalence of strong 
disaster management programmes.  The economic and commercial development that follows 
colonisation is another likely factor.  Australia, Canada and New Zealand are all high-income 
countries, due to core businesses such as commercial agriculture, mining, and more recently tourism, 
which are reliant upon distributed infrastructure (Gardner, 2015).  Growth of these businesses, and 
associated populations, in remote locations has led to increased dependence upon distributed 
infrastructure.  Further, Australia, Canada and New Zealand all have strong disaster management 
programmes and funding programmes capable of identifying the need for, and enabling research into, 
the disaster resilience of remote communities. 
The sectors that were either involved with the research or were the main research focus are shown in 
Figure 7.  Many studies (13/19) focussed on more than one sector.  The community sector featured in 
15 of the 19 studies (of this 15, seven studies focussed on indigenous communities), the government 
sector was the focus of 13 studies, and seven studies focussed on the private sector (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7.  Sectors involved with the research or studied. 
Most of the studies (11/19) were focussed on a specific hazard (Figure 8).  Three studies were 
concerned with hazards associated with climate change, three with hazards posed by earthquakes 

























































Figure 8.  A graph showing the primary hazard focus within the studies. 
2.4.3 Study methodologies and participatory governance techniques 
All reviewed literature was concerned with disaster management decision-making, and most 
publications were focussed on participatory governance.  This consistency across such an otherwise 
diverse group of studies is strongly indicative of a convergence across disciplines and institutes 
towards participatory governance. 
The following categorisation of methodologies and techniques draws from the distinction Bishop et al. 
(2007) make between methodology, as the order of steps in an overarching research process, and 
technique, which concerns the way that each step is carried out.  According to this distinction, the 
methodologies used in the reviewed literature can be broadly categorised into three types (again, note 
that some constitute more than one of these types): 
i. four articles synthesised a relevant evidence base (4/19) (Aoki, 2018; Beeton & Lynch, 2012; 
Ellemor, 2005; Gardner, 2015) (note that there was no cross over between the articles 
reviewed in this study and those synthesised in these four studies); 
ii. six articles reported on case studies in which researchers helped facilitate a new participatory 
methodology (6/19) (Amaratunga, 2014; Cox & Hamlen, 2015; de Andrade & Szlafsztein, 
2015; Hicks et al., 2014; Murphy et al., 2014; Orchiston et al., 2013), and  
iii. ten articles reported on researcher observation of a case-study (10/19) (Aoki, 2018; Blakely & 
Fisher, 2017; Chapter 3; Espiner & Becken, 2014; Gupta & Sharma, 2006; Manuel-Navarrete 
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Studies were also broadly categorised according to the Aoki (2018) participation typology (Section 
2.2.3) according to disaster management decision-making and participatory techniques, both for ease 
of reference and as a starting point for the analysis.  Only four (of 19) studies are concerned with 
participatory approaches that bring expert administrators together with public or community 
representatives, and of these, only Aoki (2018) reports on a case study in which decision-making 
responsibility is shared between expert administrators and public representatives.  Additionally, of the 
seven studies concerned with building the disaster resilience of remote indigenous communities, only 
the Blakely and Fisher (2017) comparison of issues affecting remote communities in Australia and the 
United States discusses co-governance arrangements in which expert administrators share decision-
making authority with representatives of remote communities.  This suggests that the need identified 
by Ellemor (2005) for more partnership between government agencies and indigenous communities is 
still urgent, particularly in view of Ackerman (2004), who finds that the most successful participatory 
efforts involve community representatives in government decision-making. 
 





Table 4.  Relevant studies broadly categorised according to the Aoki (2018) modified typology for understanding participation. 
Disaster management decision-making (rather than specifically participatory governance) methodologies used or described within the studies are shown. 
The table also categorises the studies according to year published (papers are alphabetically arranged within years). 
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et al.














Davies    
et al.
Aoki Otoara 
Ha'apio    
et al.
2005 2006 2011 2012 2016
Expert administrators ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Elected representatives ✓ ✓ ✓
Professional stakeholders, hired by government ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Organised interest groups (e.g. business associations) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Lay stakeholders ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Concerned general public ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Diffuse public sphere ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Legal mandate ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Employment (professional assignment) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Social obligation ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Targetted invitation ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Open invitation ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Self-initiative by the participants themselves ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Listen as spectator ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Express preferences ✓ ✓
Develop preferences ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Aggregate preferences and propose ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Deliberate and negotiate ✓ ✓
Deploy technique and expertise ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Passive audience ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Active audience ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Advocates ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Advisors and consultants ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Joint decision makers (co-governance) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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2.5 Thematic analysis 
Thematic analysis of the 19 studies included in the present review yielded three high-level themes: 
Factors affecting the resilience of remote communities; Disaster management decision-making in 
remote communities, and Implementing participatory governance in remote communities. 
2.5.1 Factors affecting the resilience of remote communities 
The studies identify the widely-held belief that remote communities have a ‘foundation of resilience’, 
with residents in remote settlements identifying as ‘self-reliant people whose relationship with the 
outdoors, which may have brought them to these locations, has equipped them with the knowledge, 
skills, and experience associated with resilience’ (Cox & Hamlen, 2015, p. 233).  In addition, members 
of small communities typically know the community well, and can be far more aware of demographic 
trends and local strengths, issues and desires than government administrators (Aoki, 2018; Cox & 
Hamlen, 2015; Ellemor, 2005; Espiner & Becken, 2014; Murphy et al., 2014; Orchiston, 2013). 
Several factors, however, mean that those living in remote communities can also be more exposed to 
the impacts of hazards than the rest of the population.  For example, small size and large distance 
from urban centres can reduce access to employment, social security, basic healthcare and other 
essential services (usually provided by governments), often leading to increased social and economic 
hardship (Murphy et al., 2014).  Additionally, businesses located in remote communities are typically 
small, which can make them particularly vulnerable to disasters because business size is a key 
determinant in the uptake of resilience measures, including continuity insurance (Orchiston, 2013).  
Reduced business resilience can have a compounding effect on the economic resilience of remote 
communities.  For example, short-, and in some cases long-, term unemployment can result from 
isolation as a result of disruption caused by disaster impacts (Chapter 3; Gardner, 2015).  Further, the 
innate resilience of remote communities can be challenged if they are isolated following a disaster.  
Immediate emergency response can fail to reach isolated communities, meaning that this 
responsibility can fall to community members.  This includes the responsibility to care for tourists, who 
can vastly outnumber residents and strain local resources (such as food and medical supplies) when 
these are unable to be replenished via distributed infrastructure (Gardner, 2015; Orchiston, 2013). 
Remote indigenous communities living in recently colonised countries can be at particularly high risk.  
Lack of essential services and infrastructure, low incomes and high rates of physical and mental 
illness can be the ‘result of a marginality that makes of their life a “permanent emergency”’ (Bankoff, 
2001, p. 25, cited in Ellemor, 2005).  Historical culturally oppressive practices have perpetuated 
assumptions of helplessness and dependence that can make it difficult for members of these 
communities to act on their aspirations, and build resilience based on traditional knowledge and 
practices (Cox & Hamlen, 2015; Ellemor, 2005).  Even in the absence of a dominant settler culture, 
remote indigenous communities are not always free to develop resilience measures that are based on 
traditional knowledge and governance arrangements (Remling & Veitayaki, 2016). 
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2.5.1.1 Distributed infrastructure 
The studies show that increased dependence upon distributed infrastructure can have both positive 
and negative effects on the resilience of remote communities.  Distributed infrastructure allows remote 
communities to reduce and overcome geographic, social, economic and/or political isolation (Gardner, 
2015; Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  For example, Gardner (2015) notes that improved 
communications allow news and images of disasters, and even minor events, to spread fast, in 
principle increasing the speed of response.  This news coverage can also increase the political 
consequences of disasters, meaning that governments can be held accountable for events in even 
remote communities, increasing pressure on them to improve the resilience of remote communities 
(Gardner, 2015).  Distributed infrastructure has also provided new development opportunities, 
including commercial agriculture and tourism, which have further increased the resilience of remote 
communities (Gardner, 2015).  For example, Espiner and Becken (2014) suggest that the natural 
attractions (such as glaciers) which enable tourism in remote communities may also increase their 
(post-disaster) resilience, due to the enduring desire of tourists to visit. 
However, distributed infrastructure has also enabled the management and provision of essential 
services to become increasingly centralised (Gardner, 2015).  For example, the improved road access 
which enables tourism often also becomes critical for the delivery of essentials, including food 
(Espiner & Becken, 2014).  The centralisation of essential services, when combined with dependence 
on distributed infrastructure for ongoing business (from new development opportunities), has 
decreased the disaster resilience of many remote communities by substantially increasing the 
negative consequences of isolation (Murphy et al., 2014). 
The studies establish that impacts on distributed infrastructure can be the primary cause of disaster 
losses at the national and regional economic scale, and confirm that remote communities have 
particularly low resilience to distributed infrastructure impacts (Chapter 3; Espiner & Becken, 2014; 
Gardner, 2015).  For example, Espiner and Becken (2014) note that heavy rain in New Zealand in 
January 2013 washed away a bridge approach, cutting road access to Franz Josef and Fox Glacier 
townships for six days during the peak tourism season (the only access to the towns was via an 
approximately 600 km detour).  Telecommunications were also cut for 36 hours by the bridge 
washout, compounding business interruption.  Subsequently, businesses reported lost revenue in the 
tens of thousands of dollars, as tourism was reduced to one-third of its usual volume for six days 
(Espiner & Becken, 2014). 
Chapter 3 reports a corresponding shift in the primary focus of the New Zealand National 
Infrastructure Unit from aiming to increase the resilience of infrastructure assets to ensuring essential 
service levels are maintained, regardless of how that service is provided.  For example, the 2016 
“Kaikōura” earthquake in New Zealand caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, especially 
ground transportation networks, which isolated several settlements.  Cross-network transportation 
interdependencies (i.e. air transport and boats) ensured continued regional transport and delivery of 
emergency supplies to isolated communities.  However, this did not reduce the substantial response 
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and recovery resources required to restore infrastructure service to isolated communities, including 
regional transport links (Chapter 3).  While alternative means can address some shortcomings of 
distributed infrastructure for essential service provision in the short term, these are not effective 
substitutes for the distributed infrastructure required to keep remote communities effectively linked to 
the outside world (Gardner, 2015). 
2.5.2 Disaster management decision-making in remote communities 
Changes in disaster management approaches over the last two decades have seen some agencies 
expand the traditional focus on disaster response to include readiness, reduction and recovery.  In 
some cases, this has led to more collaborative disaster management approaches (Chapter 3; 
Ellemor, 2005; Hicks et al., 2014).  For example, the Rural Resilience Development Project in Canada 
is a collaboration between academics and the justice department which is facilitating collaborative 
resilience planning in remote communities (Amaratunga, 2014; Murphy et al., 2014), and Australian 
emergency management agencies are working more collaboratively with remote indigenous 
communities to build disaster resilience (Ellemor, 2005).  In New Zealand, readiness, reduction, 
response and recovery legislation effectively mandates collaborations between emergency managers 
and critical infrastructure providers.  This has also improved post-disaster service levels (Chapter 3) 
by requiring lifeline utilities to be ‘able to function to the fullest possible extent, even though this may 
be at a reduced level, during and after an emergency’ (MCDEM, 2002, p. 40, Section 60). 
All reviewed studies agree that participatory governance is required to build and maintain resilience in 
potentially-isolated communities (Section 2.4).  Community members from remote communities need 
to be involved in disaster management decision-making because, if isolated, community members will 
need to lead immediate response efforts in the absence of authorities (Gardner, 2015; Orchiston, 
2013).  The need to include remote community members in disaster management decision-making 
has also been driven by the centralisation of essential services.  The need for cost efficiency in local 
government has led to responsibility being shifted to community members and organisations, so that 
community members are increasingly relied upon, and essential to, much of the success of disaster 
management (Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  In addition to documenting these specific advantages 
participatory governance offers for remote communities, the reviewed literature is also consistent with 
many of the findings of the wider participatory governance literature, showing that participatory 
governance can be advantageous for communities in general, and inform better decision-making in 
government and the private sector (Section 2.2.3). 
2.5.3 Implementing participatory governance in remote communities 
The literature also identifies several factors that make participatory approaches difficult to implement, 
despite the established benefits of participation (Section 2.2.3).  Members of some indigenous 
communities in Australia and Fiji, for example, will only adopt disaster management initiatives if they 
have capacity to do so and are not concerned about more pressing development issues (Ellemor, 
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2005; Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  Capacity to participate can be particularly limited in remote 
communities (Aoki, 2018; Ellemor, 2005), where community members are often time-poor because 
they need to generate income, often from unstable sources such as tourism and farming, or are 
struggling with development issues, including poor physical and mental health levels (Amaratunga, 
2014; Ellemor, 2005).  Moreover, as already discussed (Section 2.5.1), Orchiston (2013) finds that 
businesses within remote communities have particularly low resilience because they are often too 
small to invest in resilience.  The capacity of the community to invest in resilience and to contribute in 
participatory processes must be ascertained before implementing participatory decision-making 
approaches in remote communities. 
Ellemor (2005) and Amaratunga (2014) argue that when engaging with indigenous communities to 
design disaster management initiatives it is critical to first understand what constitutes “normal” for 
that community, so that the converse of a disaster can be understood.  While these studies are 
concerned with indigenous communities in particular, the importance of recognising that only 
community members are qualified to understand and communicate what is “normal” for the relevant 
community is also consistent with the emphasis in participatory governance literature on tailoring 
methodologies to specific contexts. 
Another key factor is the extent of community trust in the process.  To be effective, disaster 
management “solutions” must be preferred by the community (Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  This 
factor is more influential than whether a solution is objectively “better” or “worse” in theory, because 
for a disaster management initiative to succeed and be sustainable, the community must adopt and 
take ownership of the initiative (Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  This is particularly relevant in remote 
communities, given that community members are essential to implementing disaster management 
here (Section 2.5.2).  Community members are unlikely to implement a planned “solution” if they do 
not agree with it, particularly if the disaster results in isolation from the authorities who planned (to 
implement) it (Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  Again, this is critical for indigenous communities, where 
trust in government and other authorities is typically low as a result of historical and current cultural 
oppression (Ellemor, 2005).  Involvement in the process of participatory community resilience 
planning can be even more valuable in terms of trust building than the planning solutions (Murphy et 
al., 2014). 
Increasing the amount communities participate in decision-making is a consistent concern in the 
studies, which include both community-led participation, and participatory processes instituted by 
government agencies (Aoki, 2018; Gardner, 2015; Orchiston, 2013).  All the studies agree with the 
need, identified by Ackerman (2004), to involve both government and communities.  Participatory 
disaster resilience-building in remote communities is less likely to be successful when it occurs 
without government involvement, as is government decision-making without participation (Section 
2.5.2).  To implement disaster resilience initiatives, jurisdictional authority at the local, regional and 
national level may be required, as might substantial resources (including funding), making it difficult 
for communities to implement disaster management initiatives alone (Aoki, 2018; Cox & Hamlen, 
2015; Gardner, 2015; Murphy et al., 2014; Orchiston, 2013; Otoara Ha’apio et al., 2018). 
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The community-led participatory approaches documented in the identified literature are tailored for the 
relevant remote communities.  These have focussed on collaboration to reduce the individual level of 
effort required, which in turn can enable participation.  For example, Orchiston (2013) observes 
community-based disaster planning is promising for small businesses with limited capacity to invest in 
resilience, and Amaratunga (2014), Cox and Hamlen (2015), and Murphy et al. (2014) document the 
facilitation of the Canadian Rural Disaster Resilience Project (RDRP).  The RDRP aims to increase 
the resilience of remote indigenous communities in Canada by allowing them to communicate with 
and learn from each other through a “virtual community of practice”. 
Government-led disaster management approaches have moved towards participatory governance as 
part of the expanding focus of disaster management agencies to include readiness, reduction and 
recovery, alongside response.  The identified literature provides examples of this shift, including 
initiatives enabled by researchers collaborating with decision-makers to strengthen existing disaster 
management decision-making (Amaratunga, 2014; Hicks et al., 2014).  Several studies also report 
that promotional activities by dedicated and respected community members are essential to the 
success of participatory decision-making (Aoki, 2018; Orchiston, 2013; Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  
Community champions are not only well placed to encourage community participation, they are also 
well placed to communicate to other decision-makers what is “normal” and needed for the relevant 
community, particularly in the case of indigenous communities, and in this way advocate for the 
specific needs of remote communities.  For this reason, Ellemor (2005) calls for the employment of 
indigenous community members within relevant government structures to enable collaborative 
planning, grow mutual trust and understanding between communities and government agencies, and 
to build community capacity and resourcing.  Building knowledge and enhancing skill competency 
levels within remote indigenous communities are key themes within government-led participatory 
disaster management approaches, including the provision of education and training provided to 
community members by disaster management agencies, and the use of bridging organisations, 
including universities and NGOs (Amaratunga, 2014; Murphy et al., 2014).  Education can 
substantially contribute to the cultivation of a sustainable participation culture (Aoki, 2018; Remling & 
Veitayaki, 2016).  More broadly, collaborative efforts have been found to result in gradual 
improvements in relationships between disaster management agencies and indigenous communities 
(Ellemor, 2005; Hicks et al., 2014). 
The Aoki (2018) case study of a participatory governance recovery rebuild initiative in Onagawa is the 
only example in the reviewed literature of community members and government experts sharing 
decision-making responsibilities.  Aoki (2018) finds that participation levels and engagement were 
increased by the use of multiple methodologies within one overarching process.  Where “all or 
nothing” participation options can reduce participation, the use of multiple methodologies provided a 
range of options, allowing people with different capacities to choose to participate through the 
methodology which suited them best (Aoki, 2018).  For example, public opinion was widely canvassed 
through a series of public briefings which supplemented a series of working group meetings which 
involved more intense levels of participation.  Aoki (2018) found that the public briefings helped to 
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increase participation, allowing participation from people with limited capacity to participate, and were 
especially helpful for those with mental and physical hardships post-disaster.  Widely canvassing 
public opinion through public briefings also added legitimacy to the overall process by verifying that 
community input had been consistent with wider community views (e.g. not excluding the views of 
those who had limited capacity to participate in the working group) and by helping to confirm that the 
government development vision was consistent with the views of the wider community. 
While choosing a disaster management “solution” that is preferred by the community is necessary, as 
Remling and Veitayaki (2016) establish, Aoki (2018) also notes that community preference alone is 
not sufficient.  For example, in a participatory recovery process in Kesennuma, Japan, the winning 
design from an open competition for reconstruction plans, chosen by the majority of a judging panel 
consisting of three urban planning experts, the mayor, and 36 ordinary citizens, ‘was later found to be 
neither fiscally nor technically feasible’ (Aoki, 2018, p. 227).  Such outcomes can erode trust in 
participatory processes and jeopardise future appetite for involvement.  Aoki (2018) finds that 
appropriately sequencing the involvement of technical experts (early on) would have ensured that 
only feasible designs were considered by the judging panel in Kesennuma.  These findings are highly 
applicable to other remote communities, which have similarly limited capacity to take part in 
participatory processes, and which are highly dependent upon (highly-technical) distributed 
infrastructure (Chapter 3; Espiner & Becken, 2014; Gardner, 2015; Orchiston, 2013). 
Finally, the literature confirms that the specific composition of the relevant community can have a 
substantial effect on the success of participatory processes.  The typically tight-knit character of 
remote communities in Japan and New Zealand, for example, has been found to enable participatory 
governance, with Orchiston (2013), Espiner and Becken (2014) and Aoki (2018) all reporting 
participatory disaster management processes that involve remote communities and are led by local 
businesses.  Aoki (2018, p. 235) also found that strong place attachment and strong social 
connections, reinforced by everyday interactions between community members, including those from 
the private and government sectors, led to ‘a strong collective sense of survival’ which ‘encouraged 
people to remain relatively understanding and willing to compromise and work together towards a 
consensus, rather than resorting to conflict; this compromise was necessary to keep [participatory 
governance] going’ during the post-tsunami rebuild of Onagawa.  This suggests that participatory 
approaches may not only be more necessary in remote communities, but that in some cases, they 
may also be easier to achieve as community members can have more willingness to participate.  For 
example, Aoki (2018, p. 235) notes that education was actually requested by community members 
during the Onagawa participatory process as they ‘came to believe that they should not keep asking 
the government to do things for them, but should play a more proactive role’. 
However, the historical oppression and marginalisation of remote indigenous communities in Australia 
and Canada has resulted in an understandably deep mistrust of government agencies, and a 
corresponding tendency on the part of often well-intentioned government administrators to ignore 
and/or devalue the capacity for resilience conferred by traditional knowledge and cultural practices, 
instead characterising indigenous community members as passive victims (Ellemor, 2005).  This 
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means that the need for more holistic, inclusive and participatory approaches to disaster management 
is at its most extreme in remote indigenous communities, where the composition of both the 
community and government agencies makes such approaches much more difficult to achieve.  
Acknowledging recent modest improvements in relations between emergency management agencies 
and remote indigenous communities, Ellemor (2005) still finds that much more engagement is 
needed.  Particularly, Ellemor (2005) finds that the employment of indigenous community members in 
emergency management roles would add the most value.  This approach has the potential to increase 
incomes in economically challenged communities, increase community trust in government agencies, 
build community capacity to contribute to key disaster resilience decision-making, and raise 
awareness inside government agencies of the needs and value offered by traditional knowledge and 
practices (Ellemor, 2005). 
2.6 Discussion 
The systematic review methodology was useful for identifying relevant publications and providing a 
degree of oversight into research in this emerging, dispersed and interdisciplinary field.  Bringing 
together a range of articles concerning the disaster resilience of remote communities (n = 19 articles) 
indicates that the resulting field is broadly characterised by the conceptual divide between 
evolutionary and equilibrist resilience identified by White and O'Hare (2014) (Section 1).  Studies are 
either largely focussed on involving communities in participatory approaches to build social resilience, 
or primarily concerned with economic and/or infrastructure resilience. 
There is also considerable evidence of softening across this divide.  Studies concerned with building 
sociocultural resilience by reducing existing inequities also acknowledge the role of infrastructure 
(Murphy et al., 2014; Remling & Veitayaki, 2016), while those primarily concerned with infrastructure 
and/or economic resilience similarly acknowledge the importance of socio-cultural resilience (Chapter 
3; Espiner & Becken, 2014; Gardner, 2015; Orchiston, 2013).  The strongest evidence of this change 
is common ground around the consensus concerning the promise of participatory methodologies 
when it comes to building resilience in remote communities.  Although not all studies are directly 
concerned with the involvement of community members in disaster management decision-making, all 
agree that such involvement is particularly necessary for remote communities. 
Large distance from urban centres, small size and cost efficiencies effected through centralisation 
mean that community members in remote communities are likely to be responsible for immediate 
response efforts (Gardner, 2015; Orchiston, 2013).  Remote communities often have a tight-knit 
character, with strong connections between community members, and high levels of place attachment 
(Aoki, 2018; Cox & Hamlen, 2015; Ellemor, 2005; Espiner & Becken, 2014; Murphy et al., 2014; 
Orchiston, 2013).  These provide incentives for community members to participate and compromise 
for the benefit of the relevant community and its environs, meaning that participatory approaches may 
not only be more necessary in remote communities, but that in some cases, they may also be easier 
to achieve (Aoki, 2018; Espiner & Becken, 2014; Orchiston, 2013). 
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However, community members are unlikely to participate if they do not have trust in the process and 
the people leading it.  Even if community members do participate, without trust, community members 
will not take the ownership that is essential for the disaster management initiative to succeed and be 
sustainable (Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  Trust has to be earned, as is starkly exemplified in remote 
Australian and Canadian indigenous communities, where particularly low levels of trust in government 
agencies are the legacy of oppressive colonial practices (Cox & Hamlen, 2015; Ellemor, 2005).  
Recent attempts to move towards more collaborative engagement with some of these communities 
have resulted in gradual improvements in relationships with disaster management agencies (Ellemor, 
2005; Hicks et al., 2014; Murphy et al., 2014).  Far more mutual trust and understanding is required if 
indigenous communities are to be empowered to take ownership of such collaborations (Ellemor, 
2005).  Ellemor (2005) argues that this might be best achieved through the employment of indigenous 
community members in local emergency management positions.  Locally resident government 
representatives are likely to identify and be identified as local community members, enabling trust in 
the participatory process (Aoki, 2018). 
The employment of local community members would also contribute significantly to the low incomes 
typical of remote indigenous communies (Ellemor, 2005).  Again, this is illustrative of a wider issue 
affecting the capacity of community members to participate, or invest, in disaster impact reduction 
efforts.  Those living in remote communities are typically time-poor when compared with those living 
in urban areas due to the need to generate income, and/or the difficulties of living in communities with 
poor physical and mental health levels (Aoki, 2018; Ellemor, 2005; Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  
Employment of local community members in disaster resilience and emergency response roles would 
increase the capacity to contribute by supplementing income and dedicating the time of community 
members to improving the resilience of the community (Ellemor, 2005). 
To accommodate the diverse range of capacities to participate that are typical of any community, the 
design, implementation and possible outcomes of participation methodologies need to be informed by 
and tailored to the relevant specific climatic, environmental, social, economic, and political context 
(Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  Appropriately tailoring participation approaches can increase 
participation levels, which can add legitimacy to the process: first, by verifying that community input 
through more intense participation methodologies is broadly consistent with wider community views 
expressed through less intense participation methodologies (e.g. not excluding the views of those 
who had limited capacity and so could not participate in the chosen methodology); and second, by 
helping to confirm that the (resulting) government development vision is consistent with the views of 
the wider community (Aoki, 2018).  Appropriately sequencing participation methodologies and 
ensuring that these are transparent is also critical to the success of participatory processes.  
Sequencing participation allows different stakeholder groups to participate more intensely at different 
stages during the overall process, focussing on relevant areas.  This helps to ensure that “solutions” 
which are not technically or financially feasible and so can undermine trust, are not proposed.  
However, “black box” decision-making without community participation in parts of the process, can 
leave community members unsure how decisions have been made and so can also undermine trust 
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(Aoki, 2018; Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  These issues can be avoided by enabling the participation 
of community members in all aspects of the process, as long as the technical and government 
expertise concerning the feasibility of collaborative outcomes is appropriately sequenced and 
weighted (Aoki, 2018).  Sequencing participation also helps to further overcome barriers to 
participation by reducing the time commitment required from each stakeholder group (Aoki, 2018). 
The studies also highlight the key role that increased dependence upon distributed infrastructure can 
play in the resilience of remote communities.  Distributed infrastructure allows remote communities to 
dramatically reduce, and in some cases overcome, geographic, social, economic and political 
isolation (Gardner, 2015; Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  However, dependence on distributed 
infrastructure for business and essential services and supplies (including food and medical supplies) 
has also decreased the disaster resilience of remote communities.  Damage to distributed 
infrastructure networks, including that caused by natural hazards, can result in the partial and 
sometimes complete loss of a given community’s essential services for considerable periods of time, 
at substantial social as well as economic cost (Chapter 3; Espiner & Becken, 2014; Gardner, 2015). 
The focus of research and practical initiatives aiming to increase distributed infrastructure resilience 
has shifted, with increased awareness of the social and economic consequences of essential services 
loss, towards increasing prioritisation of service provision over maintaining infrastructure assets.  
However, the findings of this review suggest that the resilience of remote communities is likely to be 
substantially enhanced by using more inclusive participatory planning approaches that involve 
government decision-makers, distributed infrastructure providers and community members in 
sustained collaborative programmes that bring together community, technical and government 
knowledge to build a wider picture of disaster resilience and potential mitigative “solutions”.  Aoki 
(2018) offers a particularly useful template for such approaches.  Her typology allows for the careful 
management of stakeholder engagement and potential power imbalances, and the sequencing of 
expert technical and government input is particularly applicable in relation to infrastructure resilience.  
Further, both Aoki (2018) and Ellemor (2005) discuss the advantages of the employment of 
community members in relevant organisations and government agencies.  This would likely further 
increase the mutual trust and understanding required for effective participation, while also building 
capacity to contribute by supplementing income and dedicating the time of community members to 
improving the resilience of the relevant remote community, as well as raising awareness inside 
government agencies of the needs and value offered by traditional knowledge and practices (Ellemor, 
2005). 
2.7 Conclusions 
The research field systematically identified in this study, concerned with the disaster resilience of 
remote communities, is relatively sparse, dispersed and recent, so more research is needed to test, 
corroborate and expand these findings.  The oversight this review provides indicates a consistent 
focus across disciplines and countries of origin on the need to involve more than one sector, and in 
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particular community members, in decision-making to increase the resilience of remote communities.  
The prevalence of studies focussed on community-led planning in remote indigenous communities in 
Australia and Canada reflects the marginalisation of these communities as a result of recent 
colonisation, while the surprising absence of publications focussed on the disaster resilience of 
remote Māori communities, despite New Zealand’s recent history of colonisation and official status as 
a bicultural nation, indicates an urgent need for research in this area.  Alongside this shared emphasis 
on the need for and importance of, inclusive participatory resilience-building approaches, the literature 
emphasises the role played by distributed infrastructure in the resilience of remote communities, 
focussing on the decreased resilience of remote communities to abrupt isolation as disaster damage 
to distributed infrastructure can result in the partial and sometimes complete loss of essential 
services, at substantial social, as well as economic, cost. 
The reviewed literature does not, however, feature any studies that focus on bringing infrastructure 
providers and remote community members together to participate in disaster management decision-
making.  This omission is consistent with the disciplinary normative tendency, identified by White and 
O'Hare (2014), to apply the term “resilience” either to preserve, maintain and restore the built 
environment (including infrastructure), or to inclusive approaches to reducing the social inequities that 
inhibit resilience at local levels.  The convergence evident in the reviewed literature towards 
participatory resilience-building initiatives is likely to have been driven, at least in part, by recognition 
of the decreased resilience of remote communities to isolation, resulting from increased dependence 
on distributed infrastructure.  It is timely, then, to call for research that takes this convergence further, 
to incorporate decision-making concerning the provision of essential services into disaster impact 
reduction initiatives focussed on building socio-cultural resilience. 
The design of participatory governance processes has been found to be critical to their success.  
Aoki’s (2018) findings concerning the importance of multiple methodologies and the use of 
sequencing to ensure that resilience solutions are feasible as well as preferred by communities offer a 
promising foundation for participatory governance approaches.  Rising disaster losses and the 
ongoing centralisation of essential services make the need for this research urgent, as well as timely. 
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3.1 Abstract 
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of 
the South Island of New Zealand.  Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic 
landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation 
networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North 
Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch.  The damage caused direct 
local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of 
supply chains.  Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods 
and people.  Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure 
routine transport of goods.  Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain 
operable.  This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence & 
Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road 
access 23 days after the earthquake.  However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of 
SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as 
local, concern. 
This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent 
management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days 
following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience. 
3.2 Introduction 
New Zealand is located on a tectonic plate boundary between the Australian and Pacific plates.  The 
country exists because of this complex plate boundary; a subduction zone, along the east coast of the 
North Island, terminates northeast of the South Island, where it transitions into mostly strike-slip faults 
in the Marlborough and Alpine Fault regions (Figure 9). 
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in the Marlborough area, resulting in 
two fatalities and 57 injured persons (Nicol et al., 2016).  At least 21 faults ruptured on and offshore of 
the north-east of the South Island of New Zealand (Figure 10) (Stirling et al., 2017).  The ruptures 
began on a fault near Culverden, approximately 15 km deep, and continued north-eastwards for more 
than 170 km, at a rupture speed of around 1.8 km/s (6,450 km/hr), with Peak Ground Accelerations of 
around 1.3 g (Hamling et al., 2017; Nicol et al., 2016).  Initial estimates suggest between 80,000 and 
100,000 landslides were triggered by the earthquake, within an area of 10,000 km2, with most of the 
co-seismic landslides located within an area of 3,600 km2 (Figure 10) (Nicol et al., 2016).  Five 
landslides were more than 1,000,000 m3 in size, and 50 large landslide dams were identified (Dellow 
et al., 2017; Nicol et al., 2016).




Figure 9.  Modelled Peak Ground Velocity on land of the 14th November 2016 Mw7.8 “Kaikōura” earthquake (Bradley et al., 2017), with key transport 
networks overlaid, and New Zealand’s tectonic setting (inset).




Figure 10.  Preliminary Landslide Inventory for the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake, New Zealand by 
QuakeCoRE, GEER, and EERI (Bradley et al., 2017). 
The earthquake caused widespread damage across the northeast of the South Island, including to 
Kaikōura, a popular tourist destination, and also damaged Wellington, the country’s capital (Bradley et 
al., 2017).  Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides also damaged 
distributed infrastructure across a wide region.  In particular, transportation networks were severely 
affected, including a number of state highways in central and northern areas of the South Island, 
including State Highway 1 (SH1) in the Kaikōura District, and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line 
between Picton and Christchurch (Figure 9).  See Stevenson et al. (2017) for a summary of the 
economic and social impacts. 
SH1 is New Zealand’s main highway, and runs the length of the country, supplemented by a ferry 
crossing between the North and South islands, run by Interislander and Bluebridge ferries (Figure 9).  
Prior to the earthquake, SH1 provided the main link between Picton and Christchurch (341,500 
residents; Stats NZ, 2013), and beyond to the remainder of the South Island (Figure 11).  SH1 was by 
far the shortest road route between Picton and Christchurch at around 4 ½ hours, with the closest 
state highway alternative route taking around 6 ½ hours.  Accordingly, SH1 carried substantial 
volumes of traffic and was a route for transport of goods, as well as being a popular tourist drive 
(Figure 11). 




Figure 11.  Major South Island transport usage by Ministry of Transport (2011) (note: there is no 
longer a Nelson port to rail connection). 
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The 350 km-long MNL runs alongside SH1 and is a critical network, moving about 1 million tonnes of 
freight between Picton and Christchurch annually (Kilroy, 2017) (Figure 11).  The MNL is also a major 
tourist attraction, with the Coastal Pacific train (a KiwiRail Scenic journey service) providing a daily 
passenger service between Picton and Christchurch between the months of October and April. 
The disruption of these transport networks caused a number of direct localised impacts, such as 
acute isolation of affected communities, including Kaikōura township and a number of rural farming 
communities, through to wider regional impacts such as disruption of supply chains (Market 
Economics, 2017). 
This paper presents the impact of the 14th November 2016 Mw 7.8 earthquake on South Island 
transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early-
recovery phases, up until the 21st February 2017, 100 days after the initial event.  Direct impacts on 
the transport network, a timeline of events, level-of-service maps, as well as secondary impacts are 
presented.  Lessons learned from the event are also highlighted. 
3.3 Natural hazard resilience planning responsibilities and initiatives for transportation networks in 
New Zealand 
3.3.1 New Zealand infrastructure resilience 
When considering the impacts of the Kaikōura earthquake on transport networks, it is important to 
consider the organisational arrangements and legislative context.  New Zealand recognises that 
infrastructure ‘is the foundation on which so much of our economy relies’ (National Infrastructure Unit, 
2015, p. 7), and so the Treasury formed a National Infrastructure Unit (NIU), which is advised by the 
National Infrastructure Advisory Board (which also advises the Minister of Finance and infrastructure 
providers).  The NIU is responsible for ensuring New Zealand’s infrastructure is ‘resilient and 
coordinated and contributes to a strong economy and high living standards’ (National Infrastructure 
Unit, 2015, p. 4). 
The NIU has progressed from initially planning short-term priorities for infrastructure investment and 
regulatory reform, when established in 2009, to producing the Thirty Year New Zealand Infrastructure 
Plan 2015 (National Infrastructure Unit, 2015).  Part of this plan aims to move New Zealand 
infrastructure planning away from being “asset-driven”, where assets are ‘designed and built without 
fully considering the service being delivered’ (National Infrastructure Unit, 2015, p. 46), to ensuring 
infrastructure providers understand end users’ needs.  This priority was highlighted again in the 
Treasury’s Progress one year on from the Thirty Year New Zealand Infrastructure Plan report, which 
states ‘simply building things to address our problems is no longer sustainable.  We need a better 
understanding of the levels of service we want to deliver, more mature asset management practices 
and use of data, and more effective decision-making that considers non-asset solutions’ (The 
Treasury, 2016, p. 5).  Therefore, New Zealand government policy increasingly views infrastructure in 
terms of the integrated service provided; instead of, for example, considering roads, rail lines, 
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shipping and air travel separately, increasingly the focus is on the ability to transport goods and 
people around the integrated transport network, regardless of the transport mode. 
The Civil Defence & Emergency Management Act 2002 (MCDEM, 2002, Section 60, p. 40) requires 
lifeline utilities to be ‘able to function to the fullest possible extent, even though this may be at a 
reduced level, during and after an emergency’.  To this end, New Zealand has an increasingly strong 
“Lifelines” culture.  Lifeline utilities are entities that provide essential infrastructure services to 
communities and have responsibilities for planning and coordinating in a way which enables the 
continuation of these services in an emergency, as part of Civil Defence & Emergency Management 
(CDEM) Groups, the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management (MCDEM), and other 
relevant government agencies and regulatory bodies, legislated under the National Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Plan Order 2015 (DPMC, 2015).  A key feature of the Lifelines culture in 
New Zealand are the 16 Regional Lifelines Groups across New Zealand, with national representation 
and coordination undertaken by the New Zealand Lifelines Council (est. 1999).  These regional 
entities, made up of lifeline utility representatives, undertake collaborative work with scientists, 
engineers and emergency managers to identify interdependencies and vulnerabilities to regional 
scale emergencies.  This collaborative process provides a framework to enable integration of asset 
management, risk management and emergency management across utilities (Fenwick, 2012; New 
Zealand Lifelines Committee, n.d.). 
A notable success story of the value of the Lifelines concept is the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines’ 
Risks and Realities project (Lamb, 1997), which identified a number of vulnerabilities and 
interdependencies in Christchurch in the late 1990’s and over the subsequent decade implemented a 
suite of disaster risk reduction measures.  A review of the impact of these mitigation measures 
following the 2010/2011 Christchurch earthquake sequence found ‘the damage would have been 
greater and the response slower if the steps recommended in Risks and Realities and other 
preparatory work fostered by the Group had not been taken.  For example, Orion’s electricity 
distribution seismic strengthening programme, commenced in 1996 and progressed systematically 
each year, cost $6 million and is estimated to have saved $60 to $65 million in direct asset 
replacement costs and repairs’ (Fenwick, 2012, p. ii; Giovinazzi et al., 2011). 
3.3.2 New Zealand transport network 
The New Zealand transport network is owned and operated by several different organisations.  The 
New Zealand Transport Agency (NZ Transport Agency) is an independent crown entity, responsible 
(amongst other roles) for allocating funds from the National Land Transport Funds to land transport 
activities, including local roads, state highways and public transport and, together with local and 
regional government, for funding local roads and public transport infrastructure and services.  NZ 
Transport Agency is responsible for the state highway road network (Figure 9).  Local roading is the 
responsibility of territorial authorities in the form of district or city councils.  KiwiRail is a state-owned 
enterprise and the largest rail transport operator in New Zealand, including rail operations in the South 
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Island, and Interislander ferries (Figure 9).  KiwiRail’s ‘core purpose’ is to move people and freight, 
and aims to add value to New Zealand transport by helping their customers to be more competitive, 
assisting with the Government’s Business Growth Agenda and offering world-class tourism 
experiences (KiwiRail, 2016).  Bluebridge operates the other main ferry service between Picton and 
Wellington (the South and North islands) (Figure 9).  Numerous other shipping companies operate 
throughout New Zealand waters, and numerous private airlines operate throughout the country 
(Figure 9, Figure 11).  Air New Zealand is the national airline, 53% owned by the New Zealand 
Government. 
NZ Transport Agency and KiwiRail (alongside Transpower, the national electricity provider) have 
developed a shared resilience response framework, aligned with the Thirty Year New Zealand 
Infrastructure Plan 2015 (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2014).  Using a consistent approach allows 
better management of, and cooperation between, the networks.  Resilience is viewed by the 
collaborators as being concerned with any event, natural or man-made (including, for example, 
climate change), which could disrupt the networks.  The framework is based around three strands: 1) 
prevention, mitigation and preparedness; 2) emergency response; and 3) restoration and 
rehabilitation. 
NZ Transport Agency has undertaken further resilience work specific to its network, through: business 
continuity planning; identifying alternative routes to state highway links; creating a system to advise 
customers of events, impacts and their options; and continuing with seismic retrofit, bridge scour and 
rockfall mitigation programmes; avalanche and weather monitoring programmes; efforts to proactively 
reduce ice formation on road surfaces; and to build new structures to modern standards (New 
Zealand Transport Agency, 2014).  However, NZ Transport Agency’s most recent State Highway 
Network Resilience National Programme Business Case (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2014, p. 3) 
identified a number of areas where improvements were needed: 
- ‘while alternative routes are planned for each state highway these are not consistently recorded, 
nor do they all have sufficient capacity to be viable alternatives without upgrade; 
- ‘there is an inconsistent process used in different regions for assessing natural risks making it 
difficult to consistently assess, compare and prioritise service gaps and potential responses; 
- ‘there has been no systematic framework for recording events, or assessing infrequent risks so 
current knowledge of risk tends to be dominated by the frequently occurring events causing a 
dearth of reliable systematic assessment of the scope, location or risk of infrequent events’. 
NZ Transport Agency’s Capital Works Programme develops projects based upon a range of criteria, 
including a cost-benefit analysis, which can make it difficult to deliver projects with “resilience” as the 
primary objective or justification, though it should be noted “resilience” is often a secondary objective 
in Capital Works Programme projects.  This is because, for example, even for a relatively frequent 
natural hazard recurrence interval of 50 years, the annual benefit needs to be divided by 50.  
Calculating a Net Present Value (calculated for a 40-year period and with a relatively low 6% discount 
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rate) from the annualised benefit stream often results in a value so small that it rarely becomes a 
priority, compared to other possible improvements such as road safety. 
KiwiRail have developed several systems for consistent nationwide review of resilience related 
issues.  Rating individual slopes in terms of a “Slope Risk Ranking” allows individual slopes to be 
compared on a consistent basis across the national rail network.  Over 3,000 slopes have been 
ranked in this manner.  Additionally, KiwiRail records all incidents across the rail network and 
regularly reviews these compared to asset information such as the Slope Risk Ranking.  From this 
investment, choices for mitigation can be undertaken. 
Network-specific resilience improvements have also been made for shipping and air transport, as 
lifeline utilities.  Unfortunately, there is little publicly-available relevant information on specific 
initiatives for these networks. 
Isolated settlements, as well as wider regions supported by supply chains, are increasingly dependent 
upon distributed infrastructure.  Due to this dependency, by causing damage to distributed 
infrastructure, natural hazards can now threaten beyond their local, direct impacts.  The 14th 
November 2016 earthquake offers important insights into these increasing risks, and, accordingly, the 
success of specific resilience initiatives within the transport sector. 
3.4 Method 
This paper presents the impact of the 14th November 2016 Mw 7.8 earthquake on South Island 
transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and recovery 
phases, up until 21st February 2017, 100 days after the initial earthquake.  Throughout this paper, 
dates are referred to as “Day X”, with 14th November 2016 being Day 1 and 21st February 2017 Day 
100.  This paper uses data immediately available after the emergency response phase.  A complete 
overview of the physical and functional performance of all South Island transport is beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
The earthquake and co-seismic hazards, as well as direct impacts on road, rail, bridges, shipping and 
air transport are briefly summarised before presenting a detailed timeline of key transport events, 
derived from discussions with representatives from the NZ Transport Agency Christchurch branch, 
Canterbury CDEM, and KiwiRail (co-authors), as well as publicly-available information from NZ 
Transport Agency, KiwiRail, CentrePort, SoundsAir, CDEM, Marlborough District Council, Kaikōura 
District Council, Hurunui District Council, Waimakariri District Council, and the media.  From this 
timeline, maps are produced to show level-of-service changes between 14th November 2016 (Day 1) 
and 21st February 2017 (Day 100), for: state highway roads and alternative routes; rail lines, 
Interislander rail-enabled ferry services and official KiwiRail diversions; Interislander and Bluebridge 
vehicle and passenger ferries; and commercial flights between Kaikōura, Christchurch, Wellington, 
Blenheim, and Picton.  Secondary impacts are then presented, before discussing the timeline of 
transport interdependencies during the emergency response and initial days of recovery in the South 
Island, followed by lessons from the event. 
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3.5 Impact assessment 
3.5.1 Direct impacts 
The direct impacts of the earthquake and co-seismic hazards on road, rail, bridges, air transport and 
shipping are summarised below. 
3.5.1.1 Road 
The impact of the earthquake on roading was severe.  Prior to the earthquake, the travel time 
between Christchurch and Picton was around 4 ½ hours using SH1.  Immediately after the 
earthquake, the road travel time increased to more than 8 hours.  SH1, New Zealand’s main highway, 
was closed between Waipara and Wairau River township and SH7 (including SH7A) was closed 
between Waipara and Springs Junction (Figure 20).  Smaller roads (including Route 70) were also 
closed, making Kaikōura, Hanmer, and a number of smaller settlements in the area inaccessible by 
land.  Freight, vehicle and passenger ferry services between the North and South islands were 
suspended until damage to Wellington port could be assessed and berths cleared for use (Figure 20). 
Ground movements caused severe road cracking due to slope failure beneath the carriageway 
(Figure 13a) and vertical and horizontal displacement due to fault rupture (Figure 13b), making the 
roading network impassable at a number of locations immediately after the event (Stirling et al., 2017, 
provides an overview of fault rupture locations and impacts).  Road damage due to slope instability 
beneath the carriageway was repaired in the first few days following the earthquake in all locations 
apart from those inaccessible due to other damage typologies.  The earthquakes also increased the 
risk of co-seismic hazards.  Co-seismic landslides (Figure 13c) and rockfalls (Figure 13d) closed the 
road in a number of places, and have presented one of the greatest challenges in repairing the road 
requiring a substantial amount of time and effort to clear.  A more complete summary of landslides 
and their impacts is presented in Dellow et al. (2017). 
By the end of Day 1, SH1 had reopened from Waipara to Cheviot and SH7 between Waipara and 
Springs Junction (including daytime access along SH7A to Hanmer Springs, which was no longer 
isolated) (Figure 21), resulting in the travel time between Christchurch and Picton reducing to around 
6 ½ hours.  By Day 2, car ferry services had also resumed, albeit reduced services, making road 
travel between the North and South islands viable again (Figure 22). 
CDEM quickly prioritised access to isolated settlements, in particular to provide essential supplies 
including water, food and fuel, and to evacuate the hundreds of tourists who were trapped in Kaikōura 
(primarily to reduce the load on local supplies).  Prior to the earthquake, Kaikōura was accessible 
from the north and south by a coastal rail service and SH1, as well as via Route 70 from the south-
west (Figure 9).  Most of the smaller settlements in the area were accessible exclusively by road.  
Following the earthquake, settlements (including Kaikōura) were inaccessible by land (Figure 21). 
Despite facilitating efficient evacuation, access via air and sea were both unreliable.  For air access, 
poor weather conditions could (and did) result in no-fly days, and for sea access, damage to Kaikōura 
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port, as well as its small size, meant few vessels could dock (Cropp, 2016).  The sea bed around the 
port was uplifted and so needed to be re-surveyed for access for anything other than small boats 
(Stirling et al., 2017).  This meant access was dependent on the ability to moor offshore, and thus sea 
conditions.  Therefore, it became critical to re-establish road access. 
NZ Transport Agency began to clear SH1 from the south of Kaikōura at 06:00 on Day 2, a decision 
NZ Transport Agency described as “fairly self-evident” because the landslides north of Kaikōura were 
much larger, meaning there was greater opportunity to pursue getting the roads open to the south.  
While work began on clearing SH1, a number of options were considered by NZ Transport Agency 
and CDEM, and Route 70 was decided as the most feasible road to secure quick access to Kaikōura. 
Within the first few days, SH1 between Peketa and Mangamaunu was opened (Figure 23), and army 
convoys began travelling along Route 70 through to Kaikōura (and so also reached Peketa and 
Mangamaunu).  These convoys carried essential supplies, at the request of the Emergency Operation 
Centre in Kaikōura and Canterbury CDEM.  Before the convoy proceeded, a 10-step “Go/No Go” 
assessment (Figure 12) was conducted every morning at around 06:00, which involved a visual 
assessment of the road and geohazards (including landslide reconnaissance) by helicopter, or by 
road if the weather did not permit flying, weather forecast assessment, establishing whether the travel 
was essential, and creation of a recovery plan.  Later, specific vehicles needed to repair critical 
infrastructure were also permitted access along Route 70. 
 
Figure 12.  Canterbury CDEM “Go/No Go” criteria.  







a) Pavement cracking on SH1 due to slope 
instability.  Photo credit: Dizhur & Giaretton. 
b) Pavement rupture due to fault rupture and 
subsequent access ramp.  Photo credit: Dizhur 
& Giaretton. 
 
c) Landslide on SH1, north of Kaikōura.  Photo credit: Tonkin & Taylor. 
 
d) Rockfall on SH1, north of Kaikōura.  Photo credit: Dizhur & Giaretton. 
Figure 13.  Photos of road damage on SH1, following the 14th November 2016 earthquake. 
 





a) Rail line suspended by fault rupture (angle 
1).  Photo credit: Dizhur & Giaretton. 
b) Rail line suspended by fault rupture (angle 2).  
Photo credit: Dizhur & Giaretton. 
  
c) Large offset of rail track due to landslide.  
Photo credit: Dizhur & Giaretton. 
d) Large offset of rail track due to landslide.  
Photo credit: William Ries, GNS Science. 
 
 
e) Rail tracks severely distorted and misaligned 
due to fault rupture.  Photo credit: William Ries, 
GNS Science. 
f) Cracking of tunnel wall.                             
Photo credit: KiwiRail. 
Figure 14.  Photos of rail damage, following the 14th November 2016 earthquake. 
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Road access was a balancing act between three factors: 1. repair of the road; 2. (emergency) 
supplies for Kaikōura; and 3. access for residents (particularly for farmers to make repairs).  
Prioritisation of any of the factors slowed down the other two, meaning effective management and 
operation was critical. 
By Day 4, SH1 was open between Blenheim and Ward, and there was controlled access along SH1 
between Cheviot and Goose Bay, reducing the number of completely isolated settlements (Figure 24). 
On Day 11, the first non-emergency vehicles travelled out from Kaikōura.  81 vehicles travelled in 
convoy, subdivided into vehicle classes (i.e. cars, trucks), through Route 70 under heavy supervision 
due to the risk the road still presented.  Those wishing to travel in a convoy registered beforehand, 
and met in specified locations before proceeding, subject to the “Go/No Go” criteria.  Daily convoys in 
and out of Kaikōura along Route 70 continued until Route 70 was switched to controlled access for 
residents and emergency services on Day 23, when SH1 between Ward and Clarence was also 
opened for controlled access, meaning all settlements had road access (Figure 29).  However, the 
SH1 diversion remains in place 100 days after the event, as SH1 remains closed between 
Mangamaunu and Clarence as repair works continue (Figure 32). 
On Day 38, Route 70 was fully reopened and daytime access between Goose Bay and Peketa along 
SH1 to Kaikōura was also permitted, adding some redundancy in accessing Kaikōura (Figure 31).  
This section of SH1 closed three times during December and January, twice for a few hours due to 
weather conditions increasing the risk of rockfall onto the highway, and then for two days due to a 
slip.  Route 70 remained open throughout. 
3.5.1.2 Rail 
The earthquake and co-seismic hazards caused substantial damage to the rail network.  Immediately 
following the earthquake, all rail and rail ferry services between Palmerston North (north of 
Wellington) and Christchurch were suspended by KiwiRail until a rapid survey of the affected region 
was completed (Figure 33).  One train was trapped between damaged sections of the Main North Line 
(MNL) north of Kaikōura, as it stopped where it was during the earthquake (as is normal operating 
procedure).  The train was not damaged by the earthquake. 
While passenger rail services in the Wellington area fully resumed within 3 days following the 
earthquake, the majority of the MNL remains closed over 100 days later (Figure 38). 
KiwiRail started to assess and inspect the damage immediately after the earthquake, following the 
procedure in their “Earthquake Response for Infrastructure” Standard, with track gangs and 
inspectors undertaking visual inspections on accessible areas and flyovers over the inaccessible 
section around Kaikōura.  Engineering inspections also commenced within two days of the 
earthquake, with multiple teams assessing damage simultaneously along the MNL.  In order to 
maintain consistency in recording damage observations made by the multiple teams, a KiwiRail-
developed “Damage Classification Guideline” for rail assets was used.  Continued aftershocks and 
the very high risk of further landslides meant inspections had to be conducted in a controlled fashion.  
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The impact of aftershocks was assessed according to the above KiwiRail Standard, which required 
constant review of Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) readings following aftershocks and subsequent 
inspections (when required). 
Preliminary observations suggest that about 700-750 sites along the MNL were affected by this event, 
with tracks, bridges, tunnels, culverts, slopes, embankments and communication systems all 
damaged to varying degrees (Radio New Zealand, 2017).  Figure 14 and Figure 15 show examples of 
damage observed and recorded from the visual inspections.  Detailed damage observations on rail 
assets are still being collated. 
Rapid assessment and repairs were made to reopen the MNL between Picton and Blenheim by Day 
3, thus providing rail access to carry freight from Picton to the container transfer site at Springs Creek, 
north of Blenheim (to be later delivered by truck to Christchurch) (Figure 34). 
The rail service between the North and South islands also relies upon a rail-enabled ferry.  This did 
not resume sailing until Day 16, when the link span at the CentrePort ferry terminal in Wellington, 
used to load and discharge vehicles, was repaired (Figure 35). 
Repair works on the heavily damaged MNL continued throughout the Christmas holiday period.  This 
resulted in the reopening of a significant section of the MNL between Picton and Grassmere by Day 
64, which allowed commercial goods to be carried between Dominion Saltworks at Lake Grassmere 
and Picton (Figure 37).  These repairs also freed train wagons trapped near Lake Grassmere, 
allowing the carriages to be re-distributed around the rail network.  The train stopped partially within a 
tunnel near Kaikōura, has been moved to a different location along the MNL to take the heavy 
locomotives off a bridge to prevent damage from future aftershocks, but remains trapped.  Work trains 
were able to be run from Christchurch north to Bridge 83 on the MNL for load testing of the structures 
on Day 25, but could not travel further due to formation and bridge damage. 
Numerous teams continue to work collectively to identify badly damaged assets and to explore repair 
strategies, with achievements including: completed concept designs for strengthening and/or 
replacements of major damaged bridges and initial construction schedules; continued repairs to 
twisted tracks; detailed geotechnical assessments and testing carried out at a number of affected 
sites to prepare for major earthworks; and surveying of damaged tunnels to determine repair work 
required.  Three months following the earthquake, repair and restoration works on 120 out of over 800 
sites have been completed, and efforts are continuing to restore the remaining sections of MNL back 
to full service by the end of 2017. 




Figure 15.  Track damage states assigned (following the “KiwiRail Earthquake Damage Classification 
Guideline”) based on visual inspection of tracks: Minor (e.g. very minimal damage to rail and/or 
sleepers), Moderate (e.g. subsidence of track >150mm and/or over a distance >50m), and Major (e.g. 
significant vertical and/or horizontal movement). 




The vast majority of bridges performed well during the earthquake, with most being allowed to re-
open after inspection in the first few days after the earthquake.  Some bridges with damage to their 
piers were cleared for use before repairs were completed (Figure 16b, Figure 16c, Figure 16d). 
Although the bridge structures withstood the earthquakes well, demonstrating considerable 
robustness, many bridge approaches were damaged due to settlement and horizontal movement 
(Figure 16a), thereby making some bridges impassable.  Approach reconstruction through the 
placement of fill and resealing quickly made the majority of these road bridges usable again.  In some 
locations diversions were put in place to bypass damaged road bridges (such as the Oara Bridge in 
Figure 16a that crosses rail lines), and along Route 70 one bridge was replaced by a temporary 
Bailey bridge alongside the repair to other parts of the Route to allow for access.  Displacement is a 
greater problem for rail lines than roads, whether vertical or horizontal (Figure 16e).  However, given 
the damage to other parts of the rail network, this damage is not immediately critical, and repair can 
be scheduled accordingly. 
Palermo et al. (2017) provide an in-depth summary of the structural and geotechnical engineering-
related impacts to road bridges. 
3.5.1.4 Shipping 
Most ports throughout New Zealand were undamaged by the earthquakes, with the major exception 
of CentrePort in Wellington, which suffered substantial damage due to liquefaction-induced settlement 
and lateral spreading, rendering the port’s container cranes inoperable (Cubrinovski et al., 2017). 
Two ferry services, Bluebridge and Interislander, provide the main ferry link between the North and 
South islands between Wellington and Picton.  Ferry services between Wellington and Picton 
resumed by Day 2 (Figure 22), with the only major restriction being for foot passengers, who could not 
board the ferries due to terminal damage.  By Day 4, foot passage was again possible both ways 
between Wellington and Picton on Bluebridge services (Figure 24), although full Interislander 
operation did not resume until Day 23 (Figure 29). 
Kaikōura port was also damaged.  The sea bed around the port was uplifted and needed to be re-
surveyed for access for anything other than small boats (Stirling et al., 2017).  In part also due to its 
small size, this meant sea access to Kaikōura was dependent on the ability to moor offshore, and thus 
sea conditions. 
3.5.1.5 Air Transport 
There were no major direct impacts to the air network.  Wellington and Christchurch international 
airports, and Kaikōura and Blenheim regional airports, were undamaged and virtually uninterrupted 
following brief (less than one hour) closures for inspections. 
  




a) Oaro bridge approach failure and pavement 
cracking.  Photo credit: Dizhur & Giaretton. 
b) Lower Mason bridge with damaged supports.  
Photo credit: Dizhur & Giaretton. 
  
c) Lower Mason bridge support damage.     
Photo credit: Dizhur & Giaretton. 
d) Lower Mason bridge support repair.        
Photo credit: Liam Wotherspoon, UoA. 
  
e) Rail bridge 97 MNL approach offset and rail 
alignment failure.                                          
Photo credit: Dizhur & Giaretton. 
f) Rail bridge 129 MNL span dislocated from 
abutment due to Kekerengu Fault rupture.  
Photo credit: Tim Little, VUW. 
Figure 16.  Photos of bridge damage on SH1 and rail, following the 14th November 2016 
earthquake. 
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3.5.2 Secondary impacts 
3.5.2.1 Road 
  
a) Ruptured ground with increased landslide 
risk to the road.  Photo credit: Aurecon, 2016. 
b) Landslide undercutting road, slumping 
potential.  Photo credit: Aurecon, 2016. 
Figure 17.  Co-seismic impacts. 
The vulnerability of the state highway network to different and cascading hazards presented a 
substantial risk throughout the emergency operation, and continues to do so during the recovery 
phase, especially to working crews who must carefully execute tasks in a controlled manner due to 
the risks.  Figure 17a shows an example of fault rupture increasing the risk of a landslide onto the 
road, and Figure 17b shows an example where a landslide below the road has increased the risk of 
slumping.  Canterbury CDEM noted these hazards were not apparent when viewed from road level, 
despite the obvious threat they presented when viewed from above as part of an aerial geotechnical 
assessment. 
Perhaps the most substantial secondary impact to the state highway network was that the section of 
SH6 between SH63 and SH65 became the only section of road connecting Canterbury, the West 
Coast, Southland and Otago to the North Island through Picton and Wellington.  Presently, there is no 
redundancy for this stretch of road, a problem which has been highlighted by the relative ease by 
which other state highways have been closed due to weather and fire events.  These include SH6, 
which was partially closed between south of Havelock and north of Rai Valley township on Day 2 due 
to a slip and flooding following heavy rain, and more recently SH7, which was closed for over eight 
hours due to rural fire on 1st March 2017.  Similar challenges exist for a road closure due to a vehicle 
crash, which becomes more likely with increased traffic flows. 
In an attempt to reduce the risk of motor vehicle crashes on SH63, SH6, SH65 and SH7, NZ 
Transport Agency has increased signage, increased public communication with key messages, 
installed temporary traffic signals at one bridge, improved delineation, and reduced the speed limit 
from 100 km/h to 80 km/h, and down to 60 km/h through Wairau River township (Eder, 2016).  Police 
enforcement has also increased, and NZ Transport Agency has also enhanced its response 
measures. 
The additional traffic, particularly heavy truck freight, is causing further travel time delays, as well as 
accelerated pavement damage resulting in large additional maintenance costs.  To increase road 
capacity, NZ Transport Agency has increased the number of passing bays to increase the number of 
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overtaking opportunities, widened the sealed width of roads, and on SH63, constructed three new 
Bailey bridges alongside pre-existing one lane bridges, to allow simultaneous two-way traffic flow 
(Bartlett, 2017; Buick, 2017).  Strengthening of large stretches of the alternative route’s pavement was 
also required, principally on SH63, as it was not originally designed for the traffic loading (diverted 
from SH1 and as well as diverted rail freight) now travelling the route. 
3.5.2.2 Rail 
The earthquake cost KiwiRail $12 million from loss of trade to the end of December, and KiwiRail 
estimates direct costs from loss of trade due to the disruption of the MNL will be around $25 million by 
the end of June 2017.  Estimates suggest the total cost to repair the rail line will be approximately 
$500 million (25% of the total estimated $2 billion to restore the transport corridor), although 60-80% 
of this cost is likely to be met by KiwiRail insurance (Radio New Zealand, 2017). 
The loss of the rail line caused increased use of the road and shipping networks (Figure 35); since the 
MNL is an important freight line, KiwiRail’s immediate efforts were focussed on minimising the 
disruption to the New Zealand exporters.  This included trucking stock along the alternative state 
highway route and arranging rail alternatives for Wellington port freight customers to other North 
Island ports (Figure 35). 
To further reduce disruption to freight customers, and to reduce truck congestion on already 
increased road demands, KiwiRail entered the coastal freight shipping market with a new “NZ 
Connect” service on Day 15 (with support of Ports of Auckland, Lyttelton Port of Christchurch and 
ANL Shipping) (Figure 35).  Auckland and Christchurch ports expanded operations and rail services 
were increased from the ports’ inland hubs to maximise the effectiveness of the freight route. 
The train trapped near Kaikōura (Section 3.5.1.2) was looted (Eder, 2017).  This led to KiwiRail 
working with the police to better secure the remaining train cargo.  On Day 38, a crane arrived to 
remove containers off the train, so they could be delivered by road. 
Unrelated to the earthquake, a large rural fire closed the Christchurch to Greymouth line on 4th 
February 2017 (Day 83) (Figure 38), and this did not reopen until 22nd March, further reducing rail 
capacity within the South Island in the interim. 
3.5.2.3 North Canterbury Transport Infrastructure Rebuild (NCTIR) alliance 
Following the initial earthquake damage, there was multi-agency discussion about whether SH1 and 
the MNL railway line should be reopened, especially around the most severely damaged section 
between Mangamaunu and Clarence (Figure 32) (Davies et al., 2016; O'Connell, 2016).  NZ 
Transport Agency report that within one to two weeks (following the earthquake), the question of 
whether to abandon the coastal road and instead develop an alternate route, such as upgrading the 
Molesworth Track or Rainbow Road, was raised.  Both are poor quality, summer-only, roads that 
already exist.  KiwiRail also report discussing possible alternatives but suggest these were less 
attractive and realistic than the road alternatives.  During these discussions, it quickly became clear 
that reopening the existing coastal route was the most viable option, for three primary reasons: 
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1. Distance: the existing coastal route is by far the shortest route. 
2. Cost: The existing coastal route would be able to be cleared many times over for the cost of 
upgrading other routes (which themselves are located in a high hazard risk area). 
3. Reliability: regular winter closures versus occasional storm surge closures.  Alternatives 
including the Molesworth Track and Rainbow Road traverse high mountain passes, and so 
would be closed many times during each winter just with snow and ice events.  NZ Transport 
Agency considers infrequent (even when slightly more damaging) closures preferable to 
frequent closures. 
Accordingly, the Government passed emergency legislation to ensure repairs to the coastal route 
could be accelerated, and on Day 32, Cabinet (a council of senior Government ministers which 
formulates Government policy) agreed to fund the works required, which were estimated at a cost of 
between $1.4 billion and $2 billion (Bridges, 2016b).  Following this decision, on Day 38, the 
Government announced the North Canterbury Transport Infrastructure Rebuild (NCTIR) alliance, 
between NZ Transport Agency, KiwiRail, Fulton Hogan, Downer, Higgins and HEB Construction 
(Bridges, 2016a). 
The alliance is responsible for SH1, Route 70, the SH7, SH65, SH6 and SH63 alternative route, and 
the MNL rail corridor.  NCTIR is led by Duncan Gibb, former lead of the Stronger Christchurch 
Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT), and was formed to reduce delays caused by tendering for work, 
and to pool resources to ensure a more cost-effective repair of the rail and road, in the same 
approach used by SCIRT (Bridges, 2016a): this ability to pool resources was a key consideration 
when considering whether to repair the coastal route or upgrade an alternative. 
NCTIR is operating as the lead delivery agency, managing, operating and undertaking all repair, 
recovery, rebuild and resilience works: where appropriate, NCTIR will take the opportunity to make 
some strategic resilience investments, such as road shoulder and lane widening, raising the road 
and/or tracks in areas susceptible to storm surges, and building rockfall and landslide mitigation 
structures, as can be found elsewhere in New Zealand (Figure 18).  The extent to which such 
resilience measures are implemented is expected to be decided by mid-2017. 
 
Figure 18.  Otira rock fall shelter and aqueduct (Mattinbgn, 2011). 




Most ports throughout New Zealand were undamaged by the earthquakes, with the major exception 
of Centreport, Wellington, which suffered substantial damage.  Many cargo ships were diverted from 
Wellington to other ports including Napier, Tauranga and Auckland.  This contributed to a doubling of 
freight demand between Auckland and Christchurch, New Zealand’s busiest domestic sea route.  A 
reduction in rail freight capacity also contributed to this increase in demand (Section 3.5.2.2). 
Ferry services between Wellington and Picton resumed by Day 2 (Figure 22), with the only major 
restriction being for foot passengers, who could not board the ferries due to terminal damage.  By Day 
4, foot passage was again possible both ways between Wellington and Picton on Bluebridge services 
(Figure 24), although full Interislander operation did not resume until Day 23 (Figure 29). 
Shipping was also used as a key emergency resource for Kaikōura, being used to evacuate 635 
people from Kaikōura on HMNZS Canterbury to Lyttleton Port and provide emergency supplies for the 
township. 
3.5.2.5 Air 
Immediately following the earthquake, many settlements (including Kaikōura) were inaccessible by 
land.  Therefore, helicopters were extensively used to access these settlements (there was huge 
demand for helicopter access from CDEM, infrastructure providers, media, scientists and other 
groups), as well as plane and sea access for Kaikōura, via its small airfield and port.  Due to high 
usage, a five-day Temporary Restricted Area was established around Kaikōura on Day 4, to facilitate 
safe aircraft operation during the emergency response (Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19.  The five-day Temporary Restricted Area (NZR892) established in the Kaikōura Area on 
Day 4 (Jenkins, 2016). 
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To evacuate tourists (and vulnerable residents) quickly, a “don’t come back empty” policy was 
implemented by CDEM where possible and appropriate.  The Emergency Operations Centre in 
Kaikōura prioritised evacuees, and through this policy, New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) 
helicopters delivering emergency supplies to Kaikōura evacuated 198 people by the end of Day 2, 
and a further 165 by the end of Day 3.  Air evacuees were received at Woodend by Waimakariri 
District Council and a number of agencies, including travel agents, on behalf of Canterbury CDEM. 
Private airlines also added flights, providing capacity when other transport modes could not.  On Day 
2, Air New Zealand operated an additional return flight between Wellington and Marlborough, as 
ferries were reduced, and, with no road access, SoundsAir operated four flights from Kaikōura to 
Christchurch and Pelorus Air provided a charter service between Marlborough and Kaikōura (Figure 
22).  On Day 3, SoundsAir flew four flights from Kaikōura to Wellington (Figure 23).  Additionally, on 
Day 8 (still with no public road access to Kaikōura), SoundsAir launched two temporary daily services, 
between Kaikōura and Christchurch and Kaikōura and Blenheim (Figure 26).  As part of this service, 
the company also offered to carry the town’s postal deliveries on the flights (Lewis, 2016a).  All these 
Kaikōura flights were new routes, and were limited to small aircraft, typically carrying 10 passengers, 
due to the length of the runway.  Finally, SoundsAir added additional flights between Christchurch and 
Blenheim for the Christmas and New Year period, as demand increased due to the long inland road 
diversion (Figure 29) (Lewis, 2016b). 
3.5.3 Timeline of key transport events 
A detailed table of key transport events during the first 100 days following the 14th November 2016 is 
provided in Appendix C (Table 13). 
The below maps show level-of-service changes between 14th November 2016 (Day 1) to 21st 
February 2017 (Day 100), for: state highway roads and alternative routes; rail lines and official 
KiwiRail diversions; Bluebridge and Interislander vehicle and people ferries; and commercial flights 
between Kaikōura, Christchurch, Wellington, Blenheim, and Picton.  Where days are stated without 
times, the maps show level-of-service at the end of the day. 
The maps are split into two sets.  Figure 20 to Figure 32 show state highways and alternative routes, 
commercial flights and both Bluebridge and Interislander vehicle and passenger ferry services, which 
provide the main ferry link between the North and South islands between Wellington and Picton.  Rail 
lines and official KiwiRail diversions are displayed separately in Figure 33 to Figure 38.  This is largely 
because the rail and road network follow similar routes, making it difficult to display them on the same 
maps.  The rail levels-of-service shown are for freight trains only; the daily rail passenger service 
between Picton and Christchurch has been cancelled until the end of 2017.  The rail maps also show 
the level-of-service for the rail component of the rail-enabled Aratere Interislander ferry (the Aratere 
also carries vehicles and foot passengers, included in the vehicle and passenger ferry services: 
Figure 20 to Figure 32). 
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3.5.3.1 Level-of-service mapping for state highway roads and alternative routes, commercial 
flights, and Bluebridge and Interislander vehicle and passenger ferries. 
 
Figure 20.  Level-of-service at 03:00 on Day 1 (14th November 2016). 
 
Figure 21.  Level-of-service at 16:00 on Day 1 (14th November 2016). 




Figure 22.  Level-of-service on Day 2 (15th November 2016). 
 
Figure 23.  Level-of-service on Day 3 (16th November 2016). 




Figure 24.  Level-of-service on Day 4 (17th November 2016). 
 
Figure 25.  Level-of-service on Day 5 (18th November 2016). 




Figure 26.  Level-of-service on Day 8 (21st November 2016). 
 
Figure 27.  Level-of-service on Day 12 (25th November 2016). 




Figure 28.  Level-of-service on Day 16 (29th November 2016). 
 
Figure 29.  Level-of-service on Day 23 (6th December 2016). 




Figure 30.  Level-of-service on Day 29 (12th December 2016). 
 
Figure 31.  Level-of-service on Day 38 (21st December 2016). 




Figure 32.  Level-of-service on Day 100 (21st February 2017). 
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3.5.3.2 Level-of-service mapping for rail lines carrying freight goods only, the rail component of 
the Aratere rail-enabled Interislander ferry, and official KiwiRail diversions. 
 
Figure 33.  Rail level-of-service on Day 1 (14th November 2016). 
 
Figure 34.  Rail level-of-service on Day 3 (16th November 2016). 




Figure 35.  Rail level-of-service on Day 16 (29th November 2016). 
 
Figure 36.  Rail level-of-service on Day 25 (8th December 2016). 




Figure 37.  Rail level-of-service on Day 64 (16th January 2016). 
 
Figure 38.  Rail level-of-service on Day 100 (21st February 2017). 




3.6.1 National and regional response and resilience 
From the national and regional economy perspective, the earthquake was severe due to the damage 
to distributed infrastructure, particularly transportation networks: immediately following the 
earthquake, SH1 was closed between Waipara and Wairau River township, SH7 (including SH7A) 
was closed between Waipara and Springs Junction, increasing the travel time between Christchurch 
and Picton from around 3½ hours to more than 8 hours (Figure 20), all rail services between 
Palmerston North (North Island, north of Wellington) and Christchurch were suspended (Figure 33), 
and Picton and Wellington ports were closed, closing the main sea link between the South and North 
islands.  This caused regional impacts, particularly disrupting supply chains (Market Economics, 
2017).  However, although there was still substantial strain on the transportation network, by the end 
of Day 1 access had greatly improved (Figure 21).  SH1 had reopened from Waipara to Cheviot and 
SH7 had reopened between Waipara and Springs Junction (including daytime access along SH7A to 
Hanmer Springs), meaning the travel time between Christchurch and Picton became around 6½ 
hours.  All ports were functioning (some at reduced capacity), and alternative cargo transport routes 
(by air, ferry, and road) remained.  By Day 2, extra passenger flights were also being arranged where 
the usual transport capacity had been reduced below pre-earthquake levels, both between North 
Island and South Island locations, and between South Island locations (Figure 22). 
The event evidenced strong resilient characteristics of the New Zealand transport network, 
highlighting the value of resilient design, interdependency planning, mutual assistance agreements, 
and highly trained, adaptable and scalable human resources, encouraged by New Zealand’s strong 
lifelines culture.  While the continued closure of critical sections of the country’s main highway, SH1, 
and in particular the loss of rail freight transport along the MNL railway line between Picton and 
Christchurch, have caused a major national issue in the aftermath of the earthquake, cross-network 
interdependencies and service provider adaptability have ensured continued transport of goods and 
people since Day 1.  Air and sea transport increased capacity quickly, both for emergency response 
and to ensure routine transport of goods continued as rail services were substantially reduced.  Road 
transport has been diverted, and although subsequently delayed, has remained operable under 
increased traffic flows due to the availability of alternative routes and rapid deployment of response 
measures (Section 3.5.2.1), facilitating further usage increase from rail diversions.  Although these 
alternative routes are under heavy pressure, these outcomes suggest the NIU’s focus on 
interdependency resilience and whole-of-system improved service, rather than asset, resilience is, at 
least to a degree, being achieved (Section 3.3.1). 
However, whether the current level of regional resilience is acceptable, especially given the 
unreliability of air and sea travel (Section 3.5.1.1), remains an important consideration.  The rapid 
deployment of a number of response measures facilitated the SH7, SH65, SH6 and SH63 alternative 
route to provide sufficient redundancy, but the South Island remains vulnerable as the SH6 section of 
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the alternative route is currently the only route connecting Canterbury, the West Coast, Southland and 
Otago to the North Island through Picton and Wellington, a problem highlighted by the relative ease 
by which other state highways have been closed by weather and fire events in recent months within 
the South Island alone (Section 3.5.2.1).  Additionally, the impact to KiwiRail caused by the closure of 
one rail line has been immense (Section 3.5.2.2).  The rail network is at present entirely dependent on 
shipping and road to operate.  Without Government ownership and funding, including establishing 
NCTIR, the ongoing viability of the rail network would have been questionable; it is worth noting the 
resilience the government has added in this event. 
It is also worth noting that the negative impacts of this event have been reduced by circumstance.  
While the event caused no transport-related deaths or injuries, had this event occurred during 
daytime, this almost certainly would not have been the case.  Additionally, in the 100 days after the 
event, the aftershock sequence caused relatively few transportation impacts, allowing for a swifter 
response and recovery operation.  The event also uplifted the land relative to the sea by 1-2 m, itself 
increasing resilience to future coastal hazards, and reducing damage caused by the tsunami which 
followed the earthquake (further reduced because the event happened between mid and low tide) 
(Daly, 2017). 
This event has highlighted the vulnerability of New Zealand’s regional transportation networks, which 
have limited or no redundancy in some cases.  It is critical to address this issue in the area affected, 
and in other equally vulnerable regions.  High-functioning alternative route redundancy, which can 
perform if another route or line is damaged (an area NZ Transport Agency had already identified as 
requiring improvement; Section 3.3.2), is evidently needed (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2014; 
Wilson et al., 2016).  Using the road diversion as an example, while the longer route and increased 
volumes of traffic inevitably increased travel times, travel times along the alternative route could have 
been improved by pre-event measures including strengthening the pavement to cope with heavier 
truck loads, placing sufficient passing bays for high volumes of traffic, and building two-way traffic 
bridges at locations that could become bottlenecks under high traffic flows, instead of implementing 
these measures post-earthquake (Section 3.5.2.1). 
3.6.2 Local response and resilience 
The damage to land transport networks caused direct local impacts, including acute isolation of 
communities.  However, the effective response to regional transport challenges allowed CDEM to 
quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements. 
Road access to Kaikōura was first restored through Route 70, due to the heavier damage sustained 
by SH1.  This local road, owned by Hurunui and Kaikōura district councils (Figure 9), was managed 
by Canterbury CDEM in conjunction with NZ Transport Agency under the declared State of 
Emergency, as an alternative to the damaged (and closed) state highway.  Road management was a 
balancing act between three priorities: 1. repair of the road; 2. (emergency) supplies for and 
evacuation from Kaikōura; and 3. access for residents (including farmers).  Effective management 
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and operation was critical but challenging as prioritisation of any of the factors slowed down the other 
two, and the organisational arrangement had never previously been exercised.  This led to some 
(short) operational delays and inconsistent public messaging.  NZ Transport Agency took full control 
of managing Route 70 on Day 16 (29th November 2016), and singularly managed the road until Day 
38, when the Government announced NCTIR, which assumed responsibility for the rebuild of SH1, 
Route 70 and the MNL rail corridor. 
While all settlements had road access by Day 23, CDEM currently advises residents to be prepared 
with 7 days of emergency supplies.  Although helicopter and (to some extent) sea access were 
sufficient during this event, the event also highlighted the unreliability of these modes of emergency 
transport (Section 3.5.1.1).  This evidence, along with scenarios being produced for other potential 
hazardous events, such as an Alpine Fault rupture scenario that suggests air response may be limited 
(Robinson et al., 2015), mean the length of time without road access seen in Kaikōura could be a 
realistic example of the length of time people should be prepared to be isolated for.  This highlights 
the importance of preparedness, and the gap between recommendations and expected future events. 
3.7 Conclusion 
With increasing reliance on transport networks for vital services, such as just-in-time food and other 
fast-moving consumer goods delivery, the need for a resilient transport network has never been 
greater.  From the national and regional economy perspective, the 14th November 2016 Mw 7.8 
earthquake was severe due to the damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation 
networks.  100 days after the event, sections of New Zealand’s main highway, State Highway 1 
(SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line between Picton and Christchurch (Figure 9) remain 
closed and the major consequential issue still facing New Zealand.  However, cross-network 
interdependencies and service provider adaptability have ensured continued regional transport of 
goods and people since Day 1, and this effective response to regional transport challenges allowed 
CDEM to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements. 
This earthquake, alongside coincident events (such as severe weather and rural fires), highlighted the 
need for well-practiced, efficient responses; major strengthening and engineering structures along 
critical transport routes; and high-functioning alternative route redundancy, which can perform if 
another route or line is damaged.  This work needs to be evidence-based and should take a holistic 
view of the essential nature of transportation infrastructure.  Settlements were also without road 
access for 23 days, raising questions of the validity of current CDEM generic advice that residents 
nationally should be prepared with 7 days of emergency supplies.  In rural and potentially isolated 
communities, advising preparation for a longer period appears necessary. 
Much of the groundwork for a resilient transport network was evidenced by this event, but it is 
important to learn from this, as well as from similar events experienced around the world.  This 
earthquake has highlighted the vulnerability of New Zealand’s distributed infrastructure networks, 
which have little or no redundancy throughout the country.  Ensuring the services provided by 
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distributed infrastructure can remain functional after a natural hazard is a critical challenge in order to 
ensure the future viability of the country, which will face multiple known hazards, some of which will 
be of greater magnitude than this event, in the future. 
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4. The value of natural hazards scenario planning in increasing community disaster 
resilience: developing the AF8+ scenario for Franz Josef and the West Coast region, 
New Zealand 
Note: Some of the material at the beginning of this chapter is repeated from Chapter 1 because this 
chapter forms the basis of a standalone paper. 
4.1 Abstract 
Collaboration to enable integrated disaster impact reduction decision-making has become a political, 
policy and practice priority.  However, while the importance of participatory decision-making has been 
well recognised, the development of effective participatory approaches in practice has lagged far 
behind.  In this paper, a transferrable scenario-based participatory approach is developed and 
applied, using a large-scale earthquake hazard event scenario, in a “pre-disaster” collaboration.  
Sequencing participatory methodologies within the scenario-based participatory approach allowed 
stakeholders to engage with and gain more influence over the process at their relevant scale (i.e. 
local, regional, or national), as well as enabling the process design to better suit the participation 
capacities of the stakeholder groups.  This approach enabled community knowledge to be integrated 
and balanced with and alongside that of infrastructure providers, emergency managers, local 
government policymakers and researchers to proactively increase resilience to naturally-triggered 
disasters.  The process demonstrated the ability to co-create knowledge which in turn can inform 
decision-making.  Further, the process also directly increased the resilience of Franz Josef, New 
Zealand, and the resilience of distributed infrastructure networks by stakeholders actioning the 
developed shared understanding. 
4.2 Introduction 
Collaboration to enable integrated disaster impact reduction decision-making has become a political, 
policy and practice priority, for example, featuring in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNISDR, 2015).  Although hazards and impacts may be regional, disasters are local 
events which first and foremost affect local communities (Gaillard & Mercer, 2013).  This realisation 
has contributed to growing recognition of the need to involve community members in decision-making 
that affects their disaster resilience (Ackerman, 2004; Maskrey, 2011; Murphy et al., 2014; Pearce, 
2003).  The term “community” is often used to denote a group of people living or working in a 
geographic location, and particularly those who are involved to at least some extent in government or 
other administrative decision-making affecting the relevant location.  However, this use of the term 
“community” has been critiqued on the grounds that it implies a homogeneity that does not exist in 
practice, meaning that so-called “community based” initiatives that assume this homogeneity risk 
overlooking existing conflicts and entrenching existing, inequitable power relations (e.g. Cannon, 
2014).  Acknowledging the validity of this critique, and the essentially heterogenous reality of any 
population, the term “community” is used in this article to refer to the varied group of people who are 
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(or are likely to be) exposed to the same disaster impacts through social, spatial and/or immediate 
economic links (Appendix B). 
The benefits of inclusive, participatory approaches have been well established, and include better 
quality decisions and better identification of vulnerabilities, as well as more empowerment of locals, 
greater perceptions that decisions are fair, reduced conflict, and increased trust in decision-makers 
(see Reed, 2008, for a summary).  While the importance of participatory decision-making has been 
well recognised, the development of effective participatory approaches in practice has lagged far 
behind (Ackerman, 2004; Díez et al., 2015; Howard, 2018).  Community participation involves 
substantial time and effort, when all stakeholders have limited time, resources and interest, restricting 
their capacity to participate in or facilitate additional activities (Reed et al., 2013).  Further, while 
community members often participate in disaster impact reduction efforts, integrating and balancing 
the knowledge of community members with and alongside that of practitioners, policymakers and 
researchers remains rare and difficult (Ackerman, 2004; Aoki, 2018; Broad et al., 2007; Cooke & 
Kothari, 2001; Pearce, 2003; van der Vegt, 2017).  Unbalanced participation reduces opportunities for 
knowledge integration and, moreover, can reinforce existing privileges (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; 
Nelson & Wright, 1995), reduce trust (which must be earned) in the process and/or facilitator (Eiser et 
al., 2012; Ravera et al., 2011; Reed, 2008), and cause engagement fatigue and disillusionment 
(Burton et al., 2004; Cooke, 2004; Reed, 2008; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000), all of which discourage 
(future) participation. 
When developing participatory decision-making approaches, methodological advances have also not 
been well documented and so have not been well used, partly due to the abundance of participation 
methodologies being developed (Fung, 2006; Rowe & Frewer, 2005; van der Vegt, 2017).  Typologies 
have been used to clarify key participatory methodological elements since the early and influential 
‘ladder of citizen participation’ (Arnstein, 1969, p. 217).  Aoki (2018) provides one of the most recent 
and comprehensive typologies, by adapting the Fung (2006) typology through both a literature review 
and through learnings from a case study of a post-disaster recovery process in the remote Japanese 
community of Onagawa, Japan, where community members and government experts shared 
decision-making responsibilities.  However, Aoki (2018) found that sequencing participation allows 
different stakeholder groups to participate more intensely at different stages during the overall 
process, focussing on relevant areas.  This helps to ensure that “solutions” which are not technically 
or financially feasible and so can undermine trust, are not proposed. 
In this doctoral project, for example, community members had more influence on assessments of 
potential disaster impacts on the community, but less influence on assessments of technical 
infrastructure restoration times (over which infrastructure providers gain more influence).  This made it 
possible for community members to influence decisions concerning infrastructure restoration 
priorities.  Sequencing participation also helped to overcome barriers to participation by reducing the 
time commitment required from each stakeholder group, as discussions of most interest to individual 
stakeholder groups could be held without requiring all involved to participate.  This also helped to 
constrain and ensure credibility, reducing the potential for confusion caused by non-experts debating 
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and speculating about needs and outcomes they know little about.  For example, network 
infrastructure providers may have little knowledge of community post-disaster needs, while 
community members do not have access to network restoration times.  
While all communities benefit from participating in disaster impact reduction efforts to some extent, 
this participation is essential for remote communities at risk of isolation due to disaster impacts 
(Chapter 2).  Although specific definitions vary, most countries use (small) size, and distance from 
essential services (e.g. hospitals) and urban centres (geographic remoteness) when categorising the 
‘remoteness’ of regions and communities (e.g. Fiji Bureau of Statistics, n.d.; SARRAH, n.d.; Statistics 
Canada, n.d.; Stats NZ, n.d.).  Community members in remote locations are relied upon to implement 
disaster resilience. This reliance has been driven by the need for cost efficiency and by pragmatism in 
some countries (Remling & Veitayaki, 2016), and is usually required because if isolated, community 
members in remote communities must lead immediate response efforts in the absence of input from 
authorities (Gardner, 2015; Orchiston, 2013).  A growing body of evidence indicates that if community 
members are not involved in disaster governance, or do not trust the outcomes, they are not likely to 
implement the proposed disaster impact reduction measures (Eiser et al., 2012; Ellemor, 2005; 
Murphy et al., 2014).  Therefore, for a disaster impact reduction initiative to succeed in a remote 
community, community members must adopt and take ownership of the initiative (Chapter 2; Remling 
& Veitayaki, 2016). 
This paper is situated at the intersection between research and practice fields concerned with remote 
communities, distributed infrastructure, emergency management and hazard science.  It reports on 
the development of a transferrable scenario-based participatory approach, using a large-scale 
earthquake hazard event scenario, and its application in a remote community, through a collaboration 
between community members in Franz Josef, New Zealand, infrastructure providers, emergency 
managers, local government policymakers and researchers. 
In this paper, we attempt to answer the following research questions: 
1. What is required to develop an effective participatory process which integrates local 
knowledge, technical knowledge and hazard impact science, in a balanced collaboration, for 
disaster impact reduction? 
2. How might such a participatory approach integrate ongoing participant outputs as inputs, to 
ensure that disaster impact reduction efforts continue to iteratively build on improvements in 
shared understanding? 
3. What is required to create a transferrable participatory approach for disaster impact 
reduction? 
To answer these research questions, we: 
1. Develop a transferrable participatory approach for disaster impact reduction by combining and 
sequencing participation methodologies. 
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2. Apply this scenario-based participatory approach in a “pre-disaster” collaboration between 
community members, infrastructure providers, emergency managers, local government 
policymakers and researchers to: 
a. Advance collective understandings of the impacts, resource needs, and recovery 
strategies of the participating stakeholder groups; 
b. Increase the effectiveness and shared ownership of disaster impact reduction efforts; 
and consequently, 
c. Increase community resilience to future hazard events. 
4.2.1 Franz Josef case-study 
Franz Josef/Waiau is a remote community located in Westland district, within the West Coast region 
of the South Island of New Zealand (Figure 39).  The town is famous for the nearby temperate 
maritime glacier, which descends from the Southern Alps to around 400 metres above sea level.  Kā 
Roimata o Hine Hukatere, later also named Franz Josef Glacier, was first shown to Europeans by 
Māori in the mid-19th Century (Glacier Country Tourism Group, 2018b).  A settlement has existed for 
the purpose of showing the glacier to tourists since the late-19th Century, when tracks and bridges 
were built to provide access onto the glacier (Glacier Country Tourism Group, 2018b; Langridge et al., 
2016).  This settlement was later named after the glacier. 
Franz Josef’s visitor numbers have risen sharply over the last decade, driven largely by a desire to 
see the glacier (Mitchell & Williams, 2018; Wilson et al., 2014).  Franz Josef Glacier and the 
neighbouring Fox Glacier had 700,000 visitors in 2016, roughly 20% of total visitor arrivals in New 
Zealand in the same year (Tonkin + Taylor & EY, 2017).  For context, in 2016, international tourism 
expenditure contributed NZ$14.5 billion or 20.7% of New Zealand’s total exports of goods and 
services (Stats NZ, 2016).  This increase in visitors means that the number of tourists can dwarf the 
number of town residents during the summer peak tourist season.  For example, in 2018, 
approximately 6,000 people per day walked the Franz Josef Glacier track at this time of year (Morton, 
2018).  The town, however, has a resident population of approximately 450 people (Stats NZ, 2013). 
Community members have identified that they need business expansion, including larger premises, to 
cope with the current tourism “boom”, increased tourism in winter to improve sustainability, and 
business diversification to reduce the town’s dependence on the glacier, which is experiencing 
prolonged retreat (Purdie et al., 2014), for the town to continue to prosper.  However, while the 
community wants to increase investment in Franz Josef and expand the town, development is 
presently constrained by the recognition that the town is exposed to natural hazards including 
earthquakes, floods, landslides, landslide-dambreak floods, severe storms (including ex-cyclones) 
and tornadoes (Westland District Council, 2002) (Figure 39). 




Figure 39.  Maps of Franz Josef.  A: Franz Josef, and its location within New Zealand. 
B: Alpine Fault trace, FRAZ, rockfall & landslide zones (Tonkin + Taylor & EY, 2017, p. 26). 
C: 100-year modelled river flood with 6 m bed aggradation (Tonkin + Taylor & EY, 2017, p. 29). 
Franz Josef has developed at the foot of the Southern Alps, on the northern bank of the Waiho 
(Waiau) River, around and across what was later recognised to be the fault trace of the Alpine Fault 
(Langridge & Beban, 2011; Langridge & Ries, 2009; McSaveney & Davies, 1998; Wellman, 1953).  
This has meant that some buildings and town infrastructure are located directly on the fault trace 
(Figure 39).  The Alpine Fault is active and considered capable of generating a Mw 8 earthquake 
(Stirling et al., 2012).  Late in its current seismic cycle, this fault has an estimated ~30% probability of 
a major rupture in the next 50 years (Barnes et al., 2013; Cochran et al., 2017; De Pascale & 
Langridge, 2012; Stirling et al., 2012).  The Waiho River also poses a constant flooding hazard.  Major 
aggradation since the late-19th Century (Glacier Country Tourism Group, 2018a) has meant that the 
majority of the town is now located below the river bed.  This makes Franz Josef completely reliant on 
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(Langridge et al., 2016; McSaveney & Davies, 1998).  Nearby development potential is also reduced 
due to the flooding hazards posed by several nearby secondary catchments (Docherty Creek, Tartare 
Stream, Stony Creek and Potters Creek), and the town’s range-front location, which presents a 
landslide risk (Langridge et al., 2016).  While this landslide risk presently requires intensive 
investigation, it is potentially devastating (Barth, 2013; Langridge et al., 2016). 
The threat of a major Alpine Fault earthquake, which could isolate Franz Josef and the wider West 
Coast region, has received focussed attention in New Zealand in recent years (Orchiston et al., 2018; 
Robinson et al., 2015).  The annual probability of a major Alpine Fault earthquake is high (30% 
chance of a Mw 8.0 rupture in the next 50 years) (Stirling et al., 2012; Cochran et al., 2017) and prior 
to the present study, the national, regional and local implications of an Alpine Fault earthquake 
scenario had been considered by academics, disaster managers, infrastructure providers, and 
community members (McSaveney & Davies, 1998; Orchiston et al., 2013; Orchiston et al., 2018; 
Robinson et al., 2014; Robinson et al., 2015).  Notably, Alpine Fault scenarios have been used in two 
recent and high-profile national exercises.  For Exercise Te Ripahapa, an Alpine Fault scenario was 
developed for a national emergency management exercise in 2013 (Robinson et al., 2014).  
Subsequently, beginning in 2016, Project AF8 ran six regional and one national collaborative 
response planning workshops, based around a 7-day Alpine Fault magnitude 8 earthquake scenario 
(building on the scenario developed for Exercise Te Ripahapa).  Project AF8 aimed to integrate 
regional plans and national planning, and workshop participants included emergency managers, 
policymakers, lifeline utilities, and welfare representatives, amongst others (Orchiston et al., 2018). 
4.2.1.1 Franz Josef risk governance 
Franz Josef is under the jurisdiction of Westland District Council (WDC), West Coast Regional Council 
(WCRC) and the New Zealand Government.  The Resource Management Act (1991) tasks Councils 
with developing rules, objectives and policies to mitigate the effects from natural hazards.  
Specifically, regional councils are usually responsible for (amongst other responsibilities) regional 
policy statements, land use planning to avoid natural hazards, and ensuring sufficient development 
capacity for residential and business land to meet expected long-term demands of the region.  WCRC 
fulfils this obligation through the West Coast Regional Policy Statement (West Coast Regional 
Council, 2000).  District councils are usually responsible for (amongst other responsibilities) the 
effects of land use and ensuring sufficient development capacity for residential and business land to 
meet expected long-term demands of the district.  WDC fulfils this obligation through rolling updates 
to the Westland District Plan (Westland District Council, 2002).  Councils must consult with their 
communities when they prepare or review plans or regional policy statements, or consider a change 
or variation, but consultation approaches vary (MfE, 2018).  In an evaluation of land use and 
emergency management plans for natural hazards in New Zealand, Saunders et al. (2015) find that 
information on the nature and location of natural hazards needs to be more accessible to the public, 
and more councils should implement a risk-based approach that engages with communities to 
determine levels of risk.  However, whilst best practice, these are not required by legislation. 
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A summary timeline of risk governance actions and issues in Franz Josef, with increasing resolution 
closer to the time of writing, is provided in Figure 40.  A detailed timeline of participatory governance 
in Franz Josef between 2016 and 2018 is provided in Appendix D. 
 
Figure 40.  Franz Josef natural hazard risk governance summary timeline. 
Management of Franz Josef’s natural hazard risks has been highly contentious in the town (Day, 
2003; Gough, 2001; Gough et al., 2001).  Effective disaster impact reduction is challenging in Franz 
Josef due to its complex hazardscape, alongside its specific social, economic, cultural, and political 
context and history (Fischer, 2000; Gough, 2000; Gough et al., 2001; Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  
This already complicated situation has been compounded by previous disaster impact reduction 
attempts that have eroded trust between community members, emergency managers, and 
government (Day, 2003; Gough 2001).  The most notable recent example occurred in 2012, when 
WDC responded to recommendations by Langridge and Ries (2009) and Langridge and Beban 
(2011) with a proposal to update the Westland District Plan with Plan Change 7 (Westland District 


























Franz Josef Glacier named.
Franz Josef settlement established for tourists to see the glacier.
Plane flown under Waiho river swing bridge.
Alpine Fault recognised by Wellman (1953).
Ministry for the Environment (1991) Resource Management Act established,
requires West Coast Regional and District policy statements.
McSaveney & Davies (1998) Natural Hazard Assessment for the Township of 
Franz Josef Glacier and its Environs published.
West Coast Regional Policy Statement published (West Coast Regional Council, 2000).
Identifies need to mitigate Alpine Fault risk.
Westland District Plan publishes (Westland District Council, 2002). Identifies need to mitigate Alpine Fault risk.
Langridge & Ries (2009) map Alpine Fault and stipulate fault rupture avoidance zonation for WCRC.
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence.
Langridge & Beban (2011) provide further advice for regarding active fault avoidance and planning measures
for Franz Josef, including Fault Rupture Avoidance Zone (FRAZ).
Westland District Council propose Plan Change 7, including FRAZ in Franz Josef.
Langridge & Ries (2009) and Langridge & Beban (2011) GNS reports presented to Franz Josef community.
Franz Josef community members & University academics’ begin collaborative workshops.
Westland District Council approve Plan Change 7 after an independent commission.
Two separate Plan Change 7 appeals lodged to the Environment Court.
Franz Josef community members and local government policymakers’ Working Group founded.
Through Environment Court legal proceedings, the implementation of Plan Change 7 is postponed.
Waiho river flood.
Langridge et al. (2016) Natural Hazard Assessment for the Township of Franz Josef, Westland District
GNS Science hazardscape published.
“Kaikōura” earthquake.
Westland District Council revokes Plan Change 7.
Franz Josef community members & local government policymakers’ Working Group beings
Franz Josef Township: Natural Hazards Options Assessment and Cost Benefit Analysis.
Franz Josef Township: Natural Hazards Options Assessment and Cost Benefit Analysis published.
Ex-cyclone Fehi and ex-cyclone Gita events.
Franz Josef Feedback Summary on Natural Hazards Options Assessment and Cost Benefit Analysis published.
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Alpine Fault trace throughout Westland, as well as stipulating a specific Fault Rupture Avoidance 
Zone (FRAZ) through the centre of Franz Josef (Westland District Council, 2012).  Following the 
advice of an independent commission, this proposal was approved by WDC in May 2015 (Westland 
District Council, 2016).  Franz Josef community members were concerned that the introduction of this 
avoidance zone would devalue properties and prevent further development within the FRAZ without 
providing a mechanism for the buildings and infrastructure within the FRAZ to relocate.  Two separate 
appeals were lodged to the Environment Court against Plan Change 7 in July 2015 (Westland District 
Council, 2016).  Despite an August 2015 Environment Court hearing of the appeals, and formal 
mediation between WDC and the appellants, no resolution had been reached by September 2015.  
Subsequently, the Environment Court postponed the implementation of Plan Change 7 for twelve 
months.  Parties were required to agree to a resolution by February 2017 (after extensions were 
granted) or proceed to Environment Court (Westland District Council, 2016).  In December 2016, 
appellants were invited to and attended a WDC meeting, to agree on a resolution.  In this meeting, 
WDC resolved to remove Plan Change 7 (Westland District Council, 2017). 
Despite this sequence of events, Franz Josef community members have continued to demonstrate a 
keen desire to participate in disaster impact reduction efforts.  In 2015, Franz Josef’s business 
collective, Franz Inc., invited academics from the University of Canterbury and the University of 
Auckland to assist them to develop a planning strategy to increase the resilience of the town.  
Scenario exercise workshops were established as the preferred collaborative methodology and the 
collaboration grew as Franz Inc. invited members of the wider Franz Josef community to participate. 
Subsequently, a complex participatory disaster impact reduction process has developed, involving a 
wide range of stakeholders (Appendix E).  This includes the above collaboration (funded by the NZ 
Government consortia research initiative National Science Challenge project Resilience to Nature’s 
Challenges; Table 5), alongside the emergence of a distinct process led by district and regional 
councils alongside.  WDC, which had been attending the Franz Inc. planning workshops, recognised 
that the many of the Council’s “future planning” aims aligned with the work underway in the 
workshops.  The community members were asked if they would like to align the work.  A public 
meeting was held in August 2015, and the formation of the Franz Josef/Waiau Future Planning 
Working Group was agreed, consisting of WDC and WCRC elected members, representatives from 
Te Runanga o Makaawhio and DoC, the Community Development Officer, and eight community-
elected representatives.  The Working Group developed a broad list of projects to improve Franz 
Josef, and initially focussed on local infrastructure and streetscape issues (Westland District Council, 
2016).  In late 2015, WCRC also applied for funding from MBIE and commissioned GNS Science to 
create a Natural Hazard Assessment for the Township of Franz Josef, Westland District (Langridge et 
al., 2016).  This assessment recommended that a risk management strategy should be developed for 
Franz Josef, including a thorough analysis of the potential resilience options.  In May 2016, the 
Working Group agreed to check the assessment’s recommendations against the WCRC Regional 
Growth Strategy, and an application would be prepared for Government funding for the resilience 
options analysis.  The Government’s Regional Growth Programme, with involvement from MBIE, MfE, 
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DoC, MCDEM and NZ Transport Agency, granted funding to WCRC for the Franz Josef Township: 
Natural Hazards Options Assessment and Cost Benefit Analysis (Options Assessment), which was 
published in October 2017 (Tonkin + Taylor & EY, 2017).   
After the Working Group was formed, the community remained committed to the collaboration 
between community members and academics.  Notably, the Working Group collaborative process 
largely focussed on the direct impacts of flooding and earthquakes (Langridge et al., 2016; Tonkin + 
Taylor & EY, 2017), while a further established aim of the collaboration between community members 
and academics was to address disaster recovery planning.  The approach detailed in this paper was 
designed to address this aim. 
4.2.1.2 New Zealand infrastructure resilience 
Franz Josef’s dependence on the West Coast region’s linear distributed infrastructure for service 
delivery also increases the town’s vulnerability (Chapter 2; Appendix A).  The West Coast region has 
no network redundancy (except in towns) for over 400 kilometres, meaning Franz Josef is only 
accessible via ground transportation by a single road (State Highway 6) and is serviced by only one 
powerline and one telecommunications line (Figure 41) (National Infrastructure Unit, 2015; Tonkin + 
Taylor & EY, 2017; Willis, 2014). 
 
Figure 41.  A map showing the South Island road network of New Zealand and the combined 
exposure of SH6 to earthquake rupture, landslide, debris flow and river flood (Appendix A, Figure 56). 
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With no redundancy, any disruption to any part of the distributed infrastructure networks can result in 
the partial and sometimes complete loss of a given community’s essential services for considerable 
periods of time.  Depending on the duration of the outage and various contextual factors, this can lead 
to potentially substantial social and economic impacts.  The combination of low (or no) infrastructure 
redundancy and high hazard exposure (including earthquakes, landslides, landslide dam-break 
flooding, river flooding, rockfalls, severe storms, tornadoes and tsunami) in the West Coast region 
compounds the vulnerability of remote West Coast communities, including Franz Josef (Appendix A), 
and means that community members will likely be isolated in the event of a major disaster in the West 
Coast region.  It has been identified by previous studies and the West Coast Civil Defence & 
Emergency Management (CDEM) Group that, when isolated, community members will likely be 
responsible for the immediate response efforts. This will include caring for stranded tourists, who 
vastly outnumber residents during peak tourist season, and are unlikely to be prepared for a disaster 
(Orchiston, 2013; West Coast CDEM Group, 2016). 
Under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, New Zealand government agencies at 
local, regional and national levels, infrastructure providers (often termed “lifeline utilities” or “lifelines”) 
and emergency services all have defined functions and responsibilities for disaster readiness, 
reduction, response, and recovery.  Table 5 summarises the roles and responsibilities of key 
organisations for this case-study.  Section 60 requires every lifeline utility to be ‘able to function to the 
fullest possible extent, even though this may be at a reduced level, during and after an emergency’ 
(CDEM Act 2002, p. 40).  Lifeline utilities must also establish planning and operational relationships 
with their regional Civil Defence & Emergency Management (CDEM) Group under the Act.  In most 
regions, lifeline utilities predominantly fulfil their duties under the act by participating in regional 
lifelines groups, with national representation and coordination undertaken by the New Zealand 
Lifelines Council (est. 1999).  In the West Coast region, this collaboration is enabled through the West 
Coast Engineering Lifelines Group, which is led by the West Coast Civil Defence & Emergency 
Management (CDEM) Group and includes representatives from the West Coast Regional Council, 
Buller, Grey and Westland District Councils, and infrastructure providers, including: Aratuna 
Freighters, Buller Electricity, Chorus, Downer, Elgas, Fulton Hogan, Hokitika Airport Authority, 
KiwiRail, the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management (MCDEM), NZ Transport Agency, 
Opus, Port of Greymouth, Rockgas, Solid Energy, Spark, Transport Logistics Ltd., Transpower, 
Trustpower, Westland Milk Products, Vodafone, Westport Airport, Westport Harbour, and Westpower 
(key roles and responsibilities are summarised in Table 5).  Prior to this project, the participating 
academics had built a deep, trusting relationship with the West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group, in 
part by regularly attending Lifelines Group meetings since 2015, as part of a long-term researcher 
collaboration under the New Zealand Resilience to Nature’s Challenges research programme. 
The West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group (Table 5) has undertaken a number of projects including 
natural hazards scenario planning and post-event debriefs to assess and improve the resilience of 
West Coast lifelines (e.g. McCahon et al., 2006, 2017; West Coast Regional Council, 2014).  These 
projects and other work fostered or contributed to by the West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group and 
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its members have developed valuable inter-personal and inter-corporate relationships and have 
improved the infrastructure resilience of the West Coast region.  However, up to the point of the 
activity described in this paper, community members had not been given the opportunity to participate 
in these planning and decision-making processes. 
The remote character of Franz Josef and the town’s dependence on distributed infrastructure means 
that there is an additional need for community participation, as community members in remote 
locations are relied upon to implement disaster resilience for cost efficiency (Remling & Veitayaki, 
2016) and when isolated, community members lead immediate response efforts in the absence of 
input from authorities (Gardner, 2015; Orchiston, 2013) (Section 4.2).  Therefore, this project aimed to 
provide a platform to increase disaster resilience by bringing Franz Josef community members 
together with West Coast region distributed infrastructure providers, emergency managers, local 
government decisionmakers and University academics. 
  




Table 5.  A table summarising key risk governance organisations and their relevant roles and 
responsibilities in respect to this case-study in Franz Josef, New Zealand. 
Organisation Roles and responsibilities 
GNS Science A New Zealand Crown Research Institute, focussed on geology, geophysics 
(including seismology and volcanology) and nuclear science.  GNS Science 
researches, monitors and provides advice on natural hazard risks and impacts. 
Civil Defence & Emergency 
Management (CDEM) Group 
New Zealand has 16 regional CDEM Groups, which lead regional hazard risk 
reduction, preparedness, response and recovery.  CDEM Groups operate under 
the CDEM Act 2002 and National CDEM Plan, and also make commitments 
beyond these responsibilities to reduce the impacts of emergencies.  Franz 
Josef sits within the West Coast CDEM Group. 
Ministry of Civil Defence & 
Emergency Management 
(MCDEM) 
Leads national hazard risk reduction, preparedness, response and recovery 
policy, and supports the management of CDEM Groups, upholding the CDEM 
Act 2002. 
Ministry for the Environment Upholds the Resource Management Act 1991, which tasks Councils to develop 
rules, objectives and policies to mitigate the effects from natural hazards. 
NZ Transport Agency An independent crown entity, responsible (amongst other roles) for the State 
Highway network and for allocating funds from the National Land Transport Fund 
to land transport activities, including local roads, state highways and public 
transport and, together with local and regional government, for funding local 
roads and public transport infrastructure and services.  As a lifeline utility, NZ 
Transport Agency must be ‘able to function to the fullest possible extent, even 
though this may be at a reduced level, during and after an emergency’ under 
Section 60 of the CDEM Act 2002  Lifeline utilities must also establish planning 
and operational relationships with their regional Civil Defence & Emergency 
Management (CDEM) Group under the Act.  NZ Transport Agency fulfils this 
obligation by participating in regional lifelines groups, including the West Coast 
Engineering Lifelines Group. 
Project AF8 A three-year programme of scientific modelling, response planning and 
community engagement, led by South Island CDEM Groups. 
Resilience to Nature’s 
Challenge’s 
A New Zealand Government Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 
(MBIE) funded “National Science Challenge”.  A cross-research institutes 
collaboration, focussed on research that supports increasing resilience to natural 
hazard disasters. 
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West Coast Engineering 
Lifelines Group 
Critical infrastructure providers must establish planning and operational 
relationships with their regional CDEM Group, under the CDEM Act 2002.  In the 
West Coast region, these lifeline utilities predominantly fulfil their duties by 
participating in the West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group.  This group is led by 
the West Coast Civil Defence & Emergency Management (CDEM) Group and 
includes representatives from the West Coast Regional Council, Buller, Grey and 
Westland District Councils, and infrastructure providers, including: Aratuna 
Freighters, Buller Electricity, Chorus, Downer, Elgas, Fulton Hogan, Hokitika 
Airport Authority, KiwiRail, the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency 
Management (MCDEM), NZ Transport Agency, Opus, Port of Greymouth, 
Rockgas, Solid Energy, Spark, Transport Logistics Ltd., Transpower, 
Trustpower, Westland Milk Products, Vodafone, Westport Airport, Westport 
Harbour, and Westpower. 
West Coast Regional Council The regional council responsible for the West Coast region of New Zealand.  The 
Council must develop rules, objectives and policies to mitigate the effects from 
natural hazards under the Resource Management Act 1991.  Specifically, 
regional councils are usually responsible for (amongst other responsibilities) 
regional policy statements, land use to avoid natural hazards, and ensuring 
sufficient development capacity for residential and business land to meet 
expected long-term demands of the region. 
Westland District Council The district council responsible for Westland District, within the West Coast 
Region of New Zealand.  The Council must develop rules, objectives and 
policies to mitigate the effects from natural hazards under the Resource 
Management Act 1991.  Specifically, district councils are usually responsible for 
(amongst other responsibilities) the effects of land use and ensuring sufficient 
development capacity for residential and business land to meet expected long-
term demands of the district. 
Westpower Electricity distributor responsible for distribution and local generation of electricity 
for the majority of the West Coast region, including Franz Josef.  As a lifeline 
utility, Westpower must be ‘able to function to the fullest possible extent, even 
though this may be at a reduced level, during and after an emergency’ under 
Section 60 of the CDEM Act 2002  Lifeline utilities must also establish planning 
and operational relationships with their regional Civil Defence & Emergency 
Management (CDEM) Group under the Act.  Westpower fulfils this obligation by 
participating in the West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group. 
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4.3 Literature review: participatory approaches for disaster impact reduction 
The development of effective participatory approaches that bring community members together with 
decision makers and give them power to influence decision-making has lagged behind increasing 
recognition of their importance (Ackerman, 2004; Díez et al., 2015; Howard, 2018; Section 1 herein).  
Resilience is usually considered probabilistically.  For a given hazard, probabilistic analysis aims to 
quantify the likelihood of all possible events and their consequent impacts at a given location.  A good 
example is Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA; Baker, 2008), which details the expected 
peak ground acceleration (PGA) with various exceedance probabilities over timescales of hundreds to 
thousands of years (e.g. Stirling et al., 2012).  Probabilistic analysis is used to identify the most likely 
hazards over a long time period, and so is especially useful for informing engineering design codes 
and for insurance.  In contrast, a deterministic analysis considers one possible event and its impacts; 
deterministic scenarios do not consider the full range of possible outcomes, and do not quantify the 
likelihood these outcomes.  Deterministic scenarios are widely used for emergency management 
exercises, personnel training, risk communication and contingency planning.  Among these 
applications, using disaster event scenarios as boundary objects has been proven to enable 
collaboration between government, practitioners and hazard risk and impacts experts to reduce 
disaster impacts (Alexander, 2000; Orchiston et al., 2018; Perry et al., 2011; Robinson, 2014).  The 
sociological concept of a “boundary object” was introduced by Star and Griesemer (1989, p. 393) to 
refer to ‘objects which both inhabit several intersecting social worlds and satisfy the informational 
requirements of each of them’, who also describe them as ‘a means of translation’.  Using disaster 
event scenarios has been proven to enable cross-sector collaboration (Cash et al., 2003; Thompson 
et al., 2015), when all stakeholder groups perceive the boundary object to be: i) credible by being 
accurate (e.g. scientifically, technically, locally); ii) legitimate by fairly reflecting stakeholders’ divergent 
views and interests; and iii) relevant to stakeholder needs (Beaven et al., 2016; Cash et al., 2003).  
When considering large disaster events, this means that the scenario must be relevant at local, 
regional and national scales, and must encompass all pre-, syn-, and post-event implications (Cutter, 
1996).  It has been established that disaster event scenarios enable practitioners, policymakers and 
researchers to co-create integrated disaster resilience knowledge (Alexander, 2000; Centre for 
Advanced Engineering, 1997; Orchiston et al., 2018; Perry et al., 2011; Robinson, 2014). 
While both probabilistic and deterministic approaches are clearly important for resilience, probabilistic 
approaches are more suited to a longer-term view based primarily around insurance, land-use 
planning, financial security and life safety, whereas deterministic scenarios are more suitable for 
collaborative planning.  However, there is notable overlap between the two approaches: probabilistic 
modelling is often used to help generate a hazard scenario, providing scientific credibility to the 
deterministic approach (e.g. Orchiston et al., 2018; Centre for Advanced Engineering, 1997). 
It is logical that integrating community members with and alongside practitioners, policymakers and 
researchers will offer even greater advantages to those found for government, practitioners, and 
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hazard risk and impacts experts (Davies et al., 2015).  Therefore, we now review scenario-based 
participatory approaches to date. 
4.3.1 Scenarios 
The scenario literature has developed across disciplines including military (DeWeerd, 1967; Kahn & 
Wiener, 1967), corporate (Shell International, 2003; Wack, 1985a; Wack, 1985b), environmental 
(Butler et al., 2016; Kishita et al., 2016; Wodak & Neale, 2015), and emergency management studies 
(Alexander, 1999; Alexander, 2000).  As discussed above, the success of many scenario-based 
participatory approaches lies in their ability to be used as boundary objects to enable collaboration 
between stakeholders.  For the scenario to be relevant, credible and legitimate for all participating 
stakeholder groups (Cash et al., 2003), the scenario-based participatory approach must be context-
specific, which has led to an abundance of scenario-based participatory approaches. 
Recently, scenarios have become increasingly prevalent through high-profile, multi-disciplinary, often 
international and multi-year projects concerning environmental challenges, including the Brundtland 
Report (Keeble, 1988), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Nakicenovic et al., 2000), 
and the United Nations Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Millennium Assessment Board, 2005).  
These projects have established principles which are common to scenario-based approaches for 
environmental challenges, including natural hazards (Butler et al., 2016; Jenkins, 2000; Kishita et al., 
2016; Wodak & Neale, 2015), which include: 
1) combining qualitative descriptions and quantitative simulations, enabling collaboration across 
knowledge fields with a scientific underpinning; 
2) typically using one of three scenario types: 
i. Forecasting: scenario planning which begins in the present and details futures based 
around changing inputs; 
ii. Backcasting: scenario planning in which a future is detailed and so is driven by an 
interest in the conditions required to get to this predetermined future; 
iii. Event: scenario planning which details the consequence of a specified future event; 
3) often involving stakeholder participation. 
The present paper details a scenario-based participatory approach to reduce impacts from disasters 
triggered by natural hazards, such as floods, earthquakes, tsunami, and volcanic eruptions.  Beyond 
the general principles for scenario-based approaches for environmental challenges outlined above, 
this approach also builds on principles from the broader scenario literature.  Therefore, we now briefly 
summarise key outcomes from the scenario literature which are applicable to the methodology 
presented in Section 4.4. 
4.3.2 Definitions 
The abundance of applications for scenarios has led to numerous definitions of the term.  However, a 
“scenario” can be broadly defined as a credible (but necessarily simplified) storyline which allows 
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discursive exploration of future possibilities.  Scenarios must be plausible, internally consistent and 
coherent (Bishop et al., 2007; Butler et al., 2016; Duinker & Greig, 2007; Kishita et al., 2016, p. 334; 
Oteros-Rozas et al., 2015; Wodak & Neale, 2015).  While the definition of the term “scenario” is 
broadly agreed, there is more confusion when the term is used in conjunction with other terms 
(Wodak & Neale, 2015).  A common confusion is equating scenario planning with scenario 
development (Bishop et al., 2007).  Bishop et al. (2007) define scenario planning as a ‘complete 
foresight study’, and scenario development as ‘specifically… creating actual stories about the future’.  
In this way, scenario development can be viewed as one aspect or technique of the overarching 
methodology of scenario planning (Bishop et al., 2007). 
Herein we use “scenario-based participatory approach” as a substitute for “scenario planning”, given 
our focus on participation and to avoid confusion between disciplines, while recognising that it is not 
applicable to all applications of scenarios.  We also define a “stakeholder” as a person who will be 
affected by the outcomes of the participatory process, and a “stakeholder group” is defined as a 
community or organisation affected by the outcomes of the participatory process.  Finally, we define a 
“community” as a varied group of people who are exposed to the same disaster impacts through 
social, spatial and/or economic links (Davies et al., 2015; Gaillard & Mercer, 2013). 
4.3.3 Knowledge integration 
Although community members often participate in scenario-based participatory approaches for 
disaster impact reduction (DPMC, 2016; Hagendijk & Irwin, 2006; Jones & Benthien, 2011; Reed et 
al., 2013), as summarised in Section 4.2, there is a lack of documented evidence of scenario-based 
participatory processes that integrate and balance the knowledge of community members with and 
alongside that of practitioners, policymakers and researchers (Reed et al., 2013).  For example, 
Broad et al. (2007) observed a process where participants chose between scenarios, but the range of 
scenarios was narrow and already developed by a risk-averse government agency, which retained 
the right to overturn any decision made by the participants (Reed et al., 2013).  As already discussed, 
such unbalanced participation reduces opportunities for knowledge integration.  Whilst other 
stakeholders can attempt to ensure that the scenario is relevant to community members (Remling & 
Veitayaki, 2016), only community members understand what is relevant to them.  Other stakeholders 
lack the local knowledge, including the implications of livelihood, habitability and wellbeing impacts, 
held by community members (Centre for Advanced Engineering, 1997; Gaillard & Mercer, 2013).  
Moreover, such unbalanced participation can also reinforce existing privileges (Cooke & Kothari, 
2001; Nelson & Wright, 1995), reduce trust (which must be earned) in the process and/or facilitator 
(Eiser et al., 2012; Ravera et al., 2011; Reed, 2008), and cause engagement fatigue and 
disillusionment (Burton et al., 2004; Cooke, 2004; Reed, 2008; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000), all of 
which discourage (future) participation. 
Nevertheless, scenario-based participatory approaches (which have not included community 
members) have demonstrated three key advantages in collaborations between government, 
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practitioners, and hazard and impacts experts for disaster impact reduction, which we summarise and 
detail below: 
1) practitioners and policymakers have technical and local knowledge which can be used to 
validate and co-produce impacts scenarios; 
2) involving policymakers and organisations in scenario planning can help to ensure that pre-
disaster resilience measures, which can be of considerable value, are implemented. 
The predictive ability of disaster event scenarios has also made them a popular approach for disaster 
impact reduction, particularly for earthquakes, which cannot be predicted to any extent (Alexander, 
2000; Fenwick, 2012; Preuss & Godfrey, 2006; Robinson et al., 2014).  Accordingly, 
3a) scenario planning can establish relationships which allow modification of response planning, 
which is vital when disasters (which are, by definition, unexpected; Davies, 2015) happen; 
and 
3b) sustaining these relationships is vital to ensuring the success of disaster response at any time 
in the future, and can have the added benefit of continuing to improve and implement 
resilience measures before the next disaster. 
Using scenarios to bring research, government, and private sector stakeholders together has 
demonstrated further advantages. First, it allows technical, official and local knowledge to be 
integrated with academic knowledge through validation of, or co-production of, the scenario, which 
improves the scenario credibility and relevance.  The integrated knowledge can challenge prevailing 
assumptions and identify new risks, vulnerabilities, and resilience solutions (Davies et al., 2015; de 
Andrade & Szlafsztein, 2015; Ellemor, 2005; Manuel-Navarrete et al., 2011; Murphy et al., 2014).  For 
example, infrastructure providers typically have the best understanding of their infrastructure system, 
and of likely service outage and restoration times for their networks, given a specific event (e.g. 
Deligne et al., 2015). 
Second, involving practitioners and policymakers in scenario planning can help to ensure the scenario 
is relevant to them (Davies et al., 2015; Pearce, 2003; Remling & Veitayaki, 2016).  This encourages 
successful implementation of resilience measures.  For example, the New Zealand “Risks and 
Realities” project (Centre for Advanced Engineering, 1997), was an intensive workshop held by 
Christchurch Engineering Lifelines.  Workshop participants included infrastructure providers, 
emergency managers and policymakers, and University academics, including engineers, 
seismologists and hazard scientists.  The workshop enabled direct collaboration between all 
stakeholder groups involved.  This project identified natural hazards vulnerabilities using seven 
scenarios, including flood, seismic, wind, tsunami, and snow.  Having invested in the scenario work, 
the infrastructure companies then successfully implemented resilience measures.  For example, the 
region’s electricity distributor commenced a seismic strengthening programme in 1996 (the Risks and 
Realities project report was published in 1997, but the project triggered this programme of work).  
After the 2010/2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, it was estimated that this $6 million resilience 
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investment saved $60 to $65 million in direct asset replacement costs and repairs alone (Fenwick, 
2012). 
Third, formation of inter-personal and inter-corporate relationships has consistently been found to be 
among the most valuable outcomes of planning processes.  For example, the city of Los Angeles, 
USA, prepared a recovery and reconstruction plan before the 1994 Northridge earthquake.  Although 
this plan was hardly referred to during the earthquake, staff performed most of the actions they were 
assigned in the plan (Spangle Associates & Robert Olson Associates, 1997).  The value of the plan 
lay in the planning process, wherein contacts were made and tasks agreed upon (Becker et al., 
2008).  There was similar evidence during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, where a review 
found that ‘the inter-corporate and inter-personal relationships developed as Risks and Realities was 
prepared proved most valuable during earthquake responses’ (Fenwick, 2012, p. iii).  Subsequently 
sustaining these relationships has been found to be vital to the success of natural hazards scenario 
planning.  For example, a review of the impact of the 2010/2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
found ‘the damage would have been greater and the response slower if the steps recommended in 
Risks and Realities and other preparatory work fostered by the Group had not been taken (Fenwick, 
2012, p. ii, emphasis added).  Therefore, (pre-event) resilience measures were not only implemented 
as a direct result of the scenario planning, but also because of sustained relationships, through which 
further (post-event) resilience measures were identified.  On the other hand, Hurricane Katrina 
provides an example of the negative implications of not sustaining relationships.  In 2004, “Hurricane 
Pam” scenario planning simulated a slow-moving category 3 hurricane causing a storm surge which 
topped the levees in New Orleans, USA.  The following year, Hurricane Katrina caused 1,200 deaths 
and $108 billion of property damage (Blake et al., 2011) in a very similar event, and showed that the 
“Hurricane Pam” exercise was prescient.  The failings during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 were later 
partially attributed to a lack of continued collaboration (see Robinson et al., 2014 for a summary). 
4.4 Methodology 
To integrate and balance the knowledge of community members with and alongside that of 
practitioners, policymakers and researchers for disaster impact reduction efforts, our approach 
sequences participation methodologies using a hazard event scenario as a boundary object.  In this 
section, we first detail methodology development, based on a review of scenario and participation 
literatures, before outlining the method.  We then describe how this method was applied in a “pre-
disaster” collaboration between community members, infrastructure providers, emergency managers, 
local government policymakers and researchers, to proactively increase the resilience of Franz Josef, 
New Zealand, to future disaster events. 
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4.4.1 Method development 
4.4.1.1 Developing the scenario 
4.4.1.1.1 Number of scenarios 
While scenario planning offers advantages, using such a deterministic approach instead of a 
probabilistic approach inevitably means that not all possibilities will be considered.  This can lead to 
an incomplete and potentially skewed perception of risk amongst stakeholders.  To counteract this 
limitation, many environmental scenario exercises use multiple scenarios, allowing a wider range of 
distinct plausible futures to be explored (Centre for Advanced Engineering, 1997; Ratcliffe, 2000; 
Robinson et al., 2018; Wodak & Neale, 2015).  However, even using many scenarios, not all 
possibilities will be considered, and greater scenario numbers lead to complexity that can reduce 
process engagement, and, as already discussed, stakeholder fatigue and disillusion if substantial 
effort is required from stakeholders with little immediate tangible benefit (Chang et al., 2014; Duinker 
& Greig, 2007; Thompson et al., 2015; Wodak & Neale, 2015). 
Following a synthesis of scenario exercises, Wodak and Neale (2015) find that using either two or 
four scenarios is a consistent compromise throughout the literature.  These numbers allow sufficient 
exploration of futures whilst keeping complexity (which can reduce process engagement) low, as well 
as preventing participants from mistakenly treating the middle or only scenario as the “most likely” 
(Wodak & Neale, 2015). 
However, it is common to use only one scenario (e.g. Deligne et al., 2015; Jones & Benthien, 2011; 
McDaniels et al., 2015; Orchiston et al., 2013; Orchiston et al., 2018; Robinson et al., 2014).  Notably, 
this aligns with the need to manage engagement expectations (using more scenarios inherently 
requires more engagement), which remains the most important consideration (Wodak & Neale, 2015).  
Moreover, “single” scenarios often form part of a larger objective, such as annual national emergency 
management exercise programmes (e.g. DPMC, 2016; FEMA, 2018; GOV.UK, 2014).  This is likely to 
reduce the tendency to prepare only for the “single” (“most likely”) scenario. 
4.4.1.1.2 Developing the hazard scenario 
Discussion of how to select scenarios is limited within the literature.  However, this question is 
important because it may influence the effectiveness of the scenario-based participatory approach.  If 
all stakeholders choose the scenario, then provided that knowledge integration is well-balanced 
between stakeholders, it should help ensure that the scenario is relevant to them (Kishita et al., 2016; 
Kok et al., 2007; Reed et al., 2013; Swart et al., 2004; Walz et al., 2007).  Regardless of who chooses 
the scenario, hazard scenarios are predominantly developed by hazard experts, who usually have the 
best understanding of the nature and range of severity of hazards, and so also have a strong role in 
guiding the overall scenario selection.  Natural hazards scenario development can be subdivided to 
provide a distinction between hazard and impact scenarios (also referred to as event and effects 
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scenarios, respectively) (Robinson et al., 2014).  The hazard scenario describes the physical nature 
of a specific natural hazard event.  The impact scenario describes the effect of this scenario event on 
society.  These different subjects mean that the impacts scenario is usually more collaboratively 
developed than the hazard scenario, involving policymakers, practitioners, and community members 
alongside hazard and also often impacts experts (Alexander, 2000; Davies et al., 2015; Robinson et 
al., 2014). 
Alexander (2000) recommends that the scenario should be a “reference event”; an example of what is 
expected to happen based on a past hazard event applied to modern conditions.  This contributes to 
ensuring the scenario is realistic.  Notably, this also limits the scenario to recorded past events, 
although it is possible to transfer events which have occurred, for example, on similar earthquake 
faults, to reduce this limitation.  Alexander (2000) also argues that scenarios should be hypothetical to 
avoid inadvertently restricting solutions to preconditioned outcomes, based on hindsight (Robinson et 
al., 2014). 
Building on the work of Alexander (2000), Robinson et al. (2014, p. 19) outline that hazard scenarios 
must: 
1. ‘Be scientifically realistic and consistent with current knowledge; 
2. ‘Be of sufficient size to generate consequences applicable to the scale of the exercise [i.e. 
Robinson et al. (2014) needed to generate a scenario for all New Zealand South Island 
CDEM Groups, so needed to identify a hazard which would generate natural effects and 
subsequent impacts across the entire South Island]; 
3. ‘Be likely enough not to be dismissed as rare or extreme; and 
4. ‘Consist of a single, specific outcome rather than probabilistic ranges.’ 
Robinson et al. (2014) also note that there is a need to ensure preparation for both more frequent, low 
impact events and less frequent, high impact events.  Therefore, when selecting a scenario, 
consideration of the participants’ recent experiences with scenarios and real-world hazards is 
encouraged. 
While useful and among the best available, the Alexander (2000) and Robinson et al. (2014) 
guidelines remain broad.  For example, there is debate but little to no guidance in the literature as to 
whether an entirely catastrophic event may be too alarming or too large for a community to 
comprehend (Alexander, 2000; Wiggins, 1996).  Often, “worst-case scenarios” are used.  These 
describe the maximum credible event, meaning (theoretically) that by becoming resilient to the 
maximum event, communities automatically become resilient to any event of that hazard type 
(Davies, 2015).  Davies et al. (2015) argue that a large part of the value of using a scenario approach 
is precisely to address low probability, high impact events.  Probabilistic hazard analyses are normal 
in policy, and useful for governments assessing disaster risk over large areas.  However, for 
community members aiming to increase resilience for a small area within a realistic planning 
timeframe, disasters are unlikely to match their probability of occurrence (Davies et al., 2015).  
Therefore, Davies et al. (2015) argue that scenarios offer the opportunity to ‘enable communities to 
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plan for large, poorly-quantified or unexpected events that occur rarely (but will occur, and can occur 
at any time)’.  However, recent disasters (for example, the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and 
Tsunami) have demonstrated that “maximum credible events” can be exceeded and so are 
misleading for resilience planning.  Moreover, worst-case scenarios are, by definition, the least likely 
events (Davies, 2015).  This may discourage their use, especially if resilience to that hazard is not 
judged by stakeholders to be a priority.  More recently, Robinson et al. (2018) modelled 90 different 
earthquake scenarios to establish whether impacts are specific to certain hazards or occur 
irrespective of the hazard scenario.  Robinson et al. (2018) find that similar impacts occur irrespective 
of the hazard event scenario and that these impacts are typically closed to the minimum than the 
worst case, suggesting that planning for worst-case scenarios may be an unnecessarily large burden 
on limited resources available for disaster impact reduction. 
Scenario scaling is the practice of mapping issues and content from a pre-existing and potentially 
separate scenario onto a new, temporally, spatially, and/or topically different scenario (it does not 
refer to mathematical scaling of quantitative models or scenarios) (Wodak & Neale, 2015).  Scaling is 
a common practice due to limited resources and time.  However, scaling compounds problems 
around haphazard scenario selection, either due to whatever topic is trendy at the time, or simply 
because another scenario can be repurposed, rather than considering the need and purpose of the 
scenario in detail (Jenkins, 2000).  Alcamo (2008) outlines four criteria to determine whether scaling is 
appropriate for the scenario: 
1) purpose and potential users of the scenario (e.g. what spatial and temporal scales are the 
scenario participants interested in?); 
2) factors and processes (e.g. what scale do the scenario processes operate at?); 
3) actors/institutions (e.g. at which scale will the actors/institutions influence scenario 
developments?); 
4) quantification/data availability (e.g. at which scale is data collectable or available?) (Wodak & 
Neale, 2015). 
Again, there is a clear need for more documentation of scenario scaling in the literature to shape best 
practice, because although it is frequently utilised, there is little coverage at present (Wodak & Neale, 
2015). 
In summary, the literature lacks guidance on how stakeholders should develop hazard scenarios for 
scenario-based participatory approaches.  This is an area in which greater documentation and further 
research would be valuable. 
4.4.1.2 Participation in scenario-based planning 
Overall, there is little guidance specific to scenario-based participatory approaches.  When designing 
a participatory decision-making process, systematic identification and selection of stakeholders is first 
required to ensure that the process is not biased (Reed et al., 2013).  In an analysis of methodological 
frameworks used to develop participatory scenario processes for environmental management, Reed 
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et al. (2013, p. 360) find that ‘the most important factors associated with success or failure were 
associated with process design and participant selection’.  However, despite the critical importance of 
participant selection for successful participatory decision-making projects, this step is rarely taken 
(Reed et al., 2013).  Stakeholder analysis is designed to successfully identify stakeholders for 
participation in a decision-making process.  Reed et al. (2013, p. 348) describe stakeholder analysis 
as ‘a process that: i) defines aspects of a social and/or natural system affected by a decision or 
action, ii) identifies individuals and groups who are affected by or can affect those parts of the system 
(this may include non-human and non-living entities and future generations); and iii) prioritises these 
individuals and groups for involvement in the decision-making process.’  A wide variety of tools and 
approaches have been developed for stakeholder analysis, suitable to a range of contexts, so we do 
not detail these here.  For a full review of stakeholder analysis methods, see Reed et al. (2009). 
Like all participatory processes, scenario-based participatory approaches also require highly-skilled 
facilitation to be successful (Reed et al., 2013; Richards et al., 2004; Riddell et al., 2018).  Reed 
(2008, p. 2425) argues that ‘the outcome of any participatory process is far more sensitive to the 
manner in which it is conducted than the tools that are used’ because ‘different facilitators can use the 
same tools with radically different outcomes, depending on their skill level’ and experience.  
Therefore, facilitation adds a complex component to scenario-based participatory approaches, above 
and beyond the design of the process.  Notably, given its importance to all participatory exercises 
(Wodak & Neale, 2015), while good facilitation is possible, facilitation is clearly an area which requires 
more investment. 
The participation literature describes characteristics of, or requirements to be, a successful facilitator.  
For example, successful facilitators must be perceived to be impartial, open to multiple perspectives, 
and approachable; capable of sustaining positive group dynamics, balancing strong opinions, and 
handling dominating or offensive individuals; and must encourage participants to question 
assumptions and re-evaluate entrenched positions, get the most out of reticent individuals, and 
facilitate the process to reach desired outcomes (Reed, 2008; Riddell et al., 2018).  Accordingly, the 
literature suggests that the facilitator can come from any stakeholder group (or be independent), if 
they possess these characteristics.  Techniques have also been developed to aid facilitation (e.g. 
Cooke, 2004; Tompkins et al., 2008).  Reed (2008, p. 2425) summarises some of these, with 
examples including: ‘the development of ground rules that groups agree to follow, meticulous 
planning, psychological approaches to deal with difficult individuals and group dynamics, and being 
familiar with a wide range of alternative tools that can be adapted to the circumstances’.  However, 
Reed (2008, p. 2425) argues that these attributes are difficult to teach; they ‘tend to be developed 
through years of experience, intuition and empathy’. 
Within scenario-based exercises, Wodak and Neale (2015) find two dominant methods for facilitation 
within the literature: 
1) the essentialist method, which requires the facilitator to control the topic of discussion as well 
as the tools used to facilitate this discussion; and 
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2) the social constructionist method, in which the facilitator mediates the group dynamic, and is 
less concerned with the “relevance” of the discussion. 
These two methods both use a single facilitator, although the importance of including other non-
participants is also recognised (Wodak & Neale, 2015).  For example, scribes and timekeepers can 
aid facilitation (James et al., 2015; Wright & Cairns, 2011) and experts can advise on topics being 
discussed, without being participants (e.g. Alcamo, 2008). 
4.4.2 Method: The AF8+ scenario-based participatory approach 
A scenario-based participatory approach was designed as follows, based on the above review of 
scenario and participation literatures.  Notably, this method was developed for a context where 
community members had invited academics to assist them to develop a planning strategy to increase 
the resilience of their town (Section 4.2.1.1).  Also note that to address the needs identified in steps A 
and B, our method used a scenario-based participatory approach (steps C and D).  Non-scenario 
based participatory approaches may be more suitable (following steps A and B) to address other 
needs. 
A. Identify need: 
Work with community members to establish their most pressing collective needs, based on 
the community’s unique social, economic, cultural, and political context.  Identify which need 
is going to be addressed through the process. 
B. Design participation: 
Select other stakeholder groups associated with the identified need (e.g. council, emergency 
managers, lifelines, scientists, business groups).  Work with each stakeholder group to design 
a series of participation opportunities, discussing: types of participants, modes of recruitment, 
modes of communication, and the roles of participants (see Aoki, 2018).  
C. Develop scenario: 
In consultation with the participating stakeholder groups, decide on an appropriate scenario 
relevant to the identified need.  Develop this scenario. 
D. Co-create scenario: 
The series of participation opportunities allows stakeholder groups to further develop the 
scenario in a sequence.  Provide both the previously developed scenario and the co-created 
outputs from other stakeholder groups’ participation as inputs for subsequent stakeholder 
groups’ participation opportunities, so that additions to the scenario continually build on all 
previous outputs. 
This approach was applied to address the disaster recovery planning goal within an established “pre-
disaster” participatory disaster impact reduction collaboration between Franz Josef community 
members and University academics (Section 4.1).  There were two phases of the project, each with a 
distinct methodology; the hazard scenario, and the participatory, iterative development of an 
integrated impacts scenario through a sequence of participatory workshops. 
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4.4.2.1 Developing the AF8+ hazard scenario 
During consultation with the community, Franz Josef community members identified the need to plan 
for recovery from a disaster (Section 4.1).  In response, academics identified the need to develop a 
low-probability, high-impact hazard event scenario which would have long-term, national-scale 
consequences.  The participating academics, in collaboration with Resilience to Nature’s Challenges 
researchers, achieved this by up-scaling the Project AF8 Alpine Fault magnitude 8 scenario 
(Orchiston et al., 2016) from a 7-day to a 10-year “AF8+” scenario to create the “AF8+” hazard 
scenario.  When up-scaling the Project AF8 scenario, some hazard severities were reduced (e.g. 
removal of a 1-in-100 year rainstorm on Day 3 and large magnitude aftershocks and landslides in 
each CDEM region), as these were originally introduced to emphasise the emergency response focus 
(Orchiston et al., 2016; Zorn et al., 2018).  A new, 10-year aftershock sequence was created by 
transferring the aftershock sequence from the 2002 Mw 7.9 earthquake on the Denali Fault, Alaska.  
The rainfall sequence was transferred from the previous ten years of South Island rainfall data.  
Finally, features of Exercise Te Ripahapa (Robinson et al., 2014) were also included.  Debris flows 
were not included as hazard scenario components due to time constraints, but academics did discuss 
these with participants. 
The AF8+ scenario detailed hazard magnitude and temporal and spatial extents and, by overlaying 
buildings and distributed infrastructure, exposure (Appendix F).  These were detailed at spatial scales 
relevant to the participating stakeholder groups (e.g. local for community members, regional or 
national for an infrastructure provider).  Exposure to earthquake rupture damage, earthquake shaking 
damage and rockfall damage was determined through best judgement by the Resilience to Nature’s 
Challenges researchers (including the participating academics).  The exposure to landslides was 
determined through the approach of Robinson et al. (2016).  A co-seismic landslide hazard map at 60 
m resolution was produced based on shaking intensity, slope angle, slope position, and distances to 
streams and faults.  The best judgement of Resilience to Nature’s Challenges researchers (including 
the participating academics) was then used to systematically determine the number and distribution of 
landslides, dependent upon likelihood scores.  Landslide dams were also included using the best 
judgement of Resilience to Nature’s Challenges researchers.  Based upon experiences from the 2015 
Nepal and 2016 “Kaikōura” earthquakes (Dellow et al., 2017; Roback et al., 2018), new landslides 
after the main shock were only inferred to occur during a large Mw 7.0 aftershock on Day 11.  
Reactivation of landslides caused by the main shock were again included using the best judgement of 
Resilience to Nature’s Challenges researchers, based on the new aftershock sequence and a new 
rainfall sequence. 
Scaling reduced the time and resources required to develop the scenario and association with Project 
AF8, which had acquired a high profile nationally following outreach efforts and articles being 
published in the press (e.g. Mitchell, 2017; Orchiston et al., 2018), generated interest in the AF8+ 
scenario-based participatory approach.  However, there were also difficulties involved with scaling the 
Project AF8 scenario.  Particularly, deciding appropriate hazard intensity for the scenario was a 
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matter of judgement for scientists (Section 4.4.1.1.2).  Further, while Project AF8 was intended to 
have one scenario, it was developed as sub-scenarios for six regional and one national emergency 
management workshops.  This led to inconsistencies caused by creating seven sub-scenarios in a 
short space of time, including between the types of information presented, the phrasing of the 
information presented, the data specified for the same information between scenarios, and the 
timestamps at which information was presented both for different regions and between the scenario 
and GIS mapping.  Discrepancies also developed due to the intended changing (“living document”) 
nature of the AF8 scenario, designed to increase the relevance of the AF8 scenario by allowing 
workshops to reflect research outputs as they were produced, including accounting for real-world 
events which occurred between exercises, such as the November 2016 “Kaikōura” earthquake 
(Orchiston et al., 2016; Orchiston et al., 2018).  These discrepancies fragmented the AF8 scenario, so 
that it was initially difficult to develop the AF8+ scenario from the AF8 scenario. 
It is also worth cautioning that because the process used a single hazard scenario, scaling ran the 
risk of placing too much focus not only on a particular hazard but also on a particular faultline, given 
the prominence of Project AF8.  On balance, using a “single” hazard scenario was deemed 
appropriate in part because the wider Franz Josef participatory disaster impact reduction process was 
considering other hazard events, including through the use of scenarios (Section 4.1).  University 
academics were also able to stress in workshop presentations that other hazards needed to be 
considered, and particularly that the scenario-based participatory approach was focussing on impacts 
and that similar impacts could result from other large-scale events, including earthquakes originating 
from other faultlines, so it was felt that the scenario would not be considered by participants as the 
“only” natural hazard to prepare for (Section 4.4.1.1.1).  Using a “single” scenario also helped reduce 
complexity within the process, and reduced resources required from the Resilience to Nature’s 
Challenges researchers (including the participating academics). 
4.4.2.1 Identifying participants 
Franz Josef community members who were already actively involved in disaster impact reduction 
collaborations were invited to participate in recovery planning workshops.  Participating community 
members also invited further community members to participate through word-of-mouth and emails 
via a community email list.  Community members agreed to participate and agreed that the scenario-
based approach was suitable and the AF8+ scenario was relevant (Section 4.1).  In these 
discussions, University academics and Franz Josef community members collaboratively identified the 
need to focus on the distributed infrastructure dependence of Franz Josef in this process, and 
particularly road access, electricity supply and telecommunications.  This was due to awareness of 
Franz Josef’s dependence on the West Coast region’s linear distributed infrastructure for service 
delivery, and of the relatively limited prior focus on distributed infrastructure within participatory 
disaster impact reduction processes within the town, and the national-scale implications of the 
scenario (Section 4.1). 
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At a West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group meeting, academics explained the proposed project, 
and members were invited to participate (full membership is detailed in Table 5).  The West Coast 
Maintenance Contract Manager of the NZ Transport Agency (which is responsible for New Zealand’s 
State Highway network), the general manager of Westpower (which is responsible for the majority of 
the West Coast electricity distribution) and regional CDEM Group emergency managers were invited 
to participate in workshops that focussed more intensively on their disaster response responsibilities 
(in addition to their participation as members of the West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group).  
Stakeholders within these organisations were asked to invite relevant stakeholders to participate.  
Emails were also sent to the CEOs of telecommunications providers and the national electricity 
transmission agency, inviting them to take part, but they declined to engage with the process. 
University academics, selected on the basis of known aligned research interests and experience, 
were also invited to participate.  These included Civil, Environmental and Geospatial Engineers, 
Collaborative Governance and Community Participation Social Scientists, Geomorphologists and 
Hazard, Risk and Resilience Scientists.  The involvement of academics was partly enabled through 
the New Zealand Government Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment National Science 
Challenges consortia research funding programme Resilience to Nature’s Challenges (Table 5), 
which was designed to encourage cross-institution research collaboration. 
4.4.2.2 Workshop sequence 
The impacts scenario was co-created through a sequence of six workshops, held between October 
2017 and March 2018 (Figure 42; Table 6).  Different stakeholder groups (i.e. Franz Josef community 
members, Westpower, etc.) were invited to different workshops to allow stakeholder groups to co-
create the impacts scenario in detail at a relevant scale.  The date, time, location and duration of each 
workshop were agreed between the participating stakeholder group(s) for each workshop.  This 
meant that workshops were held when, where and for a duration best suited the participating 
stakeholder groups, including the weekend as well as the week, in Franz Josef, Greymouth and 
Christchurch, and for half-days and full-days, to maximise participation. 
The first four separate workshops were held with Franz Josef community members, Westpower, 
ground transport operators (NZ Transport Agency and KiwiRail) and the West Coast Engineering 
Lifelines Group, respectively.  CDEM representatives and University academics participated in all 
workshops.  Following the first four workshops, the NZ Transport Agency independently organised an 
additional workshop with two of its West Coast region subcontractors, Fulton Hogan and MBD 
Construction, and followed a similar methodology (Section 4.4.2.3).  One academic (the lead 
facilitator) participated in this workshop.  CDEM representatives did not attend this workshop.  Finally, 
a “combined” workshop was attended by academics, CDEM, Franz Josef community members, 
Fulton Hogan, NZ Transport Agency, Westland District Council, and Westpower. 
After each workshop, summary notes and the impacts assessment maps were compiled and sent to 
the workshop participants to corroborate findings, correct records of the workshops, and to provide 
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feedback.  An end-to-end disaster impact reduction modelling framework for infrastructure networks 
was also integrated with the process to enhance workshop discussions.  After workshops, the 
workshop recovery estimates were input into this framework and network interdependencies of 11 
infrastructure networks were modelled.  This modelling was then shown to participants at subsequent 
workshops, to inform their impacts estimates.  Integration of this independent academic initiative into 
this participatory process is discussed in full in Chapter 5.  
In each subsequent workshop, the findings of previous workshops and the integrated modelling were 
relayed to the participants.  The impact maps created in previous workshops were also available to 
view.  This created a shared understanding which allowed workshop participants to build on the 
findings of the previous workshops both in the workshop, as well as for real world application. 
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Figure 42.  Schematic of the AF8+ scenario-based participatory approach workshops sequence (each solid box represents a workshop).  Each workshop co-
created the impacts scenario.  Workshops used the findings of previous workshops to inform the impacts scenario.  Recovery estimates were also input into 
an integrated framework to model infrastructure interdependencies (Chapter 5) which iteratively informed the impacts scenario and future workshops.  
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Table 6.  Summary of the AF8+ scenario-based participatory approach workshops. 
Date Location Attendance Purpose Scale 
Saturday 28th October 2017 Franz Josef Academics; 
Franz Josef community members; 
West Coast CDEM. 
Establish Franz Josef’s post-disaster 
resource levels. 
Local 
Monday 30th October 2017 Greymouth Academics; West Coast CDEM; 
Westpower. 
Establish West Coast region electricity post-
disaster service levels and recovery strategy. 
Regional 
Thursday 2nd November 2017 Christchurch Academics; Canterbury CDEM; 
KiwiRail; NZ Transport Agency. 
Establish South Island ground transport post-
disaster service levels and recovery strategy. 
National 
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Greymouth Academics; 
West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group 
(including District Councils; 
NZ Transport Agency; 
West Coast CDEM; 
Westland Milk Products; 
Westpower). 
Establish West Coast post-disaster service 
levels and recovery strategies, focussing on 
interdependencies. 
Regional 
Tuesday 5th December 2017 Greymouth Academics; Fulton Hogan; 
MBD Contracting; 
NZ Transport Agency. 
Corroborate West Coast State Highways’ 
post-disaster service levels and recovery 
strategy. 
Regional 
Monday 12th March 2018 Franz Josef Academics;  
Franz Josef community members; 
Fulton Hogan; 
NZ Transport Agency; 
West Coast CDEM; 
Westland District Council; Westpower. 
Enable discussion and collaboration to 
improve the resilience of Franz Josef. 
Local 
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4.4.2.3 Workshop design 
Prior to each workshop, the workshop design was proposed by University academics (modelled on 
the workshop design of Johnston et al., 2006), and then discussed and revised with participants.  This 
meant that the design of each workshop, including the participation methodologies used within the 
workshops, was tailored to the participating stakeholder group(s).  The project background, ethics 
form and (revised) workshop design were then sent to all participants.  Participants were also advised 
to bring anything which could be valuable to the workshop (e.g. organisation or community Civil 
Defence & Emergency Management response plans). 
Each workshop was structured in two phases.  The first phase was facilitated using the essentialist 
method and the second phase was facilitated using the social constructionist method (Wodak & 
Neale, 2015; Section 4.4.1.2), as follows: 
4.4.2.3.1 Workshop Phase 1: Presentation led by facilitator (the essentialist method) 
A. Present project background, ensure ethics are discussed and forms are completed, discuss 
plan for the workshop. 
All participants were provided with background to the project and the plan for the workshop 
was discussed and modified, based on stakeholder priorities. 
B. Present the hazard scenario (PowerPoint) and exposure maps. 
The AF8+ hazard scenario was communicated in the form of a PowerPoint presentation and 
exposure maps showing where hazards impacted infrastructure networks and buildings 
(Section 4.4.2.1).  Exposure maps were produced at the local scale for Franz Josef, at the 
regional scale for West Coast electricity poles, and at the national scale for South Island State 
Highways (the South Island rail network was also shown in relation to hazards estimated for 
the State Highways, as the rail network approximately follows State Highways).  These maps 
are shown in full in Appendix F.  The Franz Josef exposure map was detailed for t = 1 day.  
The electricity and ground transportation exposure maps were detailed in 10 timesteps, as 
follows: 
- t = 1 day (1 day); 
- t = 1 week (7 days); 
- t = 1 month (30 days); 
- t = 6 months (183 days); 
- t = 1 year (365 days); 
- t = 2 years (730 days); 
- t = 3 years (1095 days); 
- t = 4 years (1461 days); 
- t = 5 years (1826 days); 
- t = 10 years (3652 days). 
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4.4.2.3.2 Workshop Phase 2: Participant-led impacts discussion (the social constructionist 
method) 
A. Participants discuss and clarify hazard scenario. 
Following the scenario presentation, participants clarified background to the hazard scenario, 
including discussing comparable hazards and impacts and scenario uncertainties.  These 
answers were predominantly provided by the academics who were involved in the 
development of the scenario. 
B. Participants discuss and refine impacts scenario assumptions. 
The participants used the exposure maps to discuss and define the impacts to relevant 
buildings and infrastructure.  For example, deciding the size of landslides and deciding 
whether a bridge exposed to a hazard would collapse or not. 
C. Participants detail the impacts scenario, modifying the exposure maps. 
Participants discussed and co-created the impact scenario at the scale most suited to the 
stakeholder group, including by modifying the exposure maps to create impacts maps.  Within 
the infrastructure workshops, these impacts maps were detailed as infrastructure service 
levels through time. 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Franz Josef community workshop, Saturday 28th October 2017 
The Franz Josef workshop was run in collaboration with the West Coast CDEM Group as a “Civil 
Defence Day” in Franz Josef.  To maximise participation and increase relevance, this workshop was 
held on a Saturday, was only half a day long, and was adjusted to also include a simulation-style 
injects-based exercise (using the AF8+ scenario) as community members felt that they had not had 
enough practice at emergency response.  The day started with response training, including operations 
and equipment checks.  Towards the end of the simulation exercise, Franz Josef community 
members then detailed the expected number of people in the town, an evacuation plan, 
communications resources, transport resources, as well as supplies, in days, of food, water, fuel and 
medications.  Full summary notes are provided in Appendix G1.  Key outcomes included that the 
participating community members expected Franz Josef to have: 
- 2000 tourists to account for and evacuate; 
- 3 satellite phones; 
- 5 helicopters; 
- 48 hours triage medical supplies; 
- 4 days of food for tourists; 
- 2 weeks of food for residents; 
- 10 days of diesel; and 
- 20 days of petrol. 
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Throughout the workshop, community members also itemised several actions for future work, 
including: 
- “Need full inventory of medication needs to enable stocks.  Also need to increase medical 
supplies for a mass casualties event. 
- “Need a list of sat phone numbers, and contact phone numbers for neighbouring towns and 
local volunteers (for when mobile coverage remains available). 
- “Regular commitment to scenario training twice a year. 
- “It would be good to run a similar process with other towns, including Fox Glacier, Ōkārito and 
Whataroa.” 
4.5.2 Westpower workshop, Monday 30th October 2017 
The Westpower workshop was run as a day-long workshop in Greymouth and focussed on 
Westpower’s electricity network.  The scenario co-creation began with a detailed discussion between 
Westpower and CDEM about response and readiness.  This included discussions about the 
emergency supplies requirements for Westpower staff, and relative priorities for reconnaissance data 
collection amongst lifeline utilities. 
Westpower stakeholders noted that the repair of their electricity network is dependent upon the 
national supply and road access.  As the first infrastructure provider contributing to the AF8+ scenario, 
both of these dependencies had to be assumed in the workshop.  Full summary notes from the 
workshop are detailed in Appendix G2.  Key scenario findings were as follows: 
- After one week, without replenishment of supplies and gear (poles, cross arms, fuel etc.) 
Westpower would run out of supplies and be unable to continue repairs.  The repair operation 
would go backwards as if substations run out of (back-up) power supply, they may not be able 
to be restored. 
- Within one month, mains power is expected to be restored to Franz Josef if the Waihapo 
power plant is still generating. 
- Within six months, participants were fairly confident that all power stations between the top of 
Westpower’s region down to Franz Josef would be restored.  Fox Glacier would have an 
isolated power supply.  The restoration of the electricity south of Franz Josef would depend 
on government priorities and road access.  This would be a large investment across a large 
area for a small population. 
Throughout the workshop, Westpower stakeholders also itemised several actions for future work.  
These included: 
- “Plan for Emergency Management Team set-up pre-event, including ensuring vital staff are 
prepared at home to get the Emergency Management Team up running quicker. 
- “Pre-plan reconnaissance flight routes (West Coast CDEM-led). 
- “Westpower GIS needs to be compatible with CDEM GIS. 
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- “Design remote shut down switch for substations (particularly for minor, not GXP substations) 
- “Stocktake and source generators for substations.” 
4.5.3 Ground Transport workshops, Thursday 2nd November and Tuesday 5th December 2017 
The first Ground Transport workshop was run as a day-long workshop in NZ Transport Agency’s 
Christchurch office and focussed on South Island State Highways and rail infrastructure.  This 
workshop heavily recalled lessons from the 2016 “Kaikōura” earthquake (e.g. Chapter 3) to inform the 
assessment of the scenario impacts.  Full summary notes from the workshop are included in 
Appendix G3.  Key scenario findings were as follows: 
- All ground transport access to the West Coast will be closed for weeks. 
- Limited public road access to Franz Josef is expected to be restored within six months. 
- After restoring access to Franz Josef, NZ Transport Agency would prioritise the repair and 
improvement of re-opened roads over re-opening other damaged roads, unless the 
Government made these roads a priority. 
- Permanent road closures may occur, including Arthurs Pass, Haast Pass to Franz Josef and 
the Coast Road between Greymouth and Westport.  Restoration of these routes would 
depend on long-term government priorities. 
- Permanent closure of the rail network west of Springfield may occur, depending on 
government priorities.  Without road access through Arthur’s Pass, the rail cannot be 
repaired. 
Throughout the workshop, NZ Transport Agency stakeholders also itemised several actions for future 
work.  These included: 
- “NZ Transport Agency is keen for a communication strategy with communities, particularly 
around possibilities of managed retreat of infrastructure following disasters. 
- “Seek community resilience solutions to future events, some of which can be implemented 
pre-event 
- “Work with CDEM to ensure effective use of helicopters in a response. 
- “Surge capacity of contractors needs greater consideration. 
- “Cost out possible alternative routes before major events occur so that managed retreat can 
be implemented afterwards.  These can be pre-approved by NZ Transport Agency board so 
that after a disaster, alternative routes may be built instead of repairing old (destroyed) roads, 
if they are found to be more cost-effective and offer longer-term resilience. 
- “Work with other lifeline utilities on interdependencies.” 
NZ Transport Agency also independently organised a half-day workshop with its West Coast region 
subcontractors (Fulton Hogan and MBD Construction) in the NZ Transport Agency Greymouth office.  
NZ Transport Agency led the facilitation of this workshop and initially ran the workshop “blind”, without 
revealing previous workshops’ findings, to corroborate the findings of NZ Transport Agency’s national 
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planners.  Subsequently, the findings of the ground transportation workshop were provided and 
discussed.  The contractors agreed with the findings of the first Ground Transport workshop.  Full 
summary notes from the workshop are included in Appendix G3.  The contractors also raised 
additional items for future work, including: 
- “Contractors are assuming Health and Safety and resource consents may be critical to repair 
times.  It would be good to consider and plan for these in advance. 
- “Closing the road (without any form of public access) for longer will speed recovery.  This is a 
value judgement worth discussing.” 
4.5.4 West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group, Tuesday 21st November 2017 
The West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group workshop was run as a half-day workshop in 
Greymouth, following a quarterly meeting of the group in the morning.  The focus of this workshop 
was to discuss interdependencies between the State Highways, rail, and Westpower electricity 
networks’ impact assessments, co-created in previous workshops, and also to discuss the 
interdependencies between these networks and the other lifeline utilities.  Telecommunications were 
noted as a key dependency.  Unfortunately, telecommunications providers did not attend the 
workshop, limiting both assessment of telecommunications outages and recovery times.  Full 
summary notes from the workshop are included in Appendix G4.  Key scenario findings were as 
follows: 
- “Westland Milk Products and the West Coast mining industry rely on overseas contracts to 
buy and supply products and remain profitable.  They will not be able to access or supply 
products if Arthurs Pass is closed.  If this is the case, they expect to lose essential overseas 
contracts, and they do not have insurance cover for loss of overseas customers. 
- “Rail is critical to the long-term survivability of the milk and mining industry on the West Coast. 
- “Fuel management will be critical for all lifelines with no or limited road access” 
Through collaborative discussions in the workshop (as well as throughout the workshops), disaster 
impact reduction strategies were also co-created.  These included: 
- “Share Business Continuity Plans and Emergency Management Plans of local businesses 
and lifelines. 
- “Improve understanding of key agreements with service and resource providers, i.e. fuel, food 
and aid. 
- “Fuel supply is a key dependency that requires pre-disaster planning.” 
4.5.5 “Combined” workshop, Monday 12th March 2018 
The final workshop in this process brought together representatives from all stakeholder groups that 
had participated in the previous AF8+ workshops, for the first time in the process.  This was a half-day 
workshop, held in Franz Josef.  Prior to this workshop, all participants were sent a slideshow 
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containing a summary of the outcomes from the previous workshops, which were presented in full at 
the beginning of the workshop.  In the workshop, each stakeholder group’s scenario assessments 
were presented and discussed.  With all stakeholder groups participating, each group could lead or 
respond to discussions on their area of expertise. 
Workshop discussions focussed on implications for the Franz Josef community and regional 
infrastructure by leveraging the detailed national-, regional- and local-scale assessments already 
completed within the targeted workshops.  Through collaborative discussions in the workshop, 
disaster impact reduction strategies were co-created.  For example, Franz Josef community members 
identified that they would be severely impacted locally, have limited resources and a large population 
to support, and would be isolated.  Practitioners were able to confirm that the community would be 
inaccessible via ground transportation (i.e. State Highways) for months (Figure 50).  Subsequently, 
the community identified that they could self-ration to ensure that supplies would last and road 
operators identified that, due to the magnitude of regional damage, it would be more beneficial for 
locally-based roading contractors to help repair local infrastructure, including local roads, water pipes, 
sewerage, etc., than attempting to open the State Highways, as this would require a structured, 
centrally-led and resourced response.  Complete workshop summary notes are provided in Appendix 
G. 
In addition to these core discussions, the workshop also included valuable discussions of 
“background” New Zealand hazard events, with participants keen to learn from these events and 
apply the lessons to the planning process.  For example, impacts of and recovery strategies following 
two ex-cyclone events (Fehi and Gita) in February 2018 were discussed, to inform future responses.  
This included Westpower noting that it takes longer to repair powerlines when people drive on 
(closed) roads, as their crews have to stop working due to the danger this causes.  Subsequently, the 
community members noted that they could try to reduce people from driving on roads when they are 
closed to help speed electricity recovery times. 
Community members, practitioners and policymakers all noted the value of the workshop.  For 
example, a Franz Josef business owner also noted that, “from a business point of view, knowing likely 
outage times (as shown in the maps used in the workshop) is very useful for crisis management”, and 
NZ Transport Agency and Westpower noted that the workshop was a valuable opportunity to discuss 
the infrastructure providers’ best-case assessment of what may reasonably be possible after the 
scenario event presented, providing a rough order of likely work progression, to assist community 
members with their preparedness, response and recovery planning. 
Notably, the importance of the summary notes and ongoing collaborative relationships between 
stakeholders as participatory methodologies beyond the workshops was highlighted after the 
“combined” workshop.  There were particular difficulties arranging this workshop due to the two ex-
cyclone events, which meant that, although all stakeholder groups were represented, some key 
stakeholders were unable to attend the workshop due to a clash with an event debrief.  Subsequently, 
when stakeholders who were unable to attend the meeting received the workshop summary notes, 
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concerns were expressed over inaccuracies in the information discussed in the meeting.  Here, the 
workshop notes had highlighted gaps in shared understanding which had not been recognised in the 
meeting.  The workshop notes therefore enabled these gaps to be addressed by the stakeholders. 
4.5.6 Infrastructure outage maps 
The scenario-based participatory approach produced network outages over time1, shown below.  
West Coast regional electricity outages are shown in Figure 49.  South Island State Highway outages 
are shown in Figure 50.  South Island rail network outages were also established but are not shown 
because it was expected that there would be rail service on the north to south line and no rail service 
on the East-West line, including the West Coast, west of Springfield for several years. 
                                                   
1 Disclaimer: The AF8+ scenario, co-created and used to enable discussion and collaboration within workshops, is designed to 
provide an example of an extreme earthquake for response and recovery planning in the South Island of New Zealand, with a 
focus on the West Coast and Franz Josef township.  It is a realistic but extreme-case scenario, detailing earthquakes and their 
associated ground motions, landslides, and transposed real-world aftershock and rainfall sequences.  The AF8+ scenario was 
compiled using the best scientific knowledge currently available (Orchiston et al., 2016).  It is important to stress these maps 
detail expectations based on individual and collective understandings of the AF8+ hazard scenario, which was co-created into 
impacts scenarios within workshops.  Recovery strategies and service levels were estimated in workshops for this AF8+ scenario 
only. 
It is vital to understand that the AF8+ scenario is NOT A PREDICTION of what will happen during and after the next major 
earthquake that affects the West Coast (which may not be on the Alpine Fault).  The underlying philosophy is that if we plan for 
an extreme case, we improve our ability to cope with less severe events (“expect the worst, hope for the best”). 
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Figure 43.  The co-created AF8+ impact scenario for Westpower electricity service levels.  
Chapter 4.  Co-creating the AF8+ scenario for Franz Josef and the West Coast region, New Zealand. 
 141 
 
Figure 44.  The co-created AF8+ impact maps for South Island state highways’ service levels.
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4.6 Discussion 
The transferrable scenario-based participatory approach described in the previous sections utilised an 
earthquake scenario as a boundary object.  This allowed all stakeholder groups to inform the 
development of integrated knowledge concerning the likely disaster impacts, and decision-making 
required to reduce them.  This approach was applied in a “pre-disaster” collaboration (the AF8+ 
scenario-based participatory approach) which integrated and balanced the knowledge of community 
members with and alongside that of infrastructure providers, emergency managers, local government 
policymakers, and academics.  Balancing and appropriately sequencing the influence of these 
stakeholders ensured that the resulting knowledge was recognised as relevant and credible by all 
involved.  In doing so, the process encouraged a proactive increase in the disaster resilience of Franz 
Josef and distributed infrastructure networks and so the resilience of the West Coast region of New 
Zealand. 
4.6.1 Participatory design: Sequencing scenario-based participation 
Sequencing of the workshops was critical to the process outcomes.  Running a sequence of 
workshops with a combination of methodologies allowed workshops to be scheduled to maximise 
participation for every stakeholder group.  For example, most workshops were held on weekdays, but 
the community-specific workshop was held on the weekend, respectively allowing each stakeholder 
group to organise their targeted workshops when best suited them, enabling both higher levels of 
participation and participation from the people the stakeholders considered critical to informing the 
process.  Further, sequencing workshops allowed the impacts scenario to be co-created at the scale 
most relevant to the stakeholder group, focussed on the stakeholder group’s area of interest (i.e. the 
Franz Josef community focussed on Franz Josef, NZ Transport Agency focussed on State Highways, 
etc.).  This respectively enabled deep, detailed discussions of community and technical issues, 
ensuring that the workshop was highly relevant for the stakeholder groups.  Moreover, these 
advantages ensured that stakeholder groups had more influence in their own area of expertise.  
Therefore, sequencing enabled balanced participation between stakeholder groups, increasing the 
credibility and legitimacy of the process. 
The impacts scenario that was generated through this process was then able to be used as a 
boundary object, enabling the translation of often technical knowledge into forms accessible and 
useful for all stakeholder groups (Star & Griesemer, 1989).  As anticipated, the scenario was a 
successful form of translation between stakeholder groups, enabling the integration of previously 
siloed local and technical knowledge (Section 4.3).  For example, a Franz Josef business owner 
noted that “from a business point of view, knowing likely outage times (as shown in the maps used in 
the workshop) is very useful for crisis management”.  In this way, the impacts scenario created a 
shared understanding. 
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Subsequently, sequencing generated an iterative dynamic, as stakeholders were able to use the 
shared understanding to improve their impacts assessment.  For example, in the West Coast 
Engineering Lifelines workshop, with improved understanding of road outages, Westpower were able 
to improve their recovery estimates.  Further, stakeholders were able to utilise the shared 
understanding to immediately improve their disaster impact management measures in the real world.  
For example, in the combined workshop, Westpower noted that after a disaster, it takes longer to 
repair powerlines when people drive on (closed) roads, as their crews have to stop working due to the 
danger this causes.  Subsequently, the community members noted that they could try to reduce 
people from driving on roads when they are closed to help speed electricity recovery times.  
Moreover, individual stakeholder groups were able to act on the shared understanding to improve 
their understanding of disaster impacts after the workshops.  Either at subsequent workshops, or 
through feedback to the facilitator, this new knowledge was also able to inform the impacts scenario, 
enhancing the shared understanding.  This iterative integration of knowledge continuously improved 
the understanding of stakeholders, allowing them to contribute to an improved understanding through 
knock-on implications, in a feedback loop.  This was best demonstrated by integrated infrastructure 
modelling, which used recovery estimates to inform network interdependency modelling, which was 
iteratively integrated into the scenario workshops where it was discussed and produced revised 
recovery estimates, in a feedback loop.  In doing so, stakeholder input verified and highlighted areas 
for improvement in the modelling, and the modelling verified and highlighted areas for improvement in 
the stakeholder knowledge, improving both.  This process is described in detail in Chapter 5. 
Critically, in ensuring inputs were credible, legitimate and balanced, the stakeholders trusted the 
inputs as genuine needs and priorities and fully engaged with these to develop disaster impact 
reduction measures.  This formed trusting relationships between the participants, who could see 
simply by participating in the process that the other stakeholder groups were acting to address 
resilience.  This was particularly notable in the “combined” workshop, where infrastructure providers 
were able to see the commitment from the large number of community members to increase the 
resilience of Franz Josef, and the community members were able to put names and faces to 
organisation names and find out who was responsible for various disaster impact reduction initiatives. 
Overall, the willingness shown by stakeholders to participate was critical to this successful 
implementation of the AF8+ scenario-based participatory process.  Both researchers and participants 
invested large amounts of time specifically for this process, establishing new relationships and 
strengthening many existing relationships.  The drive and unwavering commitment demonstrated by 
the community members who started the process and remained determined to increase the resilience 
of Franz Josef were particularly critical.  These are likely to have been partly enabled by the tight-knit 
and remote character of the community, as community members with place attachment and strong 
connections between community members (including government) have similarly been found by 
others to assist participatory approaches by helping to ensure compromises for the good of the 
community (Aoki, 2018; Espiner & Becken, 2014; Orchiston, 2013).  The application of this approach 
also benefitted from New Zealand’s strong “lifelines” culture.  Lifeline utilities are legislated to improve 
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disaster readiness, reduction, response, and recovery in New Zealand (CDEM Act 2002).  But the 
success of this voluntary scenario-based process also relied heavily on the willingness of the West 
Coast Engineering Lifelines Group, and in particular NZ Transport Agency and Westpower, alongside 
regional CDEM Groups to go beyond the responsibilities required under this legislation by 
demonstrating commendable leadership and commitment.  In this way, the AF8+ scenario-based 
participatory approach clearly benefitted from strong, trusting relationships. 
The AF8+ scenario-based participatory approach thus successfully demonstrated the proposed 
methodology, demonstrating the ability to co-create knowledge which in turn can inform decision-
making.  Sequencing participation allowed the impacts scenario to act as a boundary object between 
community members, practitioners, policymakers and researchers.  In doing so, the approach led to 
the benefits previously observed for scenario-based collaborations between practitioners, 
policymakers and experts (Section 4.3), namely: 
1) knowledge co-production, which challenged prevailing assumptions and identified new risks, 
vulnerabilities, and resilience solutions; 
2) the implementation of resilience measures; and, 
3) the establishment and growth of relationships with and between community members, 
infrastructure providers, emergency managers, local government policymakers, and 
researchers. 
4.6.2 Limitations 
Despite successfully demonstrating the proposed methodology, the application was not without its 
shortcomings.  First, the process would have benefitted from more diverse participation 
methodologies, for example, by holding open meetings or using surveys in addition to the workshops 
(Aoki, 2018).  Workshop notes and stakeholder feedback were critical to the success of the 
participation methodology, despite not being an initial focus of the methodological approach.  Further, 
Aoki (2018) finds that combining different participation methodologies means that participants who 
can commit more time are encouraged to do so, but those who cannot commit the same amount of 
time can still participate, and do not have to be excluded from the process entirely.  More participation 
methodologies therefore likely would have increased participation, increasing credibility and the 
opportunity to grow the shared understanding.  Similarly, whilst not a focus of this study, multiple 
participation methodologies may have helped balance pre-existing social power relations and 
dynamics. 
Second, only the “relevant” stakeholders were invited to workshops.  While mostly driven by 
increased convenience, the “closed” nature of many of the workshops was in part driven by a concern 
about negative publicity, given that discussing disasters and response strategies can be a sensitive 
topic.  “Closed” workshops had the advantage of ensuring that each stakeholder group was able to 
discuss their views openly, and if necessary, confidentially.  However, Aoki (2018) provides evidence 
that allowing all stakeholders to participate in all parts of a process (enabled by varying influence 
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weightings, such as only participating as observers) can increase trust in decision-making and speed 
up the overarching process, as fewer questions need to be asked about how and why decisions are 
or were made.  It is worth noting that this requires greater “buy-in” from participating stakeholder 
groups, along with sustained interest.  However, again, the often “tight-knit” character of remote 
communities can help to enable participatory governance (Chapter 2).  Therefore, while the process, 
and particularly the “combined” workshop, disseminated outcomes from previous workshops, the 
process may have benefitted from allowing all stakeholders to participate in all parts of the process.  
This could feasibly be enabled through livestreaming of workshops to social media, as well as by 
inviting participants to observe additional workshops. 
Third, with hindsight, the sequence of the workshops could also have been improved.  While the 
lifelines workshop and “combined” workshop allowed direct discussions of interdependencies, holding 
the workshops in order of reducing scale (i.e. national, then regional, then local) would have reduced 
the assumptions required within the initial workshops.  For example, Westpower is heavily reliant on 
State Highways to repair the electricity network, including the need to bring resources into the West 
Coast from other parts of the country.  However, because their targeted workshop was held before 
the national-scale NZ Transport Agency workshops, they could not draw on this key stakeholder 
group’s knowledge, meaning that their initial restoration estimates relied heavily on assumptions 
about State Highways restoration times. 
The fundamental logistical difficulties associated with, and time investment required for, participatory 
processes were also highlighted.  Despite advantageous existing stakeholder relationships and the 
investment of a substantial amount of time in relationship building, it was not possible to engage all 
identified key stakeholders, including any telecommunications providers or the national electricity 
transmission agency.  This increased the influence of other stakeholders, particularly researchers, on 
the scenario, as the judgement of others was used as a substitute for those who did not participate.  
This decreased the credibility of the scenario.  Ultimately, though, this example highlights the 
vulnerability of the approach due to its voluntary nature. 
Finally, there was little structured stakeholder evaluation of the scenario-based participatory 
approach.  In each AF8+ workshop, feedback was encouraged at all times through a “feedback 
station” and at the end of each workshop there was also a brief discussion where participants were 
again invited to provide feedback.  The research team also kept in very close contact with participants 
from all of the stakeholder groups throughout.  This provided important feedback which could be, and 
was, used dynamically throughout the process (Chapter 4).  However, such feedback remains limited 
in its scope to evaluate the approach and its outcomes.  What constitutes successful scenario 
planning is different for different people, and so is challenging, contentious, and worthy of (more 
detailed) evaluation by all participants (Reed et al., 2008; Wodak & Neale, 2015).  For example, 
whether and how to involve participants in designing the evaluation of the project remains unclear 
(Blackstock et al., 2007; Reed, 2008; Webler & Tuler, 2006).  This problem is not unique to scenario 
planning.  There is a lack of evaluation criteria and structured data collection methods for 
transdisciplinary research in general (Holzer et al., 2018; Reed, 2008).  Most commonly, evaluations 
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of transdisciplinary research have focussed on evaluating the methodology and techniques, despite 
general agreement within the literature that evaluation of transdisciplinary projects should consider 
both the study’s process and outcomes (Holzer et al., 2018; Reed, 2008; Wodak & Neale, 2015).  
Reed (2008) argues that this may be because selecting appropriate criteria and data collections is 
difficult.  To address this gap, Holzer et al. (2018, p. 812) conducted a literature review of evaluation 
techniques across ‘a variety of fields of study and practice’, and organised these into five categories: 
customised questionnaire; integrative mixed methods; staged environmental program evaluation; 
research embedment and performance profile; and case study.  No comprehensive techniques for 
evaluating transdisciplinary outcomes were found, so Holzer et al. (2018) propose a technique.  
However, because this proposal is so recent, there is no consensus around whether this is an 
appropriate evaluation technique to assess the outcomes of transdisciplinary research (it is noted that 
the technique is tailored towards socio-ecological studies).  While this is not a gap the present 
research seeks to address, it is acknowledged that the evaluation of transdisciplinary research 
outcomes remains an important matter for future studies to address. 
4.6.3 Future work 
Notably, this research project benefitted from two key influences which aided implementation.  First, 
the application of this approach particularly benefitted from New Zealand’s strong “lifelines” culture.  
As discussed above, lifeline utilities are legislated to improve disaster readiness, reduction, response, 
and recovery in New Zealand (MCDEM, 2002), but the additional leadership and willingness to 
participate in this process shown by the West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group, and in particular NZ 
Transport Agency and Westpower, alongside regional CDEM Groups, was essential to the success of 
this voluntary process.  Second, both the National Science Challenge Resilience to Nature’s 
Challenges and Project AF8 are major national research programmes (Chapter 4), which gave this 
research project and the Franz Josef community national prominence and made the community a 
focal point for resilience planning in the West Coast region.  This created a unique situation, backed 
by substantial resources, including financial resource which councils typically cannot afford to spend.   
Accordingly, this created an unusual situation, where the researcher involvement likely had a positive 
influence on resilience planning for the community, both in terms of available resources and influence 
on both policymakers and practitioners to participate. 
However, despite these influences, the approach still suffered when infrastructure stakeholders either 
did not or could not engage with the process due to other priorities.  High staff turnover (alongside 
community members) and sustaining interest also presented challenges.  As discussed above, the 
lack of engagement from some stakeholder groups decreased the scenario credibility and increased 
the influence of other stakeholders, particularly researchers, on the scenario, as their judgement was 
used as a substitute for those who did not participate.  Further, while the research project stopped 
short of efforts to maintain collaboration (Section 4.6.2), the collaborative process has also not been 
picked up by policymakers or practitioners.  As researchers led the process but stopped short of 
efforts to establish sustain collaboration, without leadership from a stakeholder group, the benefits of 
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the application may be short-lived.  Equally, the developed approach, which could be used with other 
communities, has not been, despite explicit requests from community members from Fox Glacier, 
Ōkārito, and Whataroa, as well as requests from infrastructure companies which desire collaboration 
with community members. 
While part of the project’s success was due to the close collaboration between researchers and the 
West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group, closer collaboration could have encouraged more 
participation.  For example, making the project a formal West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group 
project may have encouraged participation from telecommunications providers.  Legislation is also an 
option which has been successful in New Zealand at effectively mandating collaboration between 
infrastructure companies and emergency managers (MCDEM, 2002).  Clarifying and, if necessary, 
strengthening this mandate could greatly increase necessary collaboration between community 
members and lifelines organisations.  This is a well-established need, which has also been identified 
as particularly critical for remote, potentially-isolated communities (Chapter 2).  CDEM Groups are 
well-positioned to lead such collaborative work, but face resource constraints.  Participatory 
processes require substantial time, trained staff, and financial resources which can limit 
implementation.  Therefore, the low resources currently afforded to CDEM Groups suggest that the 
current system may not be optimal for the resilience of remote communities in New Zealand. 
The developed approach also has applicability beyond remote communities alone.  For example, 
applying the approach to other sudden-onset hazards, such as avalanches, debris flows, flash floods, 
volcanic lahars, and tsunami, may be particularly rewarding.  Communities dealing with sudden-onset 
hazards are, similarly to remote communities, likely to be alone when responding to warnings and the 
first to respond to a disaster.  Further, the research has applicability to managed retreat discussions in 
general, including those focussed around climate change.  Again, for managed retreat to succeed, 
community members must adopt and take ownership of the initiative (Few et al., 2007), which this 
approach enables. 
4.7 Conclusions 
- A participatory approach was developed, utilising a scenario as a boundary object, allowing 
relevant, credible and legitimate decision-making across all stakeholder groups (Cash et al., 
2003) by combining and sequencing various (existing) participation methodologies (Aoki, 
2018). 
- Both infrastructure companies and community members explicitly asked for collaborative 
processes between community members, practitioners and policymakers.  This is a well-
established need, which has also been identified as particularly critical for remote, potentially-
isolated communities (Chapter 2). 
- The developed approach was applied in a “pre-disaster” collaboration: the AF8+ scenario-
based participatory approach.  This approach successfully integrated and balanced the 
knowledge of community members with and alongside that of infrastructure providers, 
Chapter 4.  Co-creating the AF8+ scenario for Franz Josef and the West Coast region, New Zealand. 
 148 
emergency managers, local government policymakers and researchers to proactively 
increase resilience to naturally-triggered disasters.  Accordingly, the process demonstrated 
the ability to co-create knowledge which in turn can inform decision-making.  Further, the 
process also directly increased the resilience of Franz Josef and the regional resilience of 
distributed infrastructure networks through stakeholders utilising the developed shared 
understanding. 
- Balancing the integration of knowledge between stakeholders is critical to the success of 
participatory processes (Ackerman, 2004; Reed et al., 2013), particularly in remote 
communities (Chapter 2), but has previously been difficult to achieve.  Sequencing 
participatory methodologies within the scenario-based participatory approach allowed 
stakeholders to engage with and gain more influence over the process at their relevant scale 
(i.e. local, regional, or national), as well as enabling the process design to better suit the 
participation capacities of the stakeholder groups.  In this way, combining and sequencing 
enabled the knowledge of community members to be integrated and balanced with and 
alongside that of practitioners, policymakers and researchers. 
- Combining and sequencing also enabled feedback loops.  In this way, stakeholder groups 
could iteratively build on the impacts scenario, co-producing knowledge across knowledge 
spheres.  Moreover, because stakeholders could understand other stakeholders’ 
contributions, stakeholders were able to utilise these contributions immediately to assess 
existing and implement new resilience measures in the “real world”. 
- The process built trusting relationships between stakeholder groups.  In ensuring inputs were 
credible, legitimate and balanced, the stakeholders trusted the inputs as genuine needs and 
priorities and fully engaged with these to develop disaster impact reduction measures.  This 
formed trusting relationships between the participants, who could see simply by participating 
in the process that the other stakeholder groups were acting to improve resilience.  This was 
particularly notable in the “combined” workshop, where infrastructure providers were able to 
see the commitment from the large number of community members to increase the resilience 
of Franz Josef, and the community members were able to put names and faces to 
organisation names and find out who was responsible for various disaster impact reduction 
initiatives. 
- However, the approach was limited by its voluntary nature, and stopped short of attempting to 
enable ongoing participation.  Without leadership from a stakeholder group, the benefits of the 
application may be short-lived (Blake et al., 2011; Fenwick, 2012; Robinson et al., 2014).  
Closer collaboration could have encouraged more stakeholders to participate.  For example, 
making the project a formal West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group project may have 
encouraged participation from telecommunications providers.  Legislation is also an option 
which has been successful in New Zealand at effectively mandating collaboration between 
infrastructure companies and emergency managers (MCDEM, 2002).  Clarifying and, if 
necessary, strengthening this mandate could greatly increase necessary collaboration 
between community members and lifelines organisations.  CDEM Groups are well-positioned 
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to lead such collaborative work, but face resource constraints.  Participatory processes 
require substantial time, trained staff, and financial resources which can limit implementation.  
Therefore, the low resources currently afforded to CDEM Groups suggest that the current 
system may not be optimal for the resilience of remote communities in New Zealand. 
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5.1 Abstract 
While it is well established that community members should participate in resilience planning, 
participation with genuine decision-making power remains rare.  We detail an end-to-end disaster 
impact reduction modelling framework for infrastructure networks, embedded within a scenario-based 
participatory approach.  Utilising the AF8+ earthquake scenario, we simulate hazard exposure, asset 
failure and recovery of interdependent critical infrastructure networks.  Quantifying service levels 
temporally offers insights into possible interdependent network performance and community 
disconnection from national networks, not apparent when studying each infrastructure in isolation.  
Sequencing participation enables feedbacks between integrated modelling and participants’ impact 
assessments.  Shared ownership of modelling outputs advances stakeholders’ understanding of 
resilience measures, allowing real-time implementation, increasing community resilience.  Modelling 
extrapolated national implications from participants’ assessments.  Readily understood by central 
government, this format may increase support and resourcing, if nationally significant.  Finally, this 
method tested integrated modelling and impacts assessments, identifying and enabling improvements 
for both. 
5.2 Introduction 
Communities require essential services, such as electricity, transport, telecommunications (including 
calls, texts and data), water and sewerage to be able to function.  These essential services are 
provided by infrastructure networks, such as electricity lines, roads, and fibre optic cables, which are 
often highly interdependent.  Damage to infrastructure, often caused by natural hazards (such as 
earthquakes), can result in the partial and sometimes complete loss of a given community’s essential 
services for considerable periods of time.  The interdependence of infrastructure networks can 
compound service loss.  Impact on one network is likely to have cascading negative consequences 
for other networks, reducing the service level provided by other networks, and increasing the time 
required to restore networks (Buldyrev et al., 2010).  Accordingly, the modelling of infrastructure 
networks’ asset failure, interdependencies, and recovery are ongoing foci of disaster management 
research worldwide (Hickford et al., 2018; Ouyang, 2014).  However, these models are not well 
integrated, which can lead to conflicting results (Ouyang, 2014; Saidi et al., 2017).  As a result, end-
to-end hazard-to-impact-to-recovery modelling for infrastructure networks remains a research gap. 
Furthermore, the need for infrastructure resilience is ultimately driven by the need for community 
disaster resilience (Chang, 2014; Gaillard & Mercer, 2013; National Infrastructure Unit, 2015).  It is 
established that community members should participate in attempts to increase resilience to 
disasters.  Normative reasoning suggests that people have a right to participate in decision-making 
which affects them, and pragmatic reasoning suggests that participatory processes deliver higher-
quality outputs (than those without participation) (Ackerman, 2004; Reed et al., 2013).  However, 
community participation involves substantial time and effort, when all stakeholders have limited time, 
resources and interest, restricting their capacity to participate in or facilitate additional activities (Reed 
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et al., 2013).  For example, existing commitments such as work and family can limit community 
members’ ability to participate, and limited time and resources can similarly discourage project 
leaders from facilitating intensive participation (Reed et al., 2013).  Further, while community 
members often participate in disaster impact reduction efforts, community participation with genuine 
decision-making power remains rare and difficult, including in the context of increasing infrastructure 
resilience (Aoki, 2018; Broad et al., 2007; Cooke & Kothari, 2001). 
Chapter 4 introduces a scenario-based participatory approach to enable successful collaboration 
among community members, researchers, and practitioners, for disaster impact reduction.  This 
approach uses a scenario as a boundary object to enable collaboration between community 
members, researchers, and practitioners.  “Boundary objects” are ‘objects which both inhabit several 
intersecting social worlds and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them.  Boundary 
objects are… a means of translation’ (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p. 393).  Numerous studies have 
shown that boundary objects can enable successful collaboration between researchers and 
practitioners, without compromising either group’s identity, integrity or autonomy, when all stakeholder 
groups perceive the boundary object as credible (scientifically and technically accurate), relevant, and 
legitimate (fairly reflecting stakeholders’ divergent views and interests) (Cash et al., 2003; Mauser et 
al., 2013; Mittelstrass, 2011; Thompson et al., 2015).  Accordingly, within disaster impact reduction 
projects, natural hazard scenarios have proved to be successful boundary objects, enabling 
knowledge co-production and establishing ongoing relationships (e.g. Centre for Advanced 
Engineering, 1997; Deligne et al., 2017; Robinson et al., 2014; Spangle Associates & Robert Olson 
Associates, 1997). 
To integrate community members into this established scenario-based approach with genuine 
decision-making power, Chapter 4 combines and sequences participatory methodologies, following 
Aoki (2018).  Sequencing participation allows different stakeholder groups to participate more 
intensely at different stages during the overall process, focussing on relevant areas.  For example, 
community members gain more influence assessing how a disaster will impact the community but 
have lower influence over assessing technical infrastructure restoration times (which infrastructure 
providers gain more influence over).  Sequencing participation also helps to overcome barriers to 
participation by reducing the time commitment required from each stakeholder group, as discussions 
of most interest to individual stakeholder groups can be held without requiring all participants.  This 
also helps to constrain and ensure credibility, reducing potential confusion which can be caused by 
non-experts debating and speculating about the needs and outcomes of parameters they know little 
about.  For example, network infrastructure providers may speculate about community post-disaster 
needs but may have little specific idea.  Equally, community members may guess network restoration 
times but are unlikely to know these.  Combining different participation methodologies can further 
overcome barriers to participation.  Methodologies with a range of participation intensities can be 
used so that participants who can commit more time are encouraged to, but those who cannot commit 
the same amount of time can still participate, and do not have to be excluded from the process 
entirely. 
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Therefore, in this paper, we aim to: 
1) Develop an end-to-end disaster impact reduction modelling framework for infrastructure 
networks which considers direct and indirect impact, cascading network disruption, network 
interdependence, and resulting recovery processes; and 
2) Embed this framework within a scenario-based participatory approach for disaster impact 
reduction to: 
i. Advance cross-sector understandings of the implications of disruption to, and 
recovery strategies for, infrastructure networks; 
ii. Increase the effectiveness and shared ownership of disaster impact reduction efforts; 
and consequently, 
iii. Increase community resilience to future hazard events. 
Notably, this approach couples hazard models (ground shaking, landslides) with the modelling of 
failure, disruption and recovery across national-scale interdependent networks.  Combining this 
integrated modelling with community- and practitioner-elicited recovery priorities creates feedback 
loops.  These iteratively highlight vulnerabilities, areas to be revised, and new areas to be considered, 
in the integrated modelling and in practice.  Further, the integration of community members and 
practitioners allows greater understanding, ownership, and ultimately application of this research, thus 
increasing community resilience. 
Accordingly, we aim to answer the following research questions: 
1) What is required to integrate hazard and infrastructure modelling, including direct and indirect 
impacts, cascading network disruption, network interdependence, and resulting recovery 
processes, to provide end-to-end impact assessment for infrastructure networks? 
2) What value is gained by developing an end-to-end model for infrastructure networks? 
3) How might a scenario-based participatory approach incorporate an end-to-end impact 
assessment model to advance both infrastructure and community resilience in an integrated 
way? 
4) What is required to ensure that such scenario-based participatory approaches incorporate 
ongoing participant outputs to ensure that disaster impact reduction efforts continue to 
iteratively build on improvements in shared understanding? 
5.2.1 The AF8+ scenario 
Recent earthquake disasters in New Zealand (2010-11 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, 2016 
“Kaikōura” Earthquake) have demonstrated the potential fragility and interdependence of 
infrastructure networks, the extent to which communities depend upon infrastructure networks, and 
the value of pre-event infrastructure resilience efforts (Chapter 3; Fenwick, 2012; McLean et al., 
2012).  These lessons have informed a strong national drive to increase the resilience of 
infrastructure networks, which has included the creation of a New Zealand Thirty Year Infrastructure 
Plan (National Infrastructure Unit, 2015).  Under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 
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(MCDEM, 2002), New Zealand government agencies at local, regional and national levels, 
infrastructure providers (often termed “lifeline utilities”) and emergency services all have defined 
functions and responsibilities for disaster readiness, reduction, response, and recovery.  Section 60, 
for example, requires every lifeline utility to be ‘able to function to the fullest possible extent, even 
though this may be at a reduced level, during and after an emergency’ (MCDEM, 2002, p. 40).  
Lifeline utilities must also establish planning and operational relationships with their regional Civil 
Defence & Emergency Management (CDEM) Group under the Act.  In most regions, lifeline utilities 
predominantly fulfil their duties under the act by participating in regional lifelines groups, with national 
representation and coordination undertaken by the New Zealand Lifelines Council (est. 1999).  
Regional lifelines groups frequently undertake regional-scale vulnerability studies (e.g. AELG, 2014; 
McCahon et al., 2017; ORC, 2014), post-event debriefs (e.g. Fenwick, 2012; Hamilton & Hinton, 
2017; West Coast Regional Council, 2014), and other work fostered or contributed to by the Groups, 
such as annual emergency management exercises at national, regional, and local scales (DPMC, 
2016), and numerous centrally-funded research initiatives which have streams dedicated to 
researching natural hazard impacts on infrastructure (including the Resilience to Natures Challenges, 
resiliencechallenge.nz; NZ Centre for Earthquake Resilience, QuakeCoRE, quakecore.nz; Economics 
of Resilient Infrastructure, naturalhazards.org.nz; DEtermining VOlcanic Risk in Auckland, DEVORA, 
devora.org.nz; and East Coast LAB, eastcoastlab.org.nz).  This work often develops valuable inter-
personal and inter-corporate relationships and has improved resilience (e.g. Chapter 3; Fenwick, 
2012).  However, there has been growing recognition that greater community involvement in 
infrastructure resilience planning is required, both from domestic experience and international 
research (Chang, 2014; Gaillard & Mercer, 2013; National Infrastructure Unit, 2015). 
The Alpine Fault (South Island, New Zealand) is an earthquake source capable of producing impacts 
of national significance.  The Fault forms the onshore boundary between the Pacific and Australian 
tectonic plates, accommodating the majority of plate relative motion, up to 28 mm/year (Barth et al., 
2014; Biasi et al., 2015; Sutherland et al., 2006).  The Alpine Fault generates Mw8+ earthquakes 
several times per millennium and is late in its current seismic cycle, with an estimated ~30% 
probability of a major rupture in the next 50 years (Barnes et al., 2013; Cochran et al., 2017; De 
Pascale & Langridge, 2012; Stirling et al., 2012). 
The Alpine Fault was considered a sufficient potential risk that Project AF8 (projectaf8.co.nz) was 
commenced in 2016, to undertake detailed planning for future major South Island earthquakes.  
Focussing on a 7-day Alpine Fault magnitude 8 earthquake scenario based on decades of prior 
research activity (Orchiston et al., 2016), Project AF8 ran six regional and one national response 
planning workshops, aiming to integrate regional and national planning.  In total, more than 500 
participants attended these workshops, including emergency managers, policymakers, lifeline utilities, 
and community representatives, amongst others (Orchiston et al., 2018).  The intended outcome is 
the South Island Alpine Fault Emergency Response (SAFER) framework, focussed on identifying 
likely impacts and addressing these through strategic planning and coordination activities. 
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This study builds on the initial Project AF8 scenario, using an up-scaled scenario that considers the 
10 years following the initial earthquake, introduced by Chapter 4, termed the “AF8+ scenario”.  The 
AF8+ scenario allows a shift in focus from reactive short-term response to analyses of longer-term 
recovery, and was designed as part of a participatory process, according to project goals established 
by community members in Franz Josef, South Island, New Zealand, and subsequent discussions with 
practitioners (Chapter 4).  Herein, we present findings based on the AF8+ scenario, informed by 
findings from workshops which enabled engagement between researchers, infrastructure 
stakeholders, disaster managers, and community members (Chapter 4). 
This paper details expected societal disruptions due to infrastructure damages up to 180 days (6 
months) following the initial AF8+ event, including those caused by the aftershock sequence and 
resultant landslides.  We seek to address: 
1) the location(s) most vulnerable to infrastructure losses for extended periods of time; 
2) the magnitude and spatial extent to which disruptions spread due to the interconnected and 
interdependent nature of the South Island infrastructure networks; and 
3) temporal changes in infrastructure network functionality during the recovery process, up to 
180 days. 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Integrated disaster impact reduction modelling framework for infrastructure networks 
Our framework for simulating the cascading network disruption and recovery processes following 
major hazard-induced damage to interdependent infrastructure networks is presented in the grey 
boxes in Figure 45.  The framework comprises five components: A: Infrastructure model, B: Hazard 
scenario, C: Failure propagation, D: Disruption metrics, and E: Recovery.  Each of these components 
is briefly outlined below. 
In the first component, A: Infrastructure model, spatial infrastructure asset data are assembled to 
produce functional and topological geospatial network models where networks are represented as 
graphs of nodes and edges representing discrete single point assets (such as water pumping stations 
or reservoirs) and connections (such as pipelines between these nodes), respectively.  The 
functionalities of the nodes are identified as: (1) sources - where infrastructure resources or services 
are generated (e.g. power plants, water supply abstraction points, bulk petroleum storage tanks); and 
(2) sinks - which signify the final points of delivery of the infrastructure services typically to the 
customer (e.g. low voltage electricity substations, water pump stations, retail petrol stations).  This 
allows creation of functional pathways, which emerge from the traceability of source-sink connectivity 
paths both within and between networks that exchange infrastructure resources and services.  User 
demands are allocated to each individual source and sink node based on “business as usual” 
statistics adopted from asset owner/operator-provided statistics, publicly available reported statistics, 
or spatial distribution/collection zones intersected with census data to provide an estimate of 
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populations dependent on assets.  These user demands are distributed along the functional pathways 
to create weighted flow network representations.  Using these network models, initial asset failures or 
disruptions are assumed based on the network assets’ intersection with the modelled hazard extents 
in B: Hazard Scenario.  Such approaches are established within the literature (e.g. Alexander, 2000; 
Robinson et al., 2014) and have been used in a range of infrastructure risk and vulnerability studies 
globally (Ouyang, 2014) including studies of interdependent infrastructure vulnerability assessment for 
New Zealand (Zorn et al., in review-a; Zorn et al., in review-b). 
 
Figure 45.  Conceptual diagram of the integrated disaster impact reduction modelling framework for 
infrastructure networks (indicated by light grey boxes) embedded within the Chapter 4 scenario-based 
participatory approach.  The dashed, dark grey box indicates the iterative process incorporating 
recovery.  Feedback loops are highlighted using red arrows. 
Components C, D, and E (Figure 45) then follow an iterative process for each modelled timestep, 
forming a feedback loop.  First, C: Failure Propagation enables the propagation of network failures 
both within a network and between networks where dependency connections are broken and no 
redundancy or rerouting of service flows are possible within our modelled network configuration.  D: 
Disruption Metrics then computes various consequence metrics.  We define Direct Disruptions as the 
population/number of users adversely affected due to failed assets within the same network, such as 
a damaged water treatment plant causing a reduction (or removal) of water provision to downstream 
customers.  By contrast, Indirect Disruptions result from failures which are initiated beyond the 
specific network of interest due to functional dependencies on other networks, such as an undamaged 
water treatment plant unable to function due to a lack of electricity supply.  The spatial outage extent 
is delineated by the intersection of spatial footprints of failed components and dependent user 
catchments or distribution/reception zones. 
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Steps A-D represent the state of the disrupted infrastructure at a snapshot of time (t).  For the next 
timestep (t + Δt), the final component, E: Recovery, reinstates asset functionality of previously failed 
assets (where appropriate).  This implies that a restoration process or provision of a permanent 
redundant supply has occurred to provide pre-event service levels. 
5.3.2 Integrated disaster impact reduction modelling framework for infrastructure networks 
embedded within a scenario-based participatory approach 
The above integrated disaster impact reduction modelling framework for infrastructure networks was 
then embedded within the Chapter 4 scenario-based participatory approach, as shown in Figure 45.  
First, all stakeholders collaborate to define the scenario, to ensure that the scenario is perceived to be 
relevant by all participating groups (Kishita et al., 2016; Kok et al., 2007; Reed et al., 2013; Swart et 
al., 2004; Walz et al., 2007).  Second, the hazard scenario is developed, as discussed above (Step B 
in Figure 45).  Third, an impacts scenario is co-created through a range of combined and sequenced 
participatory methodologies (Chapter 4).  In this way, the impacts scenario acts as a boundary object 
between participating groups, creating an ongoing feedback loop.  As new information about likely 
damage, disruption and recovery priorities is provided to the impacts scenario by one stakeholder 
group, other stakeholder groups are able to incorporate this new information and, if necessary, alter 
their own damage, disruption and recovery assessments. 
The impacts scenario also functions as a boundary object to embed the integrated disaster impact 
reduction modelling framework for infrastructure networks into the scenario-based participatory 
approach.  As new damage, disruption and recovery assessments are created by participants in 
workshops, these can be modelled after workshops to show resulting implications for cascading 
network disruption, network interdependence, and the effect on recovery.  This results in a feedback 
loop between the integrated modelling and ongoing disaster impact reduction work being undertaken 
by participants.  This feedback loop enables the iterative integration of modelling outputs within the 
impacts scenario and as a result, this information can be understood and immediately used by 
community members and practitioners. 
5.4 Application 
In this section, we briefly summarise the application of the scenario-based participatory approach to 
the AF8+ scenario, as detailed by Chapter 4.  We then step through and expand on the application of 
each of the modelling framework components (Figure 45) to the AF8+ scenario. 
5.4.1 The scenario-based participatory approach to the AF8+ scenario 
Project goals were established by Franz Josef community members, and then by practitioners, who 
asked researchers to facilitate a participatory project to increase disaster resilience (Chapter 4).  
Subsequently, the AF8+ hazard event scenario (Section 5.4.3; B) was designed and built by 
researchers in line with these project goals.  The impacts scenario was then co-created through a 
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series of participatory workshops.  Participation was sequenced, so that separate workshops were 




Figure 46.  Schematic of the Franz Josef natural hazards scenario-based participatory workshops 
(each solid box represents a workshop).  Separate workshops were held with Franz Josef community 
members, Westpower, ground transport operators (the New Zealand Transport Agency and KiwiRail) 
and road contractors (NZ Transport Agency, Fulton Hogan, MBD Construction), and the West Coast 
lifelines committee.  CDEM representatives participated in all workshops, followed by a “combined” 
workshop (Chapter 4). 
In each workshop, the hazard scenario, exposure maps and the impacts scenario to date were 
presented.  The impacts scenario was then co-created.  Community members focussed on Franz 
Josef and practitioners focussed on their infrastructure networks, in the respective workshops.  
Outputs from the previous workshops and the most recent combined infrastructure modelling were 
available in subsequent workshops, allowing each workshop to build on the impacts scenario to date 
(Chapter 4). 
5.4.2 Infrastructure model (A) 
We adopt the spatial infrastructure asset data and functional network models of Zorn et al. (2018a; 
2018b) across the energy (electricity, petroleum), transportation (road, air, ferry, rail), water & waste 
(water supply, wastewater, solid waste), and telecommunications sectors (mobile), with the addition of 
a further wired telecommunications network.  In each of these models, major assets are represented.  
Table 7 provides an outline of the node/edge representations for each of the studied networks across 
the South Island and Figure 47a presents the combined spatial distribution of assets for all networks 
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with respect to mapped faults.  For visual clarity, we have not represented each infrastructure sector 
separately. 
User demands are allocated to each of the individual nodes and edges presented in Figure 47 using 
statistics adopted from asset owner/operator-provided statistics, publicly available reported statistics, 
or spatial distribution/collection zones, intersected with the smallest publicly available census area 
unit (~100 permanent residents each).  For this paper, we consider residential and passenger 
transportation modes only (i.e. freight, and commercial and industrial customers dependent on these 
networks, are not included).  The dependencies represented within the network models are provided 
in Figure 48 (as per Zorn et al., in review-b).  It should be noted that these are assumed for normal 
network connectivity and are assumed to be consistent throughout any recovery processes.  Where 
specific connectivity pairs are unknown, edges are assumed to the closest appropriate asset either 
geographically or through a shortest path connection route. 
Table 7.  Network asset representations as nodes and edges with counted values representing the 
number of exposed assets in this scenario based on the national models of Zorn et al. (in review-a); 
Zorn et al. (in review-b). 
Infrastructure sector Network Asset representation 
Node Edge 
Energy Electricity 63 generation sources, 48 
transmission and 289 
distribution substations 
Transmission and sub-
transmission power lines 
 Petroleum 5 bulk storage facilities, 431 
retail petroleum stations 
Connected via state highway 
Network 
Telecommunications Wired 322 exchanges, 2313 cabinets Fibre and copper connections 
 Wireless 1053 mobile transmitter towers Connectivity to wired network 
Water & Waste Water supply 585 source, treatment, 
pumping, or storage nodes 




354 pump station or treatment 
assets 
Major collection pipelines 
 Solid waste 239 collection, transfer, or 
landfill assets 
Routed via state highway 
network 
Transportation State highway 
(SH) 
855 bridges/tunnels State highway classified roads 
 Rail 16 stations Rail tracks 
 Air 13 airports Flight routes (41 domestic, 4 
international) 











Figure 47.  (a) South Island faults, including the F2K section of the Alpine Fault, and (b) spatial 
distribution of studied infrastructures with respect to MMI shaking intensities used in the AF8+ 
scenario, converted from Bradley et al. (2017).  Inset map shows plate tectonic context of New 




Figure 48.  Simplified representation of the directed dependencies modelled from Zorn et al. (in 
review-b).  An infrastructure i reliance on infrastructure j is represented as i→j. 
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5.4.3 Hazard scenario (B) 
The AF8+ scenario adopts a northeast-directed 411 km rupture of the Alpine Fault between Fiordland 
and Lake Kaniere (F2K) with corresponding ground shaking determined by Bradley et al. (2017) 
(Figure 47).  While this aspect of the scenario is considered highly uncertain by the Project AF8 
science team, it was adopted given the frequency of reverse-slip earthquakes at the southern end of 
the Alpine Fault in recent decades (Barnes et al., 2013) progressing from a SW to NE direction 
(Downes & Dowrick, 2014; McGinty, 2001) and because it produces stronger ground shaking in 
populated areas on the west and east coasts than comparable scenarios (Orchiston et al., 2016; 
Orchiston et al., 2018).  Chapter 4 extended the scenario from 7 days to 10 years (herein we focus on 
the first 180 days) and reduced some additional hazard severities that were previously heightened to 
emphasise the emergency response focus (e.g. replacement of a 1-in-100 year rainstorm on Day 3 
with historic rainfall data and an updated aftershock sequence).  Co-seismic landslide exposure was 
determined through the approach of Robinson et al. (2016).  Earthquake rupture, earthquake shaking, 
rockfall exposure and landslide reactivations were determined through expert judgement. 
5.4.4 Failure propagation (C) 
Each individual network asset is assigned one of three initial functionality states as a direct result of 
the shaking and landslide models described above.  These correspond to i) complete disruption, ii) 
some interim level of functionality, or iii) no disruption such that normal pre-event service is provided. 
Disruptions were derived from locations where assets intersected the AF8+ scenario modelled fault 
rupture, shaking intensities (using Modified Mercalli Intensities (MMI), see Figure 47b), and landslide 
runout footprints, with infrastructure stakeholders providing further input regarding local geology, 
asset vulnerability, and likely impacts on the assets, based on recent experiences.  Expected recovery 
times were also derived.  In applying these failures, where alternative source-sink connectivity paths 
do not exist, all dependent nodes/edges are assumed to be disrupted.  To reduce data requirements 
and model complexities, we assume no capacity constraints at network edges and nodes, and we 
make further assumptions based on expert advice regarding reliabilities of supply (or levels of service) 
provided by specific networks following an AF8+ style scenario.  For example, electricity supply 
networks could be expected to provide intermittent service to end-users given the potential for power 
cuts following an earthquake due to aftershocks and voluntary disconnections for inspection or repair.  
In such cases, the interim level of functionality is assumed. 
5.4.5 Disruption metrics (D) 
The consequence of asset failure is quantified based on the total user disruptions after allowing for 
redundancies and rerouting.  Under full disruptions, all dependent users are considered disrupted.  
Under partial disruption, half of the additional affected users are considered disrupted.  Further, for 
some network functions (namely solid waste movements, wastewater solids disposal to landfills, and 
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petroleum delivery to retail outlets), if rerouting is required, potential user disruptions are assumed to 
be a function of the increase in travel distance as per Zorn et al. (in review-b). 
Disruptions are defined as being either initiated by direct or indirect causes (Section 2).  Given the 
wide spatial extent of potential damages throughout the AF8+ scenario, indirect disruptions could be 
attributed to multiple sources.  For example, a retail petrol station can be disrupted for a range of 
reasons, such as (but not limited to): i) loss in electricity supply such that pumping, payment, and 
safety measures are inoperable, ii) damage to the bulk supply point at which fuel is distributed, or iii) 
closure of the road/pipe networks required to transport fuel to the retail stations.  If any combination of 
these occurs, the downstream retail petrol stations will be indirectly disrupted.  However, attributing 
customer disruptions to all the indirectly causing infrastructures would lead to multiple counting.  
Therefore, we assume a strength (or priority) of dependency for each of the dependencies modelled 
(Figure 48).  In the retail pump station example, besides being directly impacted by the hazard, we 
consider a loss of electricity supply to cause the most immediate impact and therefore to be the 
leading, or initiating, infrastructure cause of indirect disruptions.  While a functional road network is 
essential for the ongoing delivery of fuel supply to the retail petrol station, on-site storage means that 
a temporary road closure would not have the same impact on customers compared to a loss of 
electricity, and therefore complete inoperability. 
5.4.6 Recovery (E) 
For this application, due to current data availability, we have focussed on five timesteps: 0-1 days (the 
initial impacts in the first 24 hours), 3 days, 7 days, 30 days, and 180 days.  Individual asset recovery 
rates were assumed from a range of Alpine Fault studies (Robinson et al., 2014; Robinson et al., 
2015) and local vulnerability studies (McCahon et al., 2017).  These were updated using preliminary 
findings from the scenario-based participatory approach (Section 5.4.1), integrating the modelling as 
shown in Figure 45. 
5.5 Results 
Franz Josef community members made detailed estimates of the community’s post-disaster capacity 
in the “Franz Josef” workshop (Figure 46).  In summary, the community expected Franz Josef to have: 
2000 tourists to account for and evacuate; 3 satellite phones; 5 helicopters; 48 hours triage medical 
supplies; 4 days of food for tourists; 2 weeks of food for residents; 10 days of diesel; and 20 days of 
petrol. 
Network outages over time were subsequently derived from the practitioner and “combined” 
workshops.  West Coast regional electricity outages are shown in Figure 49.  South Island state 
highway outages are shown in Figure 50.  South Island rail network outages were also established 
but are not shown because it was expected that there would be no rail service on the East-West line, 
including the West Coast, west of Springfield for several years. 
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Figure 49.  The co-created AF8+ impact scenario for Westpower electricity service levels.  
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Figure 50.  The co-created AF8+ impact maps for South Island state highways’ service levels.
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The modelled spatial extents of infrastructure network outages over time are shown in Figure 51.  
Shading indicates the number of infrastructure networks that are providing a complete or interim level 
of disruption to normal service.  Timesteps of 0 and 3 days are combined as some interim level of 























Figure 51.  Spatial extents and number of infrastructure disruptions across the South Island.  Darker 
(red) cells indicate a higher proportion of disrupted infrastructure services (either full disruption, or 
some reduced level of functionality/reliability compared to pre-event services) with greyed out cells 
representing normal pre-event functionality (or areas without any permanent residents and hence 
losses in infrastructure service). 
180 days 30 days 
0 days / 3 days 7 days 
▬ Alpine Fault (F2K) 
★ AF8+ epicentre 
− State highways 
Number of infrastructure networks out of service or 
providing some reduced level of functionality 
        1                   11 
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Recovery (to full pre-disruption service levels) propagates from the north, east, and south-east after 
day 7.  This is due largely to the more rapid re-instatement of interim/partial levels of service due to 
available resources (physical and human) located in these areas and less damage to the major 
assets represented in the models.  At the larger timesteps (30 days / 180 days) the West Coast region 
still shows substantial infrastructure disruptions: either complete or at some interim reduced level of 
functionality.  Much of these disruptions can be attributed to the requirement for alternative source-
sink connectivity paths for petroleum delivery, solid waste movement, and sewage disposal, with any 
deviation from normal pre-event service levels highlighted in Figure 51.  Updating model simulations 
with new network arrangements (i.e. the definition of normal, interim, and no service) should be a 
focus in future research. 
Many infrastructure recovery trajectories correlate closely to electricity network function (Figure 52a).  
While electricity providers advise the potential for “islanding” of electricity within the West Coast 
region within 180 days if the national grid is unable to be reconnected (Chapter 4), some locations 
within the West Coast region may remain without, or with intermittent, electricity supplies.  Regardless 
of location, in this (or any similar) scenario, infrastructures dependent on electricity within the West 
Coast region should continue to consider potentially widespread use of back-up electricity sources to 
aid initial recovery. 
Figure 52.  (a) Infrastructure network functionality for the South Island of New Zealand in terms of 
users disrupted (or passenger-kilometres restored for state highways) and (b) the attribution of 
disruptions to direct or indirect causes (via interdependencies) combined across networks.  A 
selection of Wellington (ferry/air) and South Island bound transport passengers (air) is also included. 
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This dependence on electricity is also reflected in Figure 52b, where the majority of user disruptions, 
across the presented time frame, can be attributed to indirect failures: predominantly disconnections 
in electricity supply.  At t = 0, direct damages (combined across all infrastructures) account for 40% of 
the cumulative user disruptions with 60% externally initiated.  With redundant electricity supplies, the 
proportion of indirect electricity-initiated disruptions would be expected to decrease (particularly for 
the mobile and wired telecommunications sectors which represent a combined ~2 million potential 
user disruptions at peak) and/or be reassigned as indirectly-initiated disruptions, due to reduced road, 
water supply, or petroleum access, amongst others.  Explicitly incorporating redundancies and their 
attributes/dependencies into the modelling framework (e.g. battery life/generator refuelling 
requirements/road access/supervision) would be a valuable extension to this research and should be 
incorporated as data for this become available. 
5.6 Discussion 
We have presented an application of an end-to-end modelling framework for earthquake shaking and 
landslide hazards coupled with interdependent critical infrastructure network models and the 
corresponding recovery processes.  This integrated modelling immediately highlighted several 
discussion points for those concerned with reducing the impacts of major South Island disasters.  The 
vulnerability of the West Coast region of the South Island is clear, as are the expected extended 
recovery times for many dependent infrastructures due to major disconnection from the transportation 
(predominantly state highway) and electricity networks.  Given the mountainous setting and (resulting) 
financial cost, increasing connectivity (and therefore redundancy) across the state highway network is 
largely unfeasible.  Therefore, improving and/or maintaining asset robustness should be a priority.  
For electricity, ongoing work by network owner/operators to introduce embedded generation (local 
generation sources connected to the distribution network reducing the reliance on the national grid) 
and backup supplies in critical areas within the West Coast region should substantially benefit the 
local resident populations while aiding timely recovery for dependent infrastructures. 
This end-to-end modelling framework was embedded within a scenario-based participatory approach 
for disaster impact reduction.  The scenario-based participatory approach coupled hazard models 
(ground shaking, landslides) with community- and practitioner-elicited post-disaster capacities and 
recovery priorities by using a scenario as a boundary object.  Sequencing and combining participation 
methodologies created a feedback loop between community members and practitioners (Chapter 4).  
For example, community members identified that they would be severely impacted locally, have 
limited resources and a large population to support, and would be isolated.  Practitioners were able to 
confirm that the community would be inaccessible via ground transportation (i.e. state highways) for 
months (Figure 50).  Subsequently, the community identified that they could self-ration to ensure that 
supplies would last, and road operators identified that due to the magnitude of regional damage, it 
would be more beneficial for locally-based road contractors to help repair local infrastructure, 
including local roads and bridges, water pipes, and sewerage, than attempting to open the state 
highways, as this would require a structured, centrally-led and resourced response. 
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Embedding the end-to-end modelling framework within the scenario-based participatory approach had 
three obvious benefits.  First, simulation of failure, disruption and recovery across national-scale 
interdependent networks allowed community members and practitioners to use the modelled impacts 
to advance their assessments of likely disruption and recovery strategies.  Second, it helped to 
translate the relative importance of the spatial extents and number of infrastructure network outages 
(Figure 51) in relation to communities’, and particularly Franz Josef’s, post-disaster capacities, and so 
their ability to recover.  Third, this method allowed testing of integrated modelling and impacts 
assessments, as community members and practitioners identified vulnerabilities, enabling appropriate 
adjustments to modelling and relevant disaster impact reduction measures implemented by 
community members and practitioners.  For example, where the modelling initially highlighted 
dependence on electricity, practitioners and community members identified dependence on road 
access and petroleum supplies to be the greatest limiting factor throughout the recovery phase.  In 
short, the modelling highlighted areas requiring increased focus in practice, while practitioners and 
community members highlighted necessary improvements for models.  Road access and petroleum 
dependence were not accurately represented in the curves of Figure 52, as the dependencies 
represented in our model highlight the connectivity required for normal operation as opposed to any 
new or changing dependencies arising to enable recovery.  Additionally, the potential indirect 
disruptions due to petroleum shortages across the West Coast region during the recovery process are 
not immediately visible in Figure 52b.  This is due to the modelling approach that defines user 
demands based on private car refuelling as opposed to petroleum demands for recovery works.  
Further supply shortages, for those restoring various infrastructure network functionalities, could 
substantially change the curves presented in Figure 52a, with the potential for cascading delays 
across multiple networks. 
Moreover, coupling the integrated infrastructure modelling and the scenario-based participatory 
approach created a valuable feedback loop between the integrated infrastructure modelling and the 
scenario-based participatory approach (Figure 45), which was enabled by sequencing participation.  
As new damage, disruption and recovery assessments were identified by workshop participants, they 
were incorporated into the modelling to show resulting implications for cascading network disruption, 
network interdependence, and effects on recovery.  Community members noted that this feedback 
loop critically added credibility to their impact assessment by extrapolating the national level 
implications of the integrated community assessment of local damage, and so be translated into a 
format which is readily understood by government at a national level.  In turn, this increased the 
likelihood of central support and resourcing for relevant national-level disaster impact reduction efforts 
for the community.  Embedding modelling within the scenario-based participatory approach also 
increased the shared ownership of the modelling and allowed both community members and 
practitioners to (in some cases immediately) implement disaster impact reduction measures at the 
local and regional levels in response to the implications of the modelling (Chapter 4).  For example, a 
Franz Josef business owner noted that “from a business point of view, knowing likely outage times, as 
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shown on the maps used in the workshop [Figure 49; Figure 50], is very useful for crisis 
management.” 
Notably, willingness to participate was critical to the success of this process.  While lifeline utilities are 
legislated to improve disaster readiness, reduction, response, and recovery (MCDEM, 2002) (Section 
5.2.1), the additional leadership and willingness to participate in this process shown by the West 
Coast Engineering Lifelines Group, and in particular the New Zealand Transport Agency and 
Westpower greatly aided this process.  Moreover, the drive shown by community members to start the 
process, and the unwavering commitment of community members to increase the resilience of Franz 
Josef cannot be understated as essential to the process.  This may have been partly enabled by the 
tight-knit and remote character of this community, as it has been established that place attachment 
and strong connections between community members (including government employees) can enable 
compromises for the good of the community (Aoki, 2018; Espiner & Becken, 2014; Orchiston, 2013).  
This is not to say that participation was easy.  The scenario lacked some credibility insofar as national 
telecommunications and electricity providers/distributors did not engage with the process.  This 
increased the influence of other stakeholders, particularly academics, on the scenario, as best 
judgement was used as a substitute for participation.  Further, while complete participation is a near 
impossibility for any project of this scale, when key personnel were unable to attend, this affected, and 
in some instances limited, discussions.  Utilising a wider range of participation methodologies beyond 
exclusively organising workshops could have increased participation in the process.  Overall, these 
difficulties highlight the problems with voluntary collaborative planning. 
Several extensions to this work are required both to i) assess the generalised recovery strategies and 
priorities across a wider range of potential hazard event scenarios that are both in progress and 
proposed, particularly building on the need to focus on recovery, and not just on the initial response; 
and ii) to improve the application of the integrated framework in future projects.  Firstly, the formal 
linking of hazard models, such as ground motion (Bradley et al., 2017), landslides (Robinson et al., 
2016) and liquefaction (Motha et al., 2017), can provide a range of realistic inputs and allow model 
updates to be easily included when available.  Improvements are further envisaged across each of 
the infrastructure sector models.  In addition to increasing asset data (quality and quantity) and 
formalising attributes (such as whether assets are buried/overhead and if redundant electricity 
supplies are present), process-based sector models (i.e. power flow, water supply hydraulics, traffic 
flow) would be desirable for more accurately modelling user disruptions.  In this paper, we have 
assumed functionality wherever connectivity exists, largely ignoring capacities of assets such as 
power line properties, pipe diameters, or the number of lanes on a given highway.  However, building 
detailed calibrated network models at a South Island scale proves difficult given the extensive data 
requirements and inherent computation costs – depending on the desired resolutions.  Despite this, a 
number of these wider infrastructure network process models are in development through the 
research initiatives discussed in Section 1 (e.g. Liu et al., 2017).  Similarly, there is further opportunity 
to provide a more robust assessment of damage and recovery at local/neighbourhood scales by 
incorporating the highly detailed water supply network fragility and recovery models of Bellagamba et 
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al. (2018), without the need for extensive hydraulic modelling.  Further, population movements (and 
therefore demands), transportation network behaviours (i.e. origin-destination pairings) and changing 
dependencies will adjust our definitions of ‘normal’ service levels.  Taking these into account will allow 
a more accurate representation of the true user disruption as opposed to pre-event comparisons, 
which are more suitable to lower-intensity events.  The temporal resolution of any model updates 
should also be carefully considered.  Finally, while this paper demonstrates that it is possible to 
integrate hazard and infrastructure modelling today, doing so was challenging.  By demonstrating the 
value of end-to-end modelling, we hope that this will encourage future modelling to be designed to be 
compatible with integrated modelling frameworks. 
This paper has outlined an approach to enable the integration of knowledge between community 
members, researchers, and practitioners, and has highlighted the benefits of end-to-end disaster 
modelling and of using a scenario-based participatory approach to integrate this modelling with 
preparedness assessment.  Further, this paper has proved that using a scenario as a boundary object 
and sequencing participation also enables the integration of autonomous participant initiatives within 
the scenario-based participatory approach introduced by Chapter 4.  This suggests that different 
autonomous initiatives (in addition to integrated infrastructure modelling) could be integrated by any 
participating group.  Overall, the collaborative linking of scientific, technical, and community 
knowledge offers great potential to increase resilience of socio-technical systems in preparing for 
future events such as the anticipated Alpine Fault rupture. 
5.7 Conclusions 
This paper has addressed its research questions as follows: 
1) An end-to-end disaster impact reduction modelling framework for infrastructure networks has 
been outlined.  This integrated direct and indirect impacts, cascading network disruption, 
network interdependence, and resulting recovery processes. 
2) When applied to the AF8+ Alpine Fault earthquake scenario, this integrated modelling 
immediately highlighted several discussion points for those concerned with reducing the 
impacts of major South Island disasters, particularly concerning extended recovery times for 
many dependent infrastructures due to major disconnection from electricity and transportation 
(predominantly state highway) networks.  Improving and/or maintaining asset robustness 
should be a priority, as should ongoing work to introduce embedded generation and backup 
supplies in critical areas within the West Coast region.  
3) The end-to-end modelling framework was embedded within a scenario-based participatory 
approach (Chapter 4) by using a scenario as a boundary object and sequencing and 
combining participatory methodologies (Aoki, 2018; Cash et al., 2003). This created a 
feedback loop.  As community members and practitioners outlined their assessments of likely 
damage, disruption, and recovery priorities, these were used to advance the modelling, and 
modelled outputs were then fed back into the participatory approach.  This highlighted 
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vulnerabilities within integrated modelling and impact assessments by community members 
and practitioners, improving both. 
4) Critically, the feedback loop increased the shared ownership of the modelling, consequently 
allowing both community members and practitioners to (in some cases immediately) 
implement disaster impact reduction measures due to the implications of the modelling, 
increasing community resilience to future hazard events.  Further, the modelling also 
translated the integrated community assessment of local damage to national implications, 
allowing the community assessment to be communicated more clearly to national 
government, increasing the likelihood of relevant national-level disaster impact reduction 
policies for the community. 
This application particularly highlighted the criticality of sequencing participation to the scenario-based 
participatory approach.  Beyond the genuine two-way communication required to ensure that 
boundary objects are perceived by all participants to be relevant, credible, and legitimate (Cash et al., 
2003), the participatory approach (Chapter 4) benefits from sequencing that enables feedback loops 
to occur, as assessments iteratively build on the current best shared understanding. 
Overall, this approach has been extremely well-received by community members and practitioners, 
having addressed two key needs: integrated modelling and genuine community participation.  The 
willingness of community members and practitioners to participate was essential to this success.  The 
process would benefit from further validation, evaluation, and numerous improvements (many 
identified herein), but clearly, future research in this area is likely to be both highly valuable and highly 
valued. 
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6. Conclusions 
This chapter presents a summary of the thesis conclusions.  It builds on the research, discussions 
and conclusions presented in the previous chapters.  An opening summary is followed by an outline of 
real-world benefits resulting from this doctoral project, and discussions of research limitations and 
fundamental contributions.  The chapter concludes with recommendations for future research and 
recommendations for policymakers and practitioners. 
6.1 Thesis summary 
While hazards and impacts may be regional, disasters are local events, which first and foremost affect 
local communities (Gaillard & Mercer, 2013).  This understanding has contributed to growing 
recognition of the need to involve community members in disaster resilience decision-making that is 
likely to affect them (Ackerman, 2004; Gaillard & Mercer, 2013; Maskrey, 2011; Murphy et al., 2014; 
Pearce, 2003).  The need for inclusive, participatory, approaches to disaster impact reduction has 
also become a political and policy priority.  For example, the United Nations 2015-2030 Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction includes the following ‘guiding principle’: ‘Disaster risk 
reduction requires an all-of-society engagement and partnership.  It also requires empowerment and 
inclusive, accessible and non discriminatory participation, paying special attention to people 
disproportionately affected by disasters, especially the poorest.  A gender, age, disability and cultural 
perspective should be integrated in all policies and practices, and women and youth leadership 
should be promoted.  In this context, special attention should be paid to the improvement of organized 
voluntary work of citizens’ (UNISDR, 2015, 19d, p. 13). 
Participatory approaches are needed to increase community involvement in efforts to reduce the 
impacts of disasters, including disruption of essential services.  However, to date, the divide in 
resilience definitions identified by White and O'Hare (2014) has resulted in largely parallel bodies of 
literature and practice, focussed either on the relationship between infrastructure and resilience, or on 
the use of participatory governance to build resilience at the community level.  Hence, there has been 
very little research combining these findings into more holistic approaches to build community 
resilience. 
This doctoral project aimed to address this gap in the field by developing and trialling an inclusive 
participatory approach to increase the resilience of a remote community to loss of essential services 
due to disaster damage to infrastructure, as an integrated component of wider initiatives to reduce 
inequities and effect social transformation. 
This aim was achieved by: 
1. Identifying factors that affect the resilience of remote communities at risk of isolation from 
disasters triggered by natural hazards. 
Systematic review methodology was used to bring together for the first time articles 
concerned with the resilience of remote communities at risk of isolation following disasters 
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triggered by natural hazards (Chapter 2).  The review showed that, besides the well-
established reasons for inclusive participatory disaster resilience decision-making outlined 
above, for a disaster impact reduction initiative to succeed in a remote community, community 
members must adopt and take ownership of the initiative (Remling & Veitayaki, 2016; Chapter 
2).  This was shown to be because community members in remote settlements are often 
relied upon to implement resilience measures, both due to a shift of responsibility onto 
community members as essential services are increasingly centralised for cost efficiency 
(Remling & Veitayaki, 2016) and because, if the settlement is isolated, community members 
will need to lead immediate response efforts in the absence of authorities, sometimes for 
considerable periods of time (Gardner, 2015; Orchiston, 2013).  Therefore, if community 
members are not involved in disaster resilience decision-making, or do not trust the 
outcomes, they are not likely to implement the proposed disaster impact reduction measures 
(Eiser et al., 2012). 
Further, while there are efforts to increase the resilience of remote communities which are 
dependent on distributed infrastructure by increasing the resilience of that infrastructure, there 
remains very little research that combines these efforts with community-inclusive participatory 
disaster resilience decision-making (White & O'Hare, 2014).  This omission is consistent with 
the normative disciplinary tendency, identified by White and O'Hare (2014), to use the term 
“resilience” to refer either to preserving, maintaining and restoring the built environment 
(including infrastructure), or to addressing the social inequities which increase the 
vulnerability of communities.  To date, this has resulted in parallel bodies of literature (and 
practice) focussed either on the relationship between distributed infrastructure and community 
resilience, or on the use of participatory governance to build resilience at the local level.  
Increasing the resilience of remote communities effectively requires a participatory approach 
that integrates socio-cultural transformation and the reduction of disruption to essential 
services (Chapter 2). 
The need for both improvements in the provision of essential services and for socio-cultural 
transformation to build the resilience of remote communities was demonstrated by an impact 
assessment of the 2016 Mw 7.8 “Kaikōura” earthquake (Chapter 3).  This assessment 
focussed on impacts to distributed transport infrastructure, which was particularly disrupted in 
the event.  Strong resilient characteristics of the New Zealand infrastructure system were 
evident, including the value of resilient design and the country’s service- rather than asset-
based approach (Chapter 3).  However, the event also highlighted the vulnerability of New 
Zealand’s distributed infrastructure networks, which have little or no redundancy throughout 
the country; demonstrated the dependence of remote New Zealand communities on 
distributed infrastructure for service delivery; and highlighted the need for remote 
communities in New Zealand to be better prepared for potential isolation from known future 
hazards, such as an Alpine Fault earthquake (Chapter 3).  One of the major challenges 
following the earthquake was prioritisation of road access between repair of the road, 
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(emergency) supplies for and evacuation from Kaikōura, and access for residents (including 
farmers) (Chapter 3).  Pre-disaster participatory decision-making could have addressed this 
challenge, educating each stakeholder group about the needs of the other groups.  
Challenges and decision-making prioritisation could have been discussed, allowing every 
stakeholder group to input into this decision-making process, and for all groups to have a 
clearer understanding of the reasoning behind decisions.  This likely would have eased 
tensions during the response as each stakeholder group would have had more realistic 
expectations and would have been empowered to be better prepared for the emergency 
response. 
2. Developing a participatory approach to integrate disaster impact reduction planning across 
stakeholder domains, to increase the resilience of remote communities at risk of isolation 
from disasters triggered by natural hazards. 
This thesis established an inclusive participatory disaster resilience decision-making 
approach by integrating a successful approach to increasing distributed infrastructure 
resilience - using a hazard event scenario as a boundary object to enable collaboration 
between decision-makers - with community-inclusive participatory disaster resilience 
decision-making (Chapter 4).  By sequencing and combining various (existing) participation 
methodologies, stakeholders can engage with and gain more influence over the process at 
relevant scales (i.e. local, regional, or national), and the process can be designed to suit the 
participation capacities of each stakeholder group.  This allows community members, 
practitioners and researchers to draw from the same knowledge base when making 
decisions, and achieve consensus where collaborative decision-making is appropriate.  This 
approach is highly-applicable for remote communities, addressing the urgent need of 
increasing the resilience of a remote community to loss of essential services due to disaster 
damage to infrastructure, as an integrated component of wider initiatives to reduce inequities 
and effect social transformation. 
3. Partnering with a remote community to apply the participatory approach, and demonstrating 
its capacity to integrate autonomous initiatives driven by any of the participating stakeholder 
groups into the approach. 
The participatory approach was applied in a “pre-disaster” collaboration between Franz Josef 
community members, infrastructure and emergency management stakeholders, and 
university researchers (Chapter 4).  An Alpine Fault earthquake scenario (the AF8+ scenario) 
was used as the boundary object.  This application established that the approach enabled 
feedback loops, allowing stakeholder groups to iteratively build on the impacts scenario, and 
to co-produce knowledge across knowledge domains.  Moreover, because stakeholders could 
understand other stakeholders’ contributions, they were able to utilise these contributions 
immediately to assess existing, and implement new, resilience measures in the real world. 
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It was subsequently established that autonomous initiatives could also be incorporated into 
the approach using an infrastructure modelling framework (Chapter 5).  Utilisation of the 
established feedback loops increased the shared ownership of the modelling, and improved 
other stakeholders’ disaster resilience assessments.  This integration also validated the 
modelling, which could then be further improved by the stakeholder input and critique.  In 
addition, the modelling was able to demonstrate the national implications of this community’s 
local impact assessment, allowing the community assessment to be communicated more 
clearly to national government, and increasing the likelihood of relevant national-level disaster 
impact reduction policies for the community. 
6.2 Achieved real-world benefits 
It is also important to acknowledge that in addition to addressing the core thesis aims, the application 
of this participatory approach (outlined above) also produced actionable “real world” benefits.  
Appendix G details workshop outcomes in full, but examples include: 
- Franz Josef community members taking control of their own preparation, identifying that 
following disasters they could self-ration to ensure that supplies will last (Chapter 4); 
- Road operators identifying that it would be beneficial to empower locally-based roading 
contractors to automatically help repair local infrastructure, including roads, water pipes, and 
sewerage, in the event of a disaster of similar magnitude to the AF8+ scenario, rather than 
attempting to open State Highways which would require a structured, centrally-led and            
-resourced response (Chapter 4); 
- Validation of ongoing work to introduce embedded electricity generation and back up supplies 
on the West Coast (Chapter 5); 
- Workshop maps being useful and used for business crisis management, as noted by Franz 
Josef business owners (Chapter 4); 
- Workshops highlighting gaps in shared understanding which were then able to be addressed 
during or after the workshops, including discussions of who has the right to open and close 
local roads (Chapter 4). 
6.3 Limitations 
This doctoral thesis successfully developed and applied a participatory governance approach to 
increase the resilience of remote communities to natural hazards (Section 6.1), and so achieved its 
major objective.  It is useful to note, however, that despite this achievement, the AF8+ scenario-based 
participatory approach was not without limitations.  Below, key areas for improvement are identified 
and discussed: 
- More integration between scenarios: To create the hazard scenario, the existing Project AF8 
scenario was up-scaled (Chapter 4).  Scaling reduced the time and resources required to 
develop the scenario, and also provided additional benefits, such as increased interest in 
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participation, but was difficult because Project AF8 produced a fragmented scenario (Chapter 
4).  Greater integration between the original Project AF8 application and the participatory 
process developed in this thesis could have enhanced both, and is worth considering for 
future large-scale scenario-based disaster resilience projects. 
- More participation methodologies: While combining and sequencing methodologies enabled 
the successful integration of stakeholders in this process, the exclusive use of workshops 
limited the approach (Chapter 5).  Complete participation is a near impossibility for any project 
of this scale (Reed et al., 2013) but combining a wider range of participation methodologies, 
for example, by holding open meetings or using surveys in addition to the workshops, could 
have reduced this limitation and increased participation in the process. 
- More open participation processes: Only the “relevant” stakeholders were invited to 
workshops.  This had the advantage of ensuring that each stakeholder group was able to 
discuss their views openly, and if necessary, confidentially.  While mostly driven by increased 
convenience, the “closed” nature of many of the workshops was in part driven by stakeholder 
groups’ concerns about negative publicity, given that discussing disasters and response 
strategies can be a sensitive topic, especially in a tourist town.  However, Aoki (2018) 
provides evidence that allowing all stakeholders to participate in all parts of a process 
(enabled by varying influence weightings, such as only participating as observers) can 
increase trust in decision-making and speed up the overarching process, as fewer questions 
need to be asked about how and why decisions are or were made.  It is worth noting that this 
requires greater “buy-in” from participating stakeholder groups, along with sustained interest.  
However, promisingly, as also found in Franz Josef, the often “tight-knit” character of remote 
communities can help to enable participatory governance (Chapter 2).  Therefore, while the 
process, and particularly the “combined” workshop, disseminated outcomes from previous 
workshops, the process would probably have benefitted from allowing all stakeholders to 
participate in all parts of the process.  This could have been enabled through livestreaming of 
workshops to social media, as well as by inviting participants to observe and ask questions in 
all workshops (Aoki, 2018) (Chapter 4). 
- More logical sequencing: The sequence of the workshops could also have been improved.  
While the lifelines workshop and “combined” workshop allowed direct discussions of 
interdependencies, holding the workshops in order of reducing scale (i.e. national, then 
regional, then local) would have reduced assumptions required within the initial workshops. 
- Greater mandate: The approach suffered when national telecommunications and electricity 
providers/distributors did not engage with the process.  The vulnerability of the approach due 
to its voluntary nature was also highlighted when key stakeholders could not attend due to 
other priorities.  The lack of engagement from some stakeholder groups decreased the 
scenario credibility and increased the influence of other stakeholders (particularly 
researchers) on the scenario, as their judgement was used as a substitute for those who did 
not participate.  High staff turnover (alongside community members) and sustaining interest 
also presented challenges.  While part of the project’s success was due to the close 
Chapter 6.  Conclusions. 
 193 
collaboration between researchers and the West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group, closer 
collaboration could have encouraged more participation.  For example, making the project a 
formal West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group project may have encouraged participation 
from telecommunications providers.  Legislation is also an option which has been successful 
in New Zealand at effectively mandating collaboration between infrastructure companies and 
emergency managers (MCDEM, 2002).  Clarifying and, if necessary, strengthening this 
mandate could greatly increase necessary collaboration between community members and 
lifelines organisations. 
- More stakeholder evaluation: There was little structured stakeholder evaluation of the 
scenario-based participatory approach.  In each AF8+ workshop, feedback was encouraged 
at all times through a “feedback station” and at the end of each workshop there was also a 
brief discussion where participants were again invited to provide feedback.  Such feedback is 
clearly limited in its scope to evaluate the approach and its outcomes.  What constitutes 
successful scenario planning is different for different people, and so is challenging, 
contentious, and worthy of (more detailed) evaluation by all participants (Reed et al., 2008; 
Wodak & Neale, 2015).  However, the research team kept in very close contact with 
participants from all of the stakeholder groups throughout.  This provided important feedback 
which could be, and was, used dynamically throughout the process (Chapter 4). 
- More sustained collaboration: Finally, the AF8+ scenario planning process stopped short of 
efforts to sustain collaboration, which can be critical to the success of disaster impact 
reduction (Blake et al., 2011; Fenwick, 2012; Robinson et al., 2014).  Sustained collaboration 
between infrastructure companies and emergency managers has been successful in New 
Zealand due to its strong lifelines culture (Chapter 3).  Involving community members in 
lifelines groups’ work may be a way to ensure ongoing collaboration with community 
members for disaster impact reduction.  The existing collaboration is effectively legislated 
between infrastructure companies and emergency managers in New Zealand (MCDEM, 
2002), and enabled by lifeline groups.  Again, strengthening this mandate could greatly 
increase necessary collaboration between community members and lifelines groups. 
6.4 Implementation 
This research project benefitted from two key influences which aided implementation.  First, the 
application of this approach particularly benefitted from New Zealand’s strong “lifelines” culture.  
Lifeline utilities are legislated to improve disaster readiness, reduction, response, and recovery in New 
Zealand (MCDEM, 2002), but the additional leadership and willingness to participate in this process 
shown by the West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group, and in particular NZ Transport Agency and 
Westpower, alongside regional Civil Defence & Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups, was 
essential to the success of this voluntary process.  Second, both the National Science Challenge 
Resilience to Nature’s Challenges and Project AF8 are major national research programmes (Chapter 
4), which gave this research project and the Franz Josef community national prominence and made 
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the community a focal point for resilience planning in the West Coast region.  Accordingly, pre-
existing relationships between researchers and community members, and the applied focus of 
research funding in New Zealand, created a unique situation where researchers were able to support 
the request of community members who wished to increase the resilience of their community.  
Backed by substantial resources, including financial resource which councils typically cannot afford to 
spend, researchers enabled an empowering opportunity for community members to collaborate and 
discuss community resilience.  Community members used this space to workshop ideas before 
presenting these to councils (in a working group indirectly triggered by the community/researcher 
collaboration; Section 4.2.1.1).  This work has particular application for readiness and reduction 
measures, as well as pre-disaster recovery planning which can be rapidly fed into response and 
recovery processes.  Accordingly, the research funding created a heighted, unusual situation, where 
the researcher involvement likely had a positive influence on resilience planning for the community, 
both in terms of available resources and influence on both policymakers and practitioners to 
participate. 
However, despite these influences, the approach still suffered when infrastructure stakeholders either 
did not or could not engage with the process (Chapter 4).  Further, while the research project stopped 
short of efforts to maintain collaboration (Section 6.3), the collaborative process has also not been 
picked up by policymakers or practitioners.  As researchers led the process but stopped short of 
efforts to establish sustain collaboration, without leadership from a stakeholder group, the benefits of 
the application may be short-lived.  Equally, the developed approach, which could be used with other 
communities, has not been, despite explicit requests from community members from Fox Glacier, 
Ōkārito and Whataroa. 
The developed approach also has applicability beyond remote communities alone.  For example, 
applying the approach to other sudden-onset hazards, such as avalanches, debris flows, flash floods, 
tsunami and volcanic lahars, may be particularly rewarding.  Communities dealing with sudden-onset 
hazards are, similarly to remote communities, likely to be alone when responding to warnings and the 
first to respond to a disaster.  Further, the research has applicability to managed retreat discussions in 
general, including those focussed around climate change.  Again, for managed retreat to succeed, 
community members must adopt and take ownership of the initiative (Few et al., 2007), which this 
approach enables. 
Therefore, while there was evident need for this research project, approaches addressing both the 
provision of essential services and socio-cultural transformation are of such importance that they 
should be mandated as policy and undertaken without requiring the involvement of researchers.  In 
New Zealand, legislation has been successful at effectively mandating collaboration between 
infrastructure companies and emergency managers (MCDEM, 2002).  Clarifying, and if necessary, 
strengthening this mandate would provide accountability to greatly increase necessary collaboration 
between community members, policymakers and practitioners.  CDEM Groups are well-positioned to 
lead such collaborative work, but face resource constraints.  Participatory processes require 
substantial time, trained staff, and financial resources which can limit implementation.  Therefore, the 
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low resources currently afforded to CDEM Groups suggest that the current system may not be optimal 
for the resilience of remote communities in New Zealand. 
6.5 A fundamental contribution: bridging the knowledge divide 
This thesis has addressed the fundamental divide between “equilibrist” and “evolutionary” definitions 
of resilience, identified by White and O'Hare (2014), where “evolutionary resilience” emphasises 
social change and adaptation while “equilibrist resilience” emphasises preservation and restoration of 
the built environment (White & O'Hare, 2014).  These differing definitions lay the foundation for 
differing policy outcomes, but White and O'Hare (2014) find an overwhelming tendency towards 
“equilibrist” definitions of “resilience” in policy, largely neutralising the transformative potential of 
“evolutionary” definitions. 
This thesis has also demonstrated that bridging this divide is of critical importance for remote 
communities, which rely as heavily on socio-cultural transformation (“evolutionary resilience”) as they 
do on the provision of essential services (“equilibrist resilience”).  Driven both by new development 
opportunities which rely on distributed infrastructure and by the increasing centralisation of essential 
services (Gardner, 2015; Chapter 2), many remote communities have increasing vulnerability and 
decreasing disaster resilience due to their dependence on distributed infrastructure, substantially 
increasing the negative consequences of isolation (Murphy et al., 2014).  Therefore, resilient 
distributed infrastructure is an essential component of the resilience of remote communities.  Further, 
besides the well-established reasons for inclusive participatory disaster resilience decision-making 
(see Reed, 2008, for a summary), for a disaster impact reduction initiative to succeed in a remote 
community, community members must adopt and take ownership of the initiative (Remling & 
Veitayaki, 2016; Chapter 2).  This is because community members in remote settlements are often 
relied upon to implement resilience measures, both due to a shift of responsibility onto community 
members as essential services are increasingly centralised for cost efficiency (Remling & Veitayaki, 
2016) and because, if the settlement is isolated, community members will need to lead immediate 
response efforts in the absence of authorities, sometimes for considerable periods of time (Gardner, 
2015; Orchiston, 2013).  Therefore, if community members are not involved in disaster resilience 
decision-making, or do not trust the outcomes, they are not likely to implement the proposed disaster 
impact reduction measures (Eiser et al., 2012). 
The need for this whole-of-society (combined “equilibrist” and “evolutionary”) approach for disaster 
resilience is a well-established political and policy priority, featuring, for example, in the multinational 
2015-2030 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.  Further, both infrastructure companies 
and community members are explicitly asking for collaborative processes between community 
members, practitioners and policymakers (Chapter 4).  However, even within the Sendai Framework’s 
‘all of society’ guiding principle (UNISDR, 2015, 19d, p. 13), societal and infrastructure resilience are 
addressed in entirely separate sections (UNISDR, 2015).  Approaches aiming to increase resilience 
are also separate as a result of the divergent definitions of resilience (White & O'Hare, 2014).  This 
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disciplinary gap makes combining these approaches an enormously difficult task (White & O'Hare, 
2014), beyond the well-documented difficulties of increasing resilience in either the “equilibrist” or 
“evolutionary” interpretations of the term also demonstrated throughout this thesis. 
Therefore, this thesis has provided a fundamental contribution to disaster resilience efforts by 
demonstrating that it is possible to bridge “equilibrist” and “evolutionary” disciplinary approaches.  By 
developing and applying an “evolutionary” participatory governance approach to bring together 
community members, practitioners, policymakers and researchers, the participating stakeholder 
groups were all able to better understand the likely disruption, resulting from disaster damage to 
distributed infrastructure networks, and to make decisions to reduce both that disruption and the 
social consequences of it.  In doing so, this increased the resilience of a remote community to natural 
hazards. 
6.6 Recommendations for future research 
This project has identified several recommendations for future research.  Overall, rising disaster 
losses and the ongoing centralisation of essential services make the need for more research 
concerned with the resilience of remote communities at risk of isolation following disasters urgent and 
timely (Chapter 2).  Continued development and establishment of participatory governance is 
essential to increase the resilience of remote communities.  More specific recommendations are 
outlined below: 
6.6.1 Participatory governance research recommendations 
- Matauranga Māori: The prevalence of studies focussed on community-led planning in remote 
indigenous communities in Australia and Canada reflects the marginalisation of these 
communities as a result of recent colonisation and a need for further research focussed on 
indigenous communities.  This prevalence also highlights the surprising absence of 
publications focussed on the disaster resilience of remote Māori communities, despite New 
Zealand’s recent history of colonisation and official status as a bicultural nation.  There is an 
urgent need for research in this area. 
- Transferability: The scenario-based participatory approach is highly transferable.  However, 
this has not been tested.  It would be relatively easy to now use the existing AF8+ hazard 
scenario with numerous other South Island communities.  This highlights an advantage of the 
method used to create the scenario in the applied methodology.  Further, the scenario-based 
participatory approach could be applied with multiple communities at once, in a different 
location, and with entirely different scenarios. 
- Multi-hazard applicability: Outside of rural communities alone, applying the approach to other 
sudden-onset hazards, such as avalanches, debris flows, flash floods, tsunami and volcanic 
lahars, may be particularly rewarding.  Communities dealing with sudden-onset hazards are, 
similarly to remote communities, likely to be alone when responding to warnings and the first 
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to respond to a disaster.  Further, the research has applicability to managed retreat 
discussions in general, including those focussed on climate change. 
- Integrating stakeholder groups’ initiatives: While the integration of independent initiatives into 
the participatory approach has been proven possible by the integration of an end-to-end 
modelling framework (Chapter 5), this has not been demonstrated for more than one 
application.  The integration of the independent initiative both advanced the modelling and the 
participatory assessments in a feedback loop.  Further, this integration highlighted areas for 
improvement or greater consideration in both.  Accordingly, integrating independent 
stakeholder groups’ initiatives would be worth pursuing as these could be of considerable 
value in both improving the stakeholder group’s initiative, as well as advancing the shared 
understanding co-created by all of the participating stakeholder groups. 
- Scenario magnitude: The literature lacks guidance on how stakeholders should develop 
hazard scenarios for scenario-based participatory approaches.  This includes how to establish 
the appropriate severity of any scenario (e.g. whether a scenario may be “too scary” or “not 
scary enough”).  There is debate but little to no guidance in the literature as to whether an 
entirely catastrophic event may be too alarming or too large for a community to comprehend.  
Further, while “worst-case scenarios” are often used, Robinson et al. (2018) find planning for 
worst-case scenarios may be an unnecessarily large burden on limited resources available for 
disaster impact reduction. This is an area in which greater documentation and further 
research would be valuable (Chapter 4). 
- Participant identification: Systematic identification and selection of participants is required to 
ensure participatory processes are as little biased as possible.  For a full review of methods to 
identify who should be involved in scenario-based participatory approaches, see Reed et al. 
(2009).  While the literature offers good guidance on this issue, this is a step that is rarely 
taken and must be considered more in the future (Reed et al., 2013; Chapter 4). 
- Uptake: As discussed above, the participatory approach suffered when national 
telecommunications and electricity providers/distributors did not engage with the process.  
However, as also discussed, the development of trusting relationships takes time (Eiser et al., 
2012).  This participatory approach has been among the first to develop collaborative, cross-
disciplinary and cross-university stakeholder relationships as part of a long-term collaboration 
programme under the New Zealand National Science Challenges’ research project Resilience 
to Nature’s Challenges.  It thus offers the opportunity to build strong and lasting relationships 
within the research community, and to leverage existing relationships, such as those 
developed in this project.  Continuing to build on and develop this approach offers the 
potential to greatly improve engagement in projects, offering benefits for both researchers and 
stakeholders. 
- Training: With a clear need for more participatory approaches, there is also a need for more 
skilled facilitators.  Therefore, more investment in training is required.  To better enable this, 
more research into how to train skilled facilitators is also required, given that how to train 
facilitators is currently unclear (Chapter 4). 
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- Evaluation: There are a lack of evaluation criteria and data collection methods for 
transdisciplinary research, including the scenario-based approach developed herein (Holzer 
et al., 2018; Reed, 2008).  The development and use of evaluation methodologies for 
transdisciplinary research outcomes remain important matters for future studies to address. 
- Publication opportunities: More broadly, there are a lack of reputable journals to publish 
discipline-spanning research, stunting the growth of much-needed research in research areas 
such as that discussed in this thesis. 
6.6.2 Integrated modelling research recommendations 
Several extensions to the integrated modelling discussed in Chapter 5 are required both to i) assess 
the generalised recovery strategies and priorities across a wider range of potential hazard event 
scenarios, particularly building on the need to focus on recovery and not just on the initial response; 
and ii) to improve the application of the integrated framework in future projects: 
- The formal interlinking of hazard models, such as ground motion (Bradley et al., 2017), 
landslides (Robinson et al., 2016) and liquefaction (Motha et al., 2017), can provide a range 
of realistic inputs and allow model updates to be easily included when available.  
Improvements are further envisaged across each of the infrastructure sector models. 
- In addition to improving asset data quality and quantity and formalising attributes (such as 
whether assets are buried/overhead and if redundant electricity supplies are present), 
process-based sector models (i.e. power flow, water supply hydraulics, traffic flow) would be 
desirable for more accurately modelling user disruptions. 
- Building detailed calibrated network models at a South Island scale is difficult given the 
extensive data requirements and inherent computation costs, depending on the desired 
resolutions.  Several of these wider infrastructure network process models are in development 
through the research initiatives including QuakeCoRE and the Resilience to Nature’s 
Challenges National Science Challenge (e.g. Liu et al., 2017).  The research in this thesis 
confirms that these models will offer considerable value. 
- Similarly, there is further opportunity to provide a more robust assessment of damage and 
recovery at local/neighbourhood scales by incorporating the highly detailed water supply 
network fragility and recovery models of Bellagamba et al. (2018), without the need for 
extensive hydraulic modelling. 
- Further, population movements (and therefore demands), transportation network behaviours 
(i.e. origin-destination pairings) and changing dependencies will adjust our definitions of 
“normal” service levels.  Taking these into account will allow a more accurate representation 
of the true user disruption as opposed to pre-event comparisons, which are better suited to 
lower-intensity events. 
- The temporal resolution of any model updates should also be carefully considered to allow 
integration of modelling and stakeholder inputs and verification. 
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- Finally, while it is possible to integrate hazard and infrastructure modelling today, doing so is 
challenging.  Demonstrating the value of end-to-end modelling will hopefully encourage future 
modelling to be designed to be compatible with integrated modelling frameworks. 
6.7 Recommendations for policymakers and practitioners 
Finally, this project has identified several recommendations for policymakers and practitioners: 
- Ellemor (2005) and Aoki (2018) both discuss the advantages of employing members of 
relevant remote communities in relevant organisations and government agencies.  This would 
likely further increase the mutual trust and understanding required for effective participation, 
while also building capacity to contribute by supplementing income and dedicating the time of 
community members to improving the community resilience, as well as raising awareness 
inside government agencies of the needs and value offered by particularly vulnerable 
communities (Ellemor, 2005) (Chapter 2). 
- The 2016 Mw 7.8 “Kaikōura” earthquake highlighted the vulnerability of New Zealand’s 
regional transportation networks, which have limited or no redundancy in some cases 
(Chapter 3).  It is critical to address this issue in the area affected, and in other vulnerable 
regions.  High-functioning alternative route redundancy, which can perform if another route or 
line is damaged (an area NZ Transport Agency had already identified as requiring 
improvement), is evidently needed (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2014; Wilson et al., 
2016).  This includes both the need for new routes to add redundancy and the need to 
upgrade existing routes to enable them to function as effective diversions for extended 
periods.  Using the diversion for State Highway 1 as an example, while the longer route and 
increased volumes of traffic inevitably increased travel times, travel times along the 
alternative route could have been improved by pre-event measures including strengthening 
the pavement to cope with heavier truck loads, placing sufficient passing bays for high 
volumes of traffic, and building two-way traffic bridges at locations that could become 
bottlenecks under high traffic flows, instead of implementing these measures post-
earthquake. 
- While all settlements had road access by Day 23 following the “Kaikōura” earthquake, CDEM 
currently advises residents to be prepared with 7 days of emergency supplies.  Although 
helicopter and (to some extent) sea access were sufficient during this event, the event also 
highlighted the unreliability of these modes of emergency transport.  This evidence, along with 
scenarios being produced for other potential hazardous events, such as an Alpine Fault 
rupture scenario that suggests air response may be limited (Robinson et al., 2015), mean that 
the length of time without road access seen in Kaikōura could be a realistic example of the 
length of time people should be prepared to be isolated for.  This highlights the importance of 
realistic preparedness, and the need to address the gap between recommendations and 
expected future events. 
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- To improve readiness and reduction measures, as well as pre-disaster recovery planning 
which can be rapidly fed into response and recovery processes, there is a need to empower 
communities; develop relationships between community members, practitioners and 
policymakers; make space for communities to make requests to councils; and work with 
communities to act on requests.  Pre-existing relationships between researchers and 
community members, and the applied focus of research funding in New Zealand, created a 
unique situation where researchers were able to support the request of community members 
who wished to increase the resilience of their community.  Backed by substantial resources, 
including financial resource which councils typically cannot afford to spend, researchers 
enabled an empowering opportunity for community members to workshop ideas before 
presenting these to councils.  Accordingly, the research funding created a heighted, unusual 
situation, where researcher involvement likely had a positive influence on resilience planning 
for the community, both in terms of available resources and influence on both policymakers 
and practitioners to participate.  Work must be undertaken to make such situations the norm. 
- With a clear need for more participatory approaches, there is also a need for more 
practitioners and policymakers to be trained or employed as skilled facilitators.  Facilitators 
are essential for government organisations and infrastructure companies to increase 
collaboration with community members, which is critical to increase the resilience of remote 
communities. 
- New Zealand’s resilient “lifelines” culture continues to repeatedly demonstrate its abundant 
value to New Zealand.  This was demonstrated both during the “Kaikōura” earthquake 
(Chapter 2) and through the application of this participatory approach, which particularly 
benefitted from the additional leadership and willingness to participate in this process shown 
by the West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group, and in particular NZ Transport Agency and 
Westpower, alongside regional Civil Defence & Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups.  
Continued investment to support this collaboration, such as through supporting forums and 
research projects, is of notable value, and may offer the best way forward to greatly increase 
necessary collaboration between community members and lifelines groups. 
- Finally, approaches addressing both the provision of essential services (“equilibrist 
resilience”) and socio-cultural transformation (“evolutionary resilience”) are of such 
importance that they should be mandated as policy and undertaken without requiring the 
involvement of researchers.  In New Zealand, legislation has been successful at effectively 
mandating collaboration between infrastructure companies and emergency managers 
(MCDEM, 2002).  Clarifying, and if necessary, strengthening this mandate would provide 
accountability to greatly increase necessary collaboration between community members, 
policymakers and practitioners.  CDEM Groups are well-positioned to lead such collaborative 
work, but face resource constraints.  Participatory processes require substantial time, trained 
staff, and financial resources which can limit implementation.  Therefore, the low resources 
currently afforded to CDEM Groups suggest that the current system may not be optimal for 
the resilience of remote communities in New Zealand.  
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1. Abstract 
Many remote communities are increasingly dependent upon regional critical infrastructure and so are 
at risk of infrastructure impacts resulting from natural hazards.  Thus, isolated communities are not 
only at risk from hazards which affect their location, but also from hazards that affect the distributed 
infrastructure they rely on, even if the community is not directly affected.  Reducing infrastructure risk 
can therefore increase community resilience and reduce response and recovery times following a 
disaster.  The West Coast region of the South Island, New Zealand, is a global tourist destination with 
numerous isolated communities and linear infrastructure corridors that are exposed to a variety of 
natural hazards, including earthquakes, landslides, debris flows and flooding.  By combining a number 
of previously modelled hazard exposures and overlaying the location of the road network in the West 
Coast region, the locations where the road network is most exposed have been identified. These 
results form part of a project which has the aim of creating a framework for improving resilience 
assessment for isolated communities, with an initial focus on the West Coast region. 
2. Introduction 
Many isolated communities in New Zealand are significantly at risk from natural hazards and are also 
often dependent upon regional infrastructure (LGNZ, 2014, NIU, 2015).  The New Zealand 
Government National Infrastructure Unit classifies New Zealand’s infrastructure into six networks: 
transport, telecommunications, energy, three waters (potable water, waste water and storm waste), 
productive water and social infrastructure (including schools, hospitals, prisons, libraries, and 
swimming pools).  Accordingly, infrastructure vulnerability affects risk in a number of ways, including 
service delivery, community preparedness, financial capabilities and organisational performance (NIU, 
2015). 
It is an implicit assumption within this study that isolated community risk is affected by regional 
hazards and infrastructure.  For infrastructure with low or no redundancy, impacts at any point on the 
network can result in the remainder of the network becoming non-functional.  For example, a landslide 
impacting a road can result in the entire section between junctions either side of the landslide 
becoming impassable, potentially resulting in large detours.  Additionally, infrastructure networks are 
intimately interdependent, so impact to one service is likely to have cascading effects on other 
infrastructure (Buldyrev et al., 2010).  Therefore, with increasing dependence upon regional 
infrastructure, risk is increasing for isolated communities; isolated communities are now not only 
significantly at risk of proximal natural hazards, but also of distal hazards that affect regional 
infrastructure (even if the community is not directly affected).  Reducing infrastructure risk will, 
therefore, reduce community risk and reduce response and recovery times. 
Infrastructure risk is the product of exposure and physical vulnerability.  Infrastructure exposure is a 
measure of infrastructure and hazard colocation.  Infrastructure vulnerability is a measure of 
infrastructure damage when impacted by a hazard (UNISDR, 2015).  In this sense, exposure is 
viewed as a spatiotemporal attribute, and physical vulnerability an engineering attribute.  Therefore, to 
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reduce infrastructure risk, the first step is to assess the hazard and infrastructure exposure (Figure 
53). 
 
Figure 53.  Conceptual framework. 
A hazard is defined as something that has the potential to cause harm.  Hazards interact in space and 
time and the possible interactions between hazards have been described using a large number of 
terms (see Kappes et al., 2012b).  These can be distilled down into two types of multi-hazard 
interaction (after Saunders et al., 2015, Kappes et al., 2012a, Kappes et al., 2010, Carpignano et al., 
2009, Kappes et al., 2012b): (i) Cumulative hazards are multiple, unrelated natural hazards that affect 
the same area; (ii) Cascading hazards are different types of hazard events that all result from the 
same trigger event.  Once the trigger event occurs, the area will be subject to further hazard events.  
Cascading hazards include, but are not limited to, storm surges and flooding from hurricanes and 
typhoons, jökulhaups (glacial outburst floods) from sub-glacial volcanic eruptions, landslides and 
debris flows from mountainous earthquakes, and landslide dams and outburst floods from landslides 
(Robinson and Davies, 2013). 
A commonality within both types of multi-hazard interaction is that one hazard can occur proximally to 
another hazard.  If more than one hazard occurs within close spatial and temporal proximity, the 
hazard and/or impact magnitude may amplify to greater than the sum of the individual hazards 
(Kappes et al., 2010, Kappes et al., 2012a). Therefore, assessing hazards individually may 
underestimate risk, so it is critical to investigate multi-hazard interactions (Kappes et al., 2012b). 
There is growing awareness of the need for multi-hazard assessment, especially for end-user 
adoption.  A high percentage of land-use plans containing all-hazard objectives (Saunders et al., 
2015) and several sets of international guidelines and documents now advocate adoption of a multi-
hazard approach to risk assessment, including the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 
which dedicates multiple goals and states ‘[d]isaster risk reduction practices need to be multi-hazard 
and multi-sectoral, inclusive and accessible in order to be efficient and effective’ (UNISDR, 2015, p. 
10, Kappes et al., 2012b, Scolobig et al., 2013).  However, significant differences in spatial and 
temporal resolutions, intensity, and measurement techniques mean hazards are (still) mostly 
Hazard area 
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assessed individually, resulting in hazard units which are not directly comparable (Kappes et al., 
2012a, Marzocchi et al., 2012, Gill and Malamud, 2014). 
Therefore, there is a clear need for a standardisation methodology.  Two main standardisation 
approaches, hazard classification and indices, have been developed, although these are far from 
becoming common practice because so few studies have analysed multiple hazards (Kappes et al., 
2012b).  Hazard classification is the most frequently used multi-hazard standardisation approach.  
User-defined criteria create intensity and frequency thresholds which are used to classify hazards into 
qualitative categories (for example, high, medium and low hazard). While this is a simple way to 
compare hazards, every user’s criteria and so classification are different, developed for different uses, 
meaning most qualitatively classified hazard datasets are not comparable (Kappes et al., 2012).  
Indices classify hazards independently, quantitatively standardising differing, not directly comparable 
parameters, allowing different datasets to be comparable.  Indices also allow the difference between 
two hazard levels to be quantified (Kappes et al., 2012). 
These attempts have first looked to make hazard magnitudes comparable.  However, depending on 
the raw data format, this can be difficult to achieve.  It is the impact of the hazard, rather than the 
hazard itself, that needs to be reduced in order to prevent (or reduce the consequences of) disasters 
(Glavovic et al., 2010).  Therefore, this paper attempt to pioneer a new methodology to combine multi-
hazard exposure as a first step towards multi-hazard risk assessment by first considering 
infrastructure exposure prior to magnitude or multi-hazard interactions. 
3. Study area 
The West Coast region of the South Island, New Zealand, is characterised by a number of natural 
hazards, including windstorms, earthquakes, rockfalls, landslides, debris flows, landslide dam-break 
flooding, river flooding, and tsunami.  The West Coast region is also an iconic, rapidly developing 
tourist destination with numerous settlements, all of which can be considered isolated.  These 
communities are reliant upon the region’s linear road, electricity and communications infrastructure 
networks, which have no redundancy (outside townships) for over 400 kilometres.  Despite this, no 
infrastructure risk assessment with a focus on the complete multi-hazard environment has been 
conducted for the West Coast region.  This paper takes the first step towards completing such an 
assessment by conducting a multi-hazard exposure assessment for a section of the State Highway 6 
(SH6), the primary road connection within the West Coast region (Figure 54). 
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Figure 54.  Map of the West Coast, New Zealand. 
The studied section of State Highway 6 is shown in yellow and extends from Hokitika to the West Coast/Otago boundary in Haast Pass. 
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4. Methodology 
This study aims to create a relative exposure assessment of SH6.  Such an assessment highlights 
exposure “hotspots”: areas of the road network that are exposed to the most hazards.  Currently this 
work does not take account of hazard intensity, hazard frequency, or the vulnerability of the road, and 
thus does not imply sections which are most likely (in a probabilistic sense) to be impacted, nor the 
most at-risk areas. 
Existing hazard and susceptibility assessments for earthquake rupture, co-seismic landslides, rainfall-
triggered debris flows and river floods, created by Kritikos (2013) and Robinson et al. (2015), were 
used as input data for the exposure analysis.  These assessments limited the study area size to a 340 
km stretch of SH6, between Hokitika and the West Coast-Otago regional boundary at Haast Pass ().  
Earthquake shaking and windstorm hazards were not used (as unique hazard inputs) because the 
respective hazard exposures were judged to be effectively uniform across the region.  Tsunami 
exposure was not considered, although the majority of the road section studied is not thought to be 
exposed to tsunami (Power, 2013). 
The hazards differ in their spatial extent and the existing hazard and susceptibility assessments were 
carried out independently, causing differences between the datasets.  It is important to consider these 
differences, especially the spatial resolution of each assessment and scale used to describe the level 
of hazard, when attempting to combine the data.  For example, surface ruptures have the ability to 
destroy a road, but are usually narrow and long, in terms of the two-dimensional area they affect.  By 
sampling discrete points on the road (for example, every kilometre), a significant number of the small 
areas where the road is susceptible to the surface rupture hazard may be missed (especially when 
you consider the road can run perpendicular to a fault).  A similar spatial issue arises for debris flow 
exposure.  So, to allow the datasets to be combined, the road network was divided into 1 km sections 
(the road was assumed to be 10 metres wide), and values were attributed to each of these sections 
using GIS software for each hazard, as explained below: 
4.1 Earthquake rupture 
Earthquake rupture was derived from the New Zealand Active Faults Database (GNS, 2016).  Buffers 
of 50 m, 100 m and 500 m from known faults were added to account for known and potential errors in 
fault mapping.  These were attributed exposure values of 0.9, 0.5 and 0.1 respectively.  Each 1 km 
section was then subsequently awarded the highest observed exposure value for that section.  For 
example, if a 1 km section of road came within 100 m of a fault at one point and within 50m of a fault 
at another point, the section was given an exposure value of 0.9. 
4.2 Landslide 
Landslide exposure was calculated according to Robinson et al. (2015), which calculated coseismic 
landslide exposure values for a modelled Mw 8.0 earthquake on the Alpine Fault, assuming landslide 
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runout direction is in the steepest downhill direction.  This technique resulted in point outputs at 1 km 
intervals along the network.  These point values were spatially interpolated along the road.  
Subsequently, the highest exposure value within each kilometre section of road was attributed to the 
entire kilometre. 
4.3 Debris flow 
Rainfall-triggered debris flow susceptibility was calculated by Kritikos (2013).  The raster output from 
these calculations (which was categorised into classes of susceptibility from 1 to 5) was used for this 
study.  The highest value within the kilometre section was attributed to the entire kilometre.  These 
values were then normalised in order to retain a consistent 0 - 1 exposure scale with the other 
considered hazards. 
4.4 River flooding 
River flooding susceptibility was calculated by Kritikos (2013).  The raw raster output from these 
calculations was used for this study.  The highest exposure value within the kilometre section of road 
was attributed to the entire kilometre. 
The highest exposure value within each kilometre section of road was attributed to the entire 
kilometre because the aim of this study is to highlight the sections of road which have high exposure 
values.  The multi-hazard exposure assessment for each 1 km section of road was then produced by 
calculating the mean hazard exposure of the four considered hazards.  It is acknowledged that it is 
impossible to be certain of exposure values, but for simplification within the individual hazards 
calculations, some data were attributed values of zero or one.  No data had exposure values of zero 
or one in the final multi-hazard exposure assessment. 
5. Results 
The landslide, river flood and combined hazards results, which comprise continuous hazard exposure 
data, were categorised into six discrete bins (0.0, 0.0 > x < 0.2, 0.2 ≥ x < 0.4, 0.4 ≥ x < 0.6, 0.6 ≥ x < 
0.8, 0.8 ≥ x < 1.0) in order to allow direct comparisons with the surface rupture and debris flow hazard 
exposures. 
5.1 Results tables and exposure maps 
The results are displayed below, in terms of total length of road (km) corresponding to each exposure 
bin.  Exposure maps for earthquake rupture, landslide, debris flow and river flood (Figure 55) and 
combined hazards (Figure 56) along the SH6 study section are presented on the following pages.
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Table 8.  Earthquake rupture exposure. 








Table 9.  Debris flow exposure. 







Table 10.  Landslide exposure. 
Exposure Value Length of road (km) 
0.0 0 
0.0 > x < 0.2 177 
0.2 ≥ x < 0.4 156 
0.4 ≥ x < 0.6 7 
0.6 ≥ x < 0.8 0 
0.8 ≥ x < 1.0 0 
 
Table 11.  River flooding exposure. 
Exposure Value Length of road (km) 
0.0 75 
0.0 > x < 0.2 1 
0.2 ≥ x < 0.4 16 
0.4 ≥ x < 0.6 45 
0.6 ≥ x < 0.8 62 
0.8 ≥ x < 1.0 141 
Table 12.  Combined hazards (earthquake rupture, landslide, debris flow and river flooding). 
Exposure Value Length of road (km) 
0.0 0 
0.0 > x < 0.2 80 
0.2 ≥ x < 0.4 198 
0.4 ≥ x < 0.6 58 
0.6 ≥ x < 0.8 4 
0.8 ≥ x < 1.0 0 
 
 





Figure 55.  SH6 earthquake rupture, landslide, debris flow and river flood exposures. 
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Figure 56.  SH6 combined hazards (earthquake rupture, landslide, debris flow and river flood) exposure. 
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6. Discussion 
The results highlight significant differences in exposure between the hazards.  As expected, the 
majority of road sections are not exposed to earthquake rupture, nor debris flow, as these are 
localised hazards.  The four individual hazard maps (Figure 55) also clearly show the road has 
highest exposure to river flooding; over 40 percent of the road sections are categorised into the 
highest river flooding exposure range, between 0.8 ≥ x < 1.0 (Table 11).  Finally, although the 
landslide hazard is the only hazard all road sections have an attributed exposure value for, the 
landslide hazard has the smallest exposure range, with no road sections attributed exposure values 
greater than 0.59 (Table 10).  The combined exposure values (Figure 56) differ significantly from each 
of the individual hazards exposure values but also suggest hazard exposure is not random: few road 
sections with the highest hazard exposure values are situated immediately next to sections with the 
lowest exposure values. 
The results reflect the influence of the regional geomorphology upon hazard exposure, which is also 
amplified in the combined exposure values.  The individual debris flow and flood hazard maps (Figure 
55) show high river flood and debris flow exposure values are spatially coincident.  The four sections 
of road with the highest combined exposure values (over 0.6) evidence this spatial coincidence; three 
of the four sections have a debris flow exposure value of 1.0 (one section has a debris flow exposure 
value of 0.6) and three of the four also have a flood exposure value of over 0.9 (the other section has 
a flood exposure value of 0.34).  Each of these road sections also had the highest surface rupture 
exposure value of 0.9, but none of the four sections were also among the four highest landslide 
exposure sections (values over 0.4), with values instead ranging between 0.15 and 0.23. 
The road sections have lower landslide exposure values largely because of the position of the road 
within the regional geomorphology and hazardscape.  Although there is a lower range of landslide 
hazard exposures along the road, the West Coast landslide exposure range is equitable within the 
West Coast as a whole.  Put simply, roads are not built along the tops of mountains, where the 
highest landslide exposure values are usually found.  Therefore, purely as a result of topographic 
preferences within road building, high landslide exposure values are less common along the studied 
section of SH6 than high flood exposure values; the lower landslide exposure values are a reflection 
of coincidental hazard management: if the road was moved higher up the mountains, landslide 
exposure would increase. 
With the road in its current position, the most exposed sections are located either side of Franz Josef, 
Okarito and Whataroa.  This analysis suggests these sections of road are most exposed to hazards.  
However, without vulnerability information, including hazard magnitude, this study is unable to state 
the sections of road which are most at risk to natural hazards. 
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Figure 57.  Revised conceptual framework. 
It is difficult to envisage how to include a vulnerability assessment following the decoupling of hazard 
exposure and hazard magnitude.  Furthermore, it is uncertain how (relative) exposures should be 
calculated in order to make them comparable for a region: because relative exposure values from 
independent analyses have been used, the landslide, debris flow and river flooding exposures may 
also have been distributed differently and this may have affected their weighting within the combined 
exposure data.  Given these observations, it is unlikely this method will be useful to reach the goal of 
multi-hazard risk assessment.  Combining all information on each individual hazard first (including 
hazard magnitude), before assessing infrastructure vulnerability to each hazard and aggregating this 
work, is more likely to be a successful strategy for infrastructure multi-hazard risk assessment (Figure 
57). 
7. Conclusions 
It is clear that this combined hazards exposure assessment (Figure 56) differs significantly from the 
individual hazard exposure assessments (Figure 55) and regional geomorphology has a significant 
influence upon hazard exposure.  The results show that in its current position, the road has lower 
exposure to landslides.  The effect of the regional geomorphology on the hazards also amplifies 
hazard exposure where the road crosses river channels, as both the river flood and debris flow 
hazards are channelised. 
The results show the most exposed sections of road are located either side of Franz Josef, Okarito 
and Whataroa, meaning these settlements are most exposed to hazards impacting road access along 
the study section.  However, by de-coupling hazard magnitude, it is impossible to infer any sense of 
the risk the multi-hazard environment presents to the West Coast infrastructure, and so to the isolated 
communities it serves. 
It is difficult to envisage how to include a vulnerability assessment following the decoupling of hazard 
exposure and hazard magnitude.  Therefore, it is unlikely this method will be useful to reach the goal 
of multi-hazard risk assessment.  Combining all information on each individual hazard (including 
Hazard area & magnitude 
Hazard area & magnitude Hazard area & magnitude 
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hazard magnitude), before assessing infrastructure vulnerability to each hazard and aggregating this 
work, is more likely to be a successful strategy for infrastructure multi-hazard risk assessment. 
Nevertheless, this paper offers a useful first multi-hazard exposure assessment for State Highway 6 
on the West Coast of New Zealand.  The multi-hazard exposure map (Figure 56) shows numerous 
hazard “hotspots” which, if are significantly vulnerable, could cause significant disruption for isolated 
communities which are reliant upon this regional infrastructure. 
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1. Abstract 
The conventional processes of science, and the incorporation of science into policy and practice, 
appear not to be resulting in improved disaster reduction solutions for communities, despite intense 
research into hazards and risk. Resilience to disasters is increased when the societal impacts of 
disasters are reduced. On this basis, the contribution that Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) can make to 
Disaster Impact Reduction (DIR) is assessed, and it is demonstrated that reducing event risk by 
reducing event probability only reliably reduces community disaster impacts for events that occur 
frequently. Such events do not fit the UNISDR definition of a disaster. Therefore, DRR cannot reliably 
improve DIR. Instead, DIR can be addressed directly by way of community adaptation, based on 
carefully selected impact scenarios derived by community-expert-official collaborations considering a 
broad range of event and asset damage scenarios. Probabilistic risk is a useful tool in insurance and 
re-insurance, and possibly in national policy-making, but such national policies are likely to be 
undermined by inevitable failures of risk-based approaches at the local level. This work clarifies the 
common usage of “risk” as meaning either impact, or impact x probability. 
2. Introduction 
Well into the 21st century, society is still attempting to come to grips with its ever-increasing 
vulnerability to extreme events resulting from the natural processes of planet Earth. This vulnerability 
has recently been demonstrated by extreme naturally-triggered disasters such as the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami (e.g. Chatenoux and Peduzzi, 2007), the 2011 Tohoku earthquake-tsunami (e.g. 
Mochizuki, 2014) and hurricane Harvey in 2017 (e.g. Shuckburgh et al., 2017).  
Over the last few decades, the global policy and research community has come together several 
times to progress the task of reducing the impacts of disasters on society. This challenge was first 
taken up at the 2005 UN World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) in Kobe, Japan, only days 
after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. International agencies and national governments then began to 
move toward setting clear targets and commitments for disaster reduction. The first step in this 
process was the formal approval, at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (HFA: 2005–2015).  The World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held on 
March 14–18, 2015, in the Japanese city of Sendai, adopted the successor accord to the Hyogo 
Framework. It is known as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030; 
https://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/sendai-framework). The global policy and research area by 
means of which nations are attempting to reduce vulnerability is thus “Disaster Risk Reduction” (DRR: 
e.g. Aitsi-Selmi et al., 2015). 
While less prominent in the official rhetoric, resilience has become a key concept in promulgating 
vulnerability reduction worldwide during the present century (e.g. Paton and Johnston, 2017). 
Compared to DRR, the term resilience conveys better to non-experts the concept that they can be 
less affected by future disasters if they can become “resilient”. The term conveys a sense of merit in 
the context of disasters, in much the same way that “sustainability” implies environmental merit.  
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Accordingly, a number of research and operational initiatives worldwide presently focus on resilience 
to disasters: for example, the New Zealand National Science Challenge “Resilience to Nature’s 
Challenges”; the establishment of Durham University (UK)’s Institute for Hazard, Risk and Resilience; 
the National Disaster Resilience Strategy under development by the Ministry of Civil Defence & 
Emergency Management, New Zealand (Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, 2018); 
the Queensland Strategy for Disaster Resilience, Australia (Queensland Government, 2014); and the 
Los Angeles County Community Disaster Resilience Project, USA (Rand Corporation,2018).  
The substantial effort among global agencies to try to mitigate disaster effects has been matched by 
plentiful academic discussions and analyses of both “DRR” and “resilience”. While DRR appears to be 
the better defined and understood term, perhaps because of its relationship with the well-established 
discipline of Risk Management (e.g. Twigg, 2004; ISO 31000, 2009), clarity in the usage and meaning 
of “resilience” is less evident. The ongoing detailed academic debate and discussion are not currently 
showing clear signs of converging to an agreed set of concepts usable in practice. Meanwhile, 
naturally-triggered disasters are exacting ever-increasing societal costs 
(https://www.preventionweb.net/risk/trends, accessed 19 May 2018). 
The purpose of the present work is, therefore, to propose some pragmatic short-cuts through these 
detailed academic considerations and, recognising from an operational perspective the need for 
urgency in community planning to reduce the effects of future disasters, to develop a set of feasible 
activities that can begin to improve communities’ resilience to these events. Real-life disaster 
situations involve intricate and complex societal and political factors that may substantially affect the 
processes we suggest below. However, we do not believe that these complexities invalidate our 
analysis or suggestions.  
First, we present the global high-level definitions relating to DRR and resilience.  Second, we make 
the case that, however it is defined, resilience is increased if the impacts of future disaster events on 
society are reduced (Disaster Impact Reduction, DIR). On this basis, we show that DRR only 
increases resilience for events that occur many times in the planning timeframe of a community.  
These frequent events do not fit the UNISDR definition of a disaster.  For events that match 
definitions of disasters (occurring very few times in a planning timeframe), DRR does not reliably lead 
to DIR, and therefore does not reliably lead to increased resilience. 
Acknowledging that DRR does not necessarily lead to DIR, we consider DIR itself as the basis of 
increasing resilience as an alternative - or complement - to DRR. We suggest ways communities can 
identify and undertake adaptations that will result in reduction of the impacts of future disasters. 
These involve the use of disaster impact scenarios, rather than (or as a complement to) the 
annualised damage cost and net benefit estimates that often underpin risk-based decision support 
tools. 
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3. Terminology 
Since the following discussion examines the relationships between DRR and resilience, we now 
summarise the definitions of these terms, as promulgated by UNISDR (2017); (italics added for 
emphasis). 
3.1 Disaster 
A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due to hazardous 
events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, leading to one or more of 
the following: human, material, economic and environmental losses and impacts. 
Annotations: The effect of the disaster can be immediate and localized, but it often widespread and 
could last for a long period of time. The effect may test or exceed the capacity of a community or 
society to cope using its own resources, and therefore may require assistance from external sources, 
which could include neighbouring jurisdictions, or those at the national or international levels. 
3.2 Disaster risk 
The potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets which could occur to a system, 
society or a community in a specific period of time, determined probabilistically as a function of 
hazard, exposure, vulnerability and capacity. 
3.3 Disaster risk reduction 
Disaster risk reduction is aimed at preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing 
residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience and therefore to the achievement of 
sustainable development 
3.4 Resilience 
The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, 
adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including 
through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk 
management. 
The italicised phrases in these definitions correspondingly imply: 
(a) that a disaster is unlikely to result from an event that happens more frequently than once 
every ten to twenty years, simply because the affected community will remember the 
recurrence of such events and will adapt (plan for them) so as to be less affected by them, in 
the knowledge that they will recur in the future; therefore, they are unlikely to be serious. 
(b) That risk is determined probabilistically, meaning that risk of event = probability of event x 
consequence of event, 
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(c) that risk reduction results in resilience, and 
(d) that resilience is achieved through risk reduction (management). 
It is important to recognise that there are numerous definitions of these terms within the wider 
literature; the UNISDR definitions are not ubiquitous.  This piece focusses on the terms “disaster” and 
“resilience”.  Therefore, further definitions of these terms are provided and discussed below. 
3.5 Other definitions 
Other definitions of “disaster” (cited by Kelman, 2017) include: 
- EMA (1998). “A serious disruption to community life which threatens or causes death or injury 
in that community and/or damage to property which is beyond the day-today capacity of the 
prescribed statutory authorities and which requires special mobilisation and organisation of 
resources other than those normally available to those authorities.” 
- FEMA, 2004 “An occurrence of a natural catastrophe, technological accident, or human 
caused event that has resulted in severe property damage, deaths, and/or multiple injuries.” 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/rrr/glo.pdf on 8 July 2004. 
- Reliefweb (2008) “A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing 
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of 
the affected community or society to cope using its own resources.” 
- UN DHA (1992) “A serious disruption of the functioning of society, causing widespread 
human, material or environmental losses which exceed the ability of affected society to cope 
using only its own resources. Disasters are often classified according to their cause (natural 
or manmade).” 
From these additional definitions, it is clear that a common concept within definitions of “disaster” is 
the inability of the local community to manage the event using its own resources.  This signifies the 
severity required to term an event a disaster and also implies the relatively infrequent occurrence of 
such events in a given locality. 
Examples of other “resilience” definitions include (italics added for emphasis): 
- IPCC (2012): “The ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, 
accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient 
manner, including through ensuring the preservation, restoration, or improvement of its 
essential basic structures and functions.” 
- DFID (2011): “the ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by 
maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses – such as 
earthquakes, drought or violent conflict – without compromising their long term prospects.” 
The above definitions thus unequivocally imply that resilience to disasters can be achieved by risk 
reduction. This implication is examined more closely herein. 
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4. Disasters 
Genuine disaster events are, as defined above (Section 3), rare in any specific location, and often (in 
fact, usually; Davies, 2015) unexpected.  Less frequent events are less likely to be present in societal 
memory, so are less expected, and pre-adaptation to their impacts is less likely.  Definitions 
commonly imply that a disaster is unlikely to result from an event that happens more frequently than 
once every ten to twenty years, simply because the affected part of society will remember the 
recurrence of such events and will adapt (plan for them) so as to be less affected by them, in the 
knowledge that they will recur in the future.  Therefore, events that occur at a range of frequencies, 
but are common enough to be expected, do not fit definitions of a disaster. 
5. Resilience 
In the disaster context, the term “resilience” first came into use in the 1950s (one article reported in 
Scopus); by 1990, seven articles were reported; by 2000, 40; by 2010, 770; and by 2018, almost 
5000. This rapid growth in usage has been accompanied by a plethora of definitions of the term – 
Scopus currently reports 151 articles including the terms “disaster resilience” and “definition”. This 
suggests that the term “disaster resilience” is widely used for a range of concepts, which in turn 
makes it difficult to operationalise in practice. How does one develop strategies that will lead to 
resilience when controversy (if not confusion) exists over its meaning? This is particularly difficult 
when working with communities whose members are unlikely to be familiar with any technical 
interpretation of the word. 
Here, we adopt the UNISDR (2017) interpretation of resilience quoted above (Section 3), excluding 
the final phrase; we question both the UNISDR (2017) and IPCC (2012) definitions for their emphasis 
on “the preservation and restoration of… essential basic structures and functions” and “ensuring the 
preservation of basic structures and functions” when these very structures and functions may cause 
vulnerability. Instead, we interpret these definitions as supporting the societal preference for business 
as usual (especially given the IPCC definition also notes the option of improving structures and 
functions). Somewhat similarly, the DFID (2012) definition focuses on “maintaining or transforming 
living standards” in the face of disaster; when it is appreciated that a large proportion of Earth’s 
population suffer poor living standards and struggle to “maintain or transform” them in the absence of 
disasters, this appears optimistic. 
The objective of the present work is to propose a set of strategies that will realise “disaster resilience” 
for a community (in the present context, a self-identifying spatially-localised group of people; e.g. a 
town, or village, or region). Why would a community want to achieve resilience to disasters? Often, 
because many people in the community are aware that disasters can befall them in the future, and 
they want a plan that will enable the community to survive these disasters and redevelop prosperity 
afterwards; the alternative is to ignore the prospective disasters and accept the greater costs that will 
result. While some community members may be psychologically inclined to the alternative way of 
thinking (able to put the potential catastrophes out of mind while hoping that no disaster will occur in 
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their lifetime), other community members will be inclined to the former, and their lives would be 
substantially improved if there were a plan that enabled them to see confidently past a disaster to a 
future with a good quality of life. More pragmatically, external organisations will be much more likely to 
invest in a community that plans for future disasters than in one that does not.  
5.1 Achieve resilience or increase resilience? 
Most of the definitions referred to above see resilience as something that can be achieved if the right 
things are done. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not anything is resilient until it is clear 
what it needs to be resilient to. In the disaster context, this is obviously disasters – but which 
disasters? Disasters come in a wide range of types and intensities; it is clearly unrealistic to achieve 
complete resilience to all of them, so in reality a community has to make a choice about how resilient 
it wishes to become – and to which disasters. This clarifies the issue somewhat; there are degrees of 
resilience, it is not a binary quality. Hence, resilience can perhaps better be seen as a direction that 
will lead towards improved “ability… to resist, absorb, accommodate…” (UNISDR, 2017, Section 2d) 
and so on, rather than as a well-defined state which can be achieved once and for all. This view 
accords with that of Manyena (2006), who argues strongly “… for a process-oriented definition of 
resilience, saying that [t]he danger of viewing disaster resilience as an outcome is the tendency to 
reinforce the traditional practice of disaster management, which takes a reactive stance.” (Gilbert, 
2016). In a similar vein, Pelling (2012) approaches resilience (to climate change) as an outcome of 
the processes of adaptation and transformation that derive from identification of the basic causes of 
vulnerability as consequences of dominant development policies. 
5.2 More resilient to what? 
This is the other key question. The crucial phrase in the UNISDR definition (Section 2d) is “effects of a 
hazard” (emphasis added); this is what the achievement of resilience will reduce, and this is what the 
community needs to achieve resilience to. A community may be vulnerable to a range of potential 
disasters, such as earthquakes, landslides, flooding, etc., all of which behave differently, some of 
which can be forecast shortly in advance and some of which cannot. However, it is not the event itself 
to which the community needs to become more resilient; it is the “effects” (Section 2d) or impacts of 
the event on the community’s ability to go about its normal business. These impacts involve damage 
to assets (houses, commercial premises, critical infrastructure, lifelines), damage to people (deaths 
and injuries) and interruption of services (food and fuel supply, health and welfare provision, civil 
order). Whichever kind of event hits the community, these are the impacts to which improved 
resilience is required. Every community will be uniquely vulnerable to these impacts because of its 
unique combination of sociocultural and socioeconomic make-up and physical location.  
A community will evidently be more resilient to the impacts of any given hazard event if those impacts 
can be reduced; thus, a direct route to improved resilience to disasters is by way of measures to 
reduce the impacts of disasters on the community. Many years of experience have demonstrated that 
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attempts to modify or prevent the hazard itself are unreliable, and can make impacts worse (e.g. Criss 
and Shock, 2001; Supprasi et al, 2013; Mileti and Gailus, 2005); hence the measures required to 
reduce impacts need to look at modifying society and its behaviour, to increase resilience to disaster 
events. 
5.3 Costs of resilience 
Resilience to disasters is not a free good, because investment in disaster resilience means less 
investment somewhere else. Every community has a range of vulnerabilities; for example, to 
everyday commercial competition as well as to natural events, and to occasional hazard impacts as 
well as genuine disasters (Section 4). Increased investment in resilience to disaster impacts may 
evidently reduce investment in everyday commerce and in protection against occasional hazard 
events (Ulanowicz et al., 2009).  Thus, any decision to prioritise investment in disaster resilience over 
other vulnerabilities to any given degree has to be taken by the community itself, as it is the body that 
is vulnerable, that has a clear picture of its desired future and has to pay for disaster resilience 
(Pearce, 2003). Here, we are focussed on reducing impacts of future hazard events which, if occurred 
today, would be disastrous.  Therefore, this ignores the reality that reactional response to, and 
recovery from, any serious disaster are likely to be government-funded, because such retrospective 
assistance is known to be less effective and less beneficial for the community than pre-planned 
disaster resilience (UNISDR, 2005). 
5.4 Resilience in a nutshell 
From the above, we conceptualise “disaster resilience” for present purposes as: societal adaptation 
designed to reduce the impacts of future disaster events on the everyday life of the community to an 
extent commensurate with the wishes of the community. Note that this definition is not exclusive; 
other measures, such as preparation for disaster response and recovery, which do not directly reduce 
impacts, also lead to increased resilience. Nevertheless, even these measures indirectly reduce 
impacts because they speed the achievement of post-disaster conditions. 
6. Planning timeframe 
It is important to consider the future time period for which the community can sensibly plan, for two 
main reasons: 
1. The farther into the future we try to plan, the more difficult it is to imagine how the community 
will have altered due to societal changes. For example, if we contemplate planning for 100 
years into the future, we need to be able to visualise what 22nd century society will be like; 
this depends on many poorly-known factors such as how much sea level rise will have 
occurred and the impact this will have had on global society, the number and nature of wars 
that may have occurred, the nature of technology, global population and so on. For 
comparison, imagine someone in 1918 trying to plan for the world in 2018. 
Appendix B.  Increasing communities’ resilience to disasters; an impact-based approach. 
 227 
2. The longer in the future we plan for, the greater the number of hazard events that will affect 
the community in that time, on average. Curiously, as we shall see, the greater the number of 
hazard events we are concerned with, the greater is the reliability with which we can predict 
their future occurrence. 
The second factor suggests that considering a long future planning period is advantageous, but the 
first obviously limits the feasibility of long-term planning. Since, in Western society at least, we can 
realistically assume that:  
- adult individuals’ serious interest in the future of the community they currently live in likely 
extends at most to 50 years (perhaps increased to 100 if they expect their children and 
grandchildren to stay in the same community);  
- political planning and policy horizons rarely extend beyond 10-20 years;  
- buildings and infrastructure rarely have expected lives greater than 50-100 years; and that 
- plans are superseded on a rolling basis and thus evolve with time, 
- then planning is realistically limited to 50 – 100 years, at most. In the present work we take 
100 years as the future period of interest, both for simplicity and to acknowledge that, 
although a shorter period may be more realistic, planning horizons lack clarity. 
Further, acknowledging that any disaster will, by definition, have serious impacts on a community, it is 
reasonable to infer that the way a community redevelops after a disaster will result in significant 
changes to the pre-disaster situation. The nature of these changes is extremely difficult to anticipate, 
so the impacts of a further disaster on the changed community cannot be foreseen. Thus, after a 
disaster, the resilience plan will need to be revisited to take account of these changes. 
Hence the relevant and realistic planning time frame for a community is either until the next disaster, 
or for 100 years, whichever is the shorter. 
7. To what extent does DRR imply DIR? 
As noted above (Section 3.2), risk is defined as the product of event probability and event 
consequence. For present purposes, consequence is equated with impact (i.e. risk is defined as the 
product of event probability and event impact); that is, consequence and impact both describe the 
costs to the community of the event resulting from damage to assets, lifelines, infrastructure, deaths 
and injuries, together with the consequential short-and long-term societal and commercial disruption.  
Given a planning timeframe of a century (Section 6), the total impact on the community of specific 
future disaster events is the number of events that occur in that time multiplied by the average cost 
per event. The number of events in a century is 100 times the annual event probability, so on this 
basis, measures that reduce risks by reducing probability will indeed reduce the total impacts of those 
events by reducing the number of events that occur. 
This assumes, however, that the number of events that will occur in any given 100-year period is 
accurately represented by the event probability. This is not necessarily – or even usually – the case. 
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For example, if the annual event probability is 0.500, then the number of events in any given 100 
years will theoretically be exactly 50, but in reality will be roughly 50 – it is likely to be within the range 
of 40-60 or so, but in terms of assessing costs 50 is close enough, especially considering that these 
are relatively low-impact events.  
Considering rarer, more intense events, however – say with an annual probability of 0.05 – then the 
number of events in the next 100 years may realistically be 3, or 4, or 5, or 6, or 7, compared with the 
theoretical number of 5. In this case it makes a large difference to total impacts if 3 events occur or 7 
events occur (Figure 58). 
Further, using an example that the probability of such events is reduced from 0.050 to 0.030 through 
hazard mitigation, while the event impacts stay the same; now the number of events may be 1, or 2, 
or 3, or 4, or 5. Hence, although the risk has been reduced by 40%, and the total impact may indeed 
be reduced, it may not – there is a 30% chance it will the same or greater. Thus, although reducing 
the risk by 40% may reduce the number of occurrences, there is no guarantee of this. This means 
that, in general, there is no guarantee that reducing risk by reducing probability will in fact reduce total 
impact (Figure 58). 
 
Figure 58.  Normal distribution showing the number of times (3 to 7) an event with an annual 
exceedence probability of 0.050 occurs in 100 years (full line) and their likelihoods; for example, 5 
events are 8 times as likely as 3 or 7 events. If the annual exceedence probability is reduced to 0.030 
the number of occurrences (1 to 5) and their likelihoods are shown by the dashed line. Thus, if the 
annual probability is 0.030 rather than 0.050, then 30% of the time there will be the same or more 
occurrences in 100 years – meaning no or negative impact reduction. 
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With even rarer (and even more intense) events, whose annual probabilities are even lower, the 
situation is worse still. Say we reduce the annual probability of an event from 0.005 to 0.003; then the 
likely number of occurrences in any given 100 years, which was originally 0 or 1, remains 0 or 1, and 
the reduction of risk has no effect whatsoever on actual impact. 
DRR thus leads reliably to impact reduction, over a chosen time period, only for events that occur 
frequently during that time. These are necessarily smaller, less intense events than those that occur 
more rarely, and their impacts will therefore be less. As noted in Section 4 above, the term “disaster” 
should be restricted to rare events. There is thus an irony in that disaster risk reduction only leads to 
resilience (impact reduction) for events that cannot be classed as disasters. 
8. Disaster Impact Reduction 
Since DRR does not reliably reduce the impacts of disasters, we are forced to look elsewhere for a 
basis for increasing resilience to disasters. The obvious place to look is towards directly reducing the 
impacts of future severe events, without considering their risk or probability (Disaster Impact 
Reduction, DIR). If this can be achieved, and adaptations developed so that the impacts of future 
events are reduced, then increased resilience is achieved. (So, incidentally, is reduced risk). 
Therefore, knowledge of the nature and magnitude of the community impacts that will result from the 
occurrence of severe hazard events during the next 100 years or so needs to be established. 
Recalling that there is no way to reliably predict what type of hazard the next event will be, the event 
severity, or when the event will happen, this seems to be a tall order. Certainly, for a specified 
location, hazard science can constrain the type of event that can occur; it can also constrain the 
maximum credible severity of the event (bearing in mind, however, that several major earthquakes 
during the last two decades have exceeded their scientifically-determined maximum credible 
magnitude; Davies, 2015). For some types of event, the occurrence can be forecast to give days 
(storms and floods), weeks or even months (volcanic eruptions) of warning, with varying degrees of 
reliability. However, no warning greater than a matter of seconds is presently feasible for 
earthquakes, and hence very little for the hazard cascades they can initiate (tsunami; landslide – 
damming – dambreak flooding - river aggradation – flooding; landslide-tsunami).  
This difficulty, however, reduces considerably when it is appreciated that communities do not need to 
be resilient to earthquakes, or eruptions, or storms. According to the present definition, they need to 
be resilient to their impacts. This can be taken further; resilience does not take the form of coping with 
specific assets being damaged, it takes the form of being less impacted by the societal consequences 
of any asset damage. For example, a community does not need to be resilient to a particular bridge 
collapsing, it needs to be resilient to the loss of services (transport, power, communications) resulting 
from that collapse.  
This situation is simplified even further when it is recalled that the particular disaster a community 
needs to be most resilient is the next one to affect it. Thus, the community as it is at present needs to 
be resilient only to the impacts of the next disaster. 
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The situations that affect a community as a consequence of any disaster fall into a small number of 
categories, such as:  
- deaths and injuries, 
- loss of supplies (food, fuel, goods), 
- loss of communications, 
- loss of power, 
- loss of water services (fresh water, storm water, waste water), 
- loss of social services (finance, care, medical), 
- loss of business, 
- loss of societal structures and functions. 
Thus, if a community can adapt so that it is better able to maintain its existence in the face of these 
losses, it becomes more resilient to future disasters of any type. This is equivalent to what Helm 
(2015) calls “intrinsic resilience”. If these losses can be reduced by pre-event adaptations, the 
community is better able to continue to function through and beyond the disaster. Some adaptation 
strategies to this end are now obvious, such as stockpiling of emergency food, fuel and medical 
supplies, satellite phones and stand-by generators. Reducing vulnerability to loss of power, water 
supplies and/or transport is more difficult, involving perhaps installation of a backup water, or power 
and fuel supply, or constructing alternative road access – here redundancy implies improved 
resilience, but at a considerable cost; this can, however, be spread over considerable time, because 
although the next disaster can in principle occur at any time, there may be several years or decades 
before it does occur. Again, as noted in 3.3 above, the immediacy of investment in disaster resilience 
is for the community to decide. 
The preceding discussion has deliberately been framed in general terms, in order to preserve clarity 
of the fundamental concepts of resilience, however, we recognise that this clarity is to some extent 
artificial, in that it glosses over the many social and political factors that in reality contribute to the 
vulnerability and resilience of communities. For example, a community may be vulnerable to disaster 
impact because dwellings are sited close to a river, but the obvious strategy of relocation may be 
unworkable for numerous reasons.  The riverside location may be a major source of revenue for the 
town, for example through tourism (e.g. Espiner & Becken, 2014).  Moreover, Tierney (2006) explores 
the contribution of social inequality to disaster impacts; the community may not have adequate 
resources or alternative sites for the dwellings, nor the political influence to remedy these needs..  
Social inequality may be able to be offset, however, by recognition of and utilisation of the 
community’s social capital – its resources of connectedness, linkages memory and networks (e.g. 
Aldrich and Meyer, 2015). 
9. Increasing community resilience: the scenario approach 
While Section 8 emphasises that increasing community resilience has much more to do with the 
impacts that hazard events have on community services than with specific hazard events themselves, 
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a clear idea of the types of threat that the community faces from hazard events is nevertheless a 
useful starting point for improvement of community resilience. This is because the decisions that are 
made about community adaptability to hazard impacts depend critically on the way of life and 
aspirations of the community, and thus must be made by the community itself (Section 5.3). 
To make these decisions, the community needs to understand  
1. the “hazard-scape” (the range of types and magnitudes of hazards that can affect the 
community; derived by hazards scientists in consultation with the community), and 
2. the “asset damage-scape” (similarly, the types and intensities of asset damages that can 
occur; derived by engineers in consultation with the community), so that these drivers can be 
integrated with 
3. the “community-scape” (the ways in which the community functions as a social, cultural and 
commercial entity; known intuitively by the community), to derive 
4. the full “impacts-scape” (as outlined in Section 8) – to which resilience is required by way of 
adaptation. 
A potential way of making relevant information available to the community is by way of three sets of 
scenarios: 
1. Hazard event scenarios, 
2. Asset damage scenarios, and 
3. Community impact scenarios. 
Hazard event scenarios represent the range of hazard events that the community can experience, 
limited by its geological and geomorphic setting. The chosen event intensities need to be at the upper 
end of what is likely (Section 7), but the exact choice of hazard and intensity needs to be made by the 
community in discussion with hazard scientists and officials, because the community has a clear 
picture of its desired future and what it is willing to pay for disaster resilience (Section 5.3).  
Damage scenarios are developed from the hazard event scenarios, by the community in discussion 
with hazard scientists, engineers and officials; through these discussions the community becomes 
aware of the full range of likely direct hazard event effects. In this phase it is important to consider 
regional infrastructure damage too, because this may seriously impact the functioning of the 
community even if direct community impacts are moderate, or even zero. 
The community impact scenarios are developed by the community (who possess expert local 
knowledge in this topic) in discussion with local authorities and infrastructure providers, for example to 
estimate how long it will take to improve and restore regional critical infrastructure levels of service 
(Zorn et al., 2018).  
These scenarios will also be influenced by increasing knowledge of hazard events in other places – 
for example, the 2016 Mw7.8 Kaikōura earthquake in New Zealand did not involve rupture of a single 
major fault, but involved rupture of about 20 minor faults, many previously unknown (Hamling et al., 
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2017). Hence major earthquakes are not limited to major faults, as has previously been assumed 
worldwide, implying that major earthquakes might occur almost anywhere that there are many minor 
faults.  The Kaikōura earthquake also informed impact assessments and expected recovery 
trajectories for infrastructure stakeholders, particularly following damages to road and rail networks.  
These are already being used by infrastructure stakeholders including the national road and rail 
operators and Civil Defence Emergency Management within New Zealand to plan for other hazards 
elsewhere in the country (Chapter 3). 
It is important to realise that here, the scenarios facilitate collaboration with, as opposed to top-down 
education of, the community.  For example, while the scientists and engineers are expected to 
provide greater levels of technical knowledge, the community may also be able to provide local 
knowledge which may alter the scientific and engineering knowledge.  No group knows everything, 
and each will learn from others through the scenarios.  This is possible because accurate 
communication of scenario information is much easier than accurate communication of technical 
scientific information (such as probabilistic risk) and technical engineering information. The scenario 
information is about hazard events, asset damage, and the impacts of asset damage on community 
life – which all parties are familiar with by experience, even if at much lower severities, or by knowing 
about impacts on other communities. All of these can be conveyed comprehensibly in everyday 
terms, and indeed the community can contribute substantially to their development. Not only can 
scenario information be more easily understood by all involved, but this also means that no-one is in a 
position of privileged knowledge, and thus of power, by virtue of profession or position. Everyone 
involved in scenario discussions has all the relevant information available to them and equally 
comprehensible by them. This is extremely important in enabling trust among the participants, which 
is itself a pre-requisite for open communication. 
Once the full set of scenarios has been developed, and community members have an understanding 
of the nature, intensity and duration of the service losses they can expect to suffer under these 
scenarios, development of adaptation strategies can begin. 
10. Selection of impacts scenario 
In the present context, an impact scenario describes only one of the many possible sets of impacts 
that can affect the community as a result of the next disaster. Any chosen scenario is very likely to 
differ from the set of impacts that will in fact occur, but, given that the full range of impacts of all these 
sets (although able to be envisioned) is probably too broad to serve as a sensible target for 
adaptation, a specific set needs to be chosen for consideration. For example, a chosen scenario may 
assume that specific buildings and sections of infrastructure are damaged.  In the next disaster, these 
exact buildings and sections of infrastructure are unlikely to all be impacted, or to be the only ones 
impacted.  However, all buildings within the community may have been strengthened as a result of 
the scenario, so those that are impacted in the event are damaged less.  The more severe is the 
chosen scenario, the greater the confidence the community can have that its chosen adaptations will 
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allow it to survive and prosper through and beyond the event; but, as noted above (Section 5.3), more 
serious adaptations to disaster scenarios will incur greater costs and therefore leave less resource to 
devote to resilience to lesser threats. Hence, again, the choice of scenario must be made by the 
community according to its own degree of risk acceptance or aversion and its own vision of the future. 
Nevertheless, even if an event occurs that exceeds the chosen scenario, the adaptations to lesser 
scenarios will reduce impacts to some degree. So, the choice of scenario is not simple, but is 
important. 
The choice of scenario is also important because a common criticism of the scenario approach, 
particularly the use of hazard event scenarios, is that it only deals with one of the many situations that 
may occur in the future and ignores all others – so it is a random shot in the dark with no certainty of 
usefully representing the next event. By contrast, the risk approach deals with the full range of known 
events and integrates their effects into the risk distribution, and an optimised solution can be derived 
by probabilistically optimising the countermeasures. Besides the intrinsic unreliability of the risk 
approach outlined above (Section 7), this objection mostly focusses only on impacts scenarios, whose 
possible range is qualitatively much smaller than that of the events scenarios. The remaining 
objections, which relate to the apparently random selection of an impacts scenario as a basis for 
planning, disappear when, as a result of considering the full range of likely impacts scenarios up to 
and including a maximum credible impacts scenario, the community chooses the scenario(s) it wants 
to use for planning. In fact, careful selection of an impacts scenario as the basis for resilience 
planning is potentially far more reliable than any probabilistically-derived “optimal” decision. In 
addition, adaptation to the wrong event still has benefits when a different event occurs, because 
adaptation is to impacts, not events (Section 8).  
An excellent example of the benefits of pre-adaptation to the wrong scenario is given by the 
experience of an electricity utility in the 2010-2011 Christchurch earthquake sequence. Following the 
publication of knowledge about the magnitude and probability of a rupture on the plate-boundary 
Alpine Fault, and its likely effects on Christchurch although about 150 km away (Lamb, 1997), Orion 
carried out strengthening of their electricity supply infrastructure in anticipation of this event. The next 
event to affect the system, however, was the series of local earthquakes that devastated Christchurch 
starting in 2010; thanks to its upgrading in anticipation of the different event, the Orion network 
required less reinstatement work following these events than would otherwise have been the case 
(Massie and Watson, 2011).  
Finally, it is important to recognise that the above processes of scenario development and choice, and 
planning, take place in an environment in which power structures and politics can play a major role. 
Particularly at the local level these factors have the potential to see vested interests override 
community welfare. Such influences are intrinsically difficult to counter, and indeed to discern, given 
the wide range of backgrounds and personalities present in any group grappling with community 
adaptation planning. In spite of these complications, however, there is accumulating evidence that 
scenario-based community resilience planning can lead to better decisions than traditional top-down 
governance (Chapter 4). 
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11. Use of the term “risk” 
The present work is based on UNISDR (2017) definitions, particularly of “disaster risk”, and the 
emphasis in that definition that risk is determined probabilistically. On that basis, it has been made 
clear that “risk management” cannot reliably result in increased resilience, and the present proposals 
may thus appear to be a substantial departure from current standard practice. However, in reality, 
many uses of the term “risk” in both technical and policy literature do not conform to the UNISDR 
definition. Many uses of “risk” in fact mean “impact”, and indeed only make sense in that context. It is 
enlightening, when reading reports and attending seminars and other addresses, to mentally alter 
every use of “risk” to “impact”; very often the sense of meaning is clarified, while often the meaning 
does not change, and rarely is it distorted.  
Thus, the present suggestions, while clarifying some potential strategies for approaching resilience, 
are less revolutionary than might appear at first sight. It is likely that professional risk managers will 
object to the side-lining of probabilistic risk suggested herein, and scientists dedicated to increasing 
the sophistication of event magnitude-frequency distributions in the pursuit of resilience may resist 
these suggestions. In response, it is emphasised that probabilistic risk reduction has its place in 
dealing with events that happen frequently in a realistic time-frame; further, these events are often 
sufficiently well-described that accurate probability distributions can be derived – which is certainly not 
the case for less frequent events. But they are not disasters. 
Probabilistic risk is most reliable where very large numbers of events are involved; for example, in 
insurance and reinsurance. Here, the organisation involved is dealing with the full range of events of 
all types that occur over very wide areas of the planet, and the summed impacts of even major 
disaster events can be reliably predicted on a statistical basis for time periods as short as a year 
(most insurance premiums are adjusted annually). The same may apply, to some extent, to a national 
government developing policy for spatially-averaged “resilience” for a whole country; the drawback in 
this context is that individual communities will not be reliably served by this policy, so from the 
community perspective, the policy will be perceived to fail from time to time (Davies, 2015). A 
democratically-elected government is vulnerable at the polls to such perceptions. 
Finally, the present work is by no means merely a semantic argument. In discussions and planning for 
reducing disaster impacts, lack of clarity about the meanings of “risk” and “resilience” can at the very 
best result in considerable time being wasted, and at the worst in unreliable strategies being adopted 
at great cost that fail to reduce the impacts of the next disaster to befall a community. The internal 
inconsistencies that have been demonstrated in high-level official definitions foster this lack of clarity, 
and the confusion that results inhibits the development and implementation of effective measures to 
reduce disaster impacts. 
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12. Conclusions 
1. UNISDR is the leading organisation globally coordinating, campaigning and advocating for 
disaster reduction; its by-line is “Connect and convince to reduce disaster impacts” 
(https://www.unisdr.org/). The organisation’s terminology (UNISDR, 2017) unequivocally 
implies that resilience to disasters can be achieved by risk reduction. However, this 
implication is false.  It is only valid for events that occur frequently in the time-frame of interest 
to an affected community, and such events cannot be “disasters”, according to the 
terminology (Section 4). Instead, Disaster Risk Reduction is reliable when applied to 
ensembles of many events, when the occurrence of events is more likely to closely match 
their probabilities. Insurance and reinsurance are examples of such contexts. 
2. Disaster impacts are the effects on society of the damage caused to community and regional 
assets by hazard events. These include deaths and injuries, loss of supplies (food, fuel, 
goods), loss of communications, loss of power, loss of water services (fresh water, storm 
water, waste water), loss of social services (finance, care, medical), loss of business and loss 
of societal structures and functions. Impacts are largely independent of the hazard type 
(Section 8). 
3. Reduction of disaster impacts is equivalent to increasing disaster resilience; this cannot, 
however, be reliably achieved by Disaster Risk Reduction. By contrast, measures specifically 
designed to reduce the impacts of disasters lead reliably to increased resilience (Section 8). 
4. Disaster Impact Reduction can be approached by community-based development of hazard, 
asset-damage and community-impact scenario sets, also involving officials and experts. The 
scenario approach critically facilitates collaboration, as opposed to top-down education of the 
community. This means the impact scenarios can form the basis for planning to reduce 
community impacts by adaptation measures (Section 9). 
5. Scenarios and adaptation strategies can be selected by community-official-expert 
collaborations, based on the community’s knowledge of its capabilities and its aspirations 
(Sections 5.3 and 9). While important, the criticality of scenario selection is moderated by the 
fact that adaptation to the wrong event will nevertheless result in reduced impacts, because of 
the general nature of the impacts (Section 8). 
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  Hazardous Event 
  Road 
 Rail 
 Air 
  Shipping 
 
Table 13.  “Kaikōura” earthquake timeline: key transport events. 
Date Event 
Day 
Day Time Event Source 
DAY 1: Monday 14th November 2016 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 00:02 Mw 7.8 earthquake. Canterbury 
CDEM 






14/11/2016 1 Mon 
 




14/11/2016 1 Mon 
 
Culverden to Kaikōura (Route 70) 






14/11/2016 1 Mon 
 
The Main North Line between Picton 
and Christchurch is closed. 
KiwiRail 
14/11/2016 1 Mon  All ferry sailings cancelled until 
Wellington and Picton ferry terminals are 
inspected and cleared to re-open. 
KiwiRail 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 
 
The rail-enabled Aratere Interislander 
ferry not shipping, pending clearance of 
the Wellington rail span. 
KiwiRail 
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14/11/2016 1 Mon 06:00 Picton to Blenheim (SH1) only open for 
Class 1 vehicles, up to 50kg.  Heavier 
vehicles backed up for several 
kilometres along the highway. 
Marlborough 
CDEM 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 10:15 Diversion around Wairau River Bridge in 
place on SH1, via SH62 and SH6. 
NZ Transport 
Agency 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 13:00 Lyttleton and Timaru ports reopen. Canterbury 
CDEM 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 14:00 Engineers on site at Wairau River 
Bridge, which remains closed. 
Marlborough 
CDEM 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 15:22 Waipara to Cheviot (SH1) open. NZ Transport 
Agency 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 15:25 Blenheim to Seddon (SH1) open. NZ Transport 
Agency 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 15:30 SH7A open to light vehicles, will close 
again at 8pm. 
NZ Transport 
Agency 




14/11/2016 1 Mon 16:00 Kaikōura airfield functional and 




14/11/2016 1 Mon 17:00 Supplies have started arriving in 
Kaikōura by helicopter. 
Canterbury 
CDEM 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 20:00 SH7A closed for repairs. NZ Transport 
Agency 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 20:00 The Wairau River Bridge is expected to 
reopen this evening.  Emergency 
vehicles only are cleared on SH1 south 




14/11/2016 1 Mon 
 
Wellington Port ferries operating, many 
cargo ships are diverting to ports 
including Napier, Tauranga and 
Auckland. 
CentrePort 
DAY 2: Tuesday 15th November 2016 
15/11/2016 2 Tue 06:00 Work begins to clear SH1 to Kaikōura 
from the south. 
Canterbury 
CDEM 
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15/11/2016 2 Tue 07:54 SH7A open to light vehicles.  No towing.  




15/11/2016 2 Tue 08:30 SH6 is closed from north of Rai Valley 
township to 7 km south of Havelock: Rai 
Valley township has been isolated by 
flooding on one side and a slip on the 




15/11/2016 2 Tue 09:45 Route 70 being investigated as alternate 
route to access Kaikōura. 
Canterbury 
CDEM 
15/11/2016 2 Tue 
 
Air New Zealand is operating scheduled 
flights from Marlborough. 
Marlborough 
CDEM 
15/11/2016 2 Tue 
 
Air New Zealand is operating an 
additional return service between 




15/11/2016 2 Tue 
 
SoundsAir fly four (10-person) flights 




15/11/2016 2 Tue 
 
Pelorus Air are providing a charter 




15/11/2016 2 Tue 
 
Two out of three Interislander ferries 
(the Kaiarahi and Kaitaki) begin carrying 
freight and vehicle passengers only.  
Foot traffic passengers are suspended 
due to terminal damage. 
KiwiRail 
15/11/2016 2 Tue  KiwiRail has set up coordination centres 
in Christchurch and Wellington to enable 
a closer working relationship with NZ 
Transport Agency as work continues to 
assess the damage to the Main North 
Line and SH1. 
KiwiRail 
15/11/2016 2 Tue 16:45 Rai Valley to Renwick (SH6) open. NZ Transport 
Agency 




Appendix C.  “Kaikōura” earthquake timeline. 
 242 
"First few days" 
Army convoys travel through to 
Kaikōura.  Critical infrastructure vehicles 
allowed through later. 
Canterbury 
CDEM 
DAY 3: Wednesday 16th November 2016 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 06:00 HMNZS Wellington and Canterbury 
arrive at Kaikōura. 
Canterbury 
CDEM 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 10:48 SH7A Open (no restrictions), will close 
at 8pm for repairs.  Expected to be 
reopened by 7am. 
NZ Transport 
Agency 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 
 
Culverden to Waiau (Route 70) reopens. NZ Transport 
Agency 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 
 




16/11/2016 3 Wed 
 
Picton to Ward (SH1) open. NZ Transport 
Agency 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 
 
Photo ID required to travel South of 
Seddon on SH1 while the emergency 
operation is underway. 
Marlborough 
CDEM 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 
 
Intercity Coach resumes Nelson to 
Picton service, begins Christchurch to 




16/11/2016 3 Wed 
 
All freight lines in the North Island and 
south of Christchurch are open and 
operating. 
KiwiRail 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 
 
Freight is being delivered to the 
container transfer site at Blenheim and 
then by truck to Christchurch, either via 
SH63, SH6, SH65 and SH7 or the West 
Coast region. 
KiwiRail 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 
 
Burnham Wharf (Wellington) reopened 
for shipping services. 
CentrePort 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 12:00 Leader Road closed NZ Transport 
Agency 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 14:30 HMNZS Canterbury loading ~380 
people for evacuation to Christchurch. 
Canterbury 
CDEM 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 
 
SoundsAir flies four flights from 
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16/11/2016 3 Wed 23:09 SH63, SH6, SH65 and SH7 is 
recommended SH1 detour. 
NZ Transport 
Agency 




DAY 4: Thursday 17th November 2016 
17/11/2016 4 Thurs 
 
SH7A Open NZ Transport 
Agency 
17/11/2016 4 Thurs 01:00 HMNZS Canterbury arrived at Lyttleton.  
Evacuated 449 people from Kaikōura. 
Canterbury 
CDEM 
17/11/2016 4 Thurs 08:00 Temporary Restricted Area established 
around Kaikōura to facilitate safe aircraft 
operations.  Expires 22/11/16 17:00. 
Canterbury 
CDEM 
17/11/2016 4 Thurs 10:16 Controlled access for residents and 
emergency services between Cheviot 
and Goose Bay (SH1) 
NZ Transport 
Agency 
17/11/2016 4 Thurs 12:10 SH1 now open fully between Picton and 
just south of Ward.  Speed restrictions 
and many one lane sections along route.  
A checkpoint is installed at the end of 






17/11/2016 4 Thurs 16:30 Bluebridge resume foot passenger 
travel, Interislander cannot take foot 
passengers from Picton to Wellington, 
but can take foot passengers from 
Wellington to Picton. 
Marlborough 
CDEM 
DAY 5: Friday 18th November 2016 
18/11/2016 5 Fri 
 
HMNZS Te Kaha, HMNZS Endeavour, 
USS Sampson, HMAS Darwin and 
HMCS Vancouver call at Wellington 
harbour, before leaving for Kaikōura. 
CentrePort 
18/11/2016 5 Fri 06:00 HMNZS Canterbury and international 
fleet arrives at Kaikōura, with supplies 
including 1000+ portable toilets. 
Canterbury 
CDEM 
18/11/2016 5 Fri 
 




Appendix C.  “Kaikōura” earthquake timeline. 
 244 
18/11/2016 5 Fri 
 
Freight demand on New Zealand's 
busiest domestic sea route, Auckland to 
Christchurch, has doubled following the 
massive Kaikōura Earthquake on 
Monday. 
KiwiRail 
18/11/16 5 Fri  Two out of three Interislander ferries 
(the Kaiarahi and Kaitaki) begin carrying 
foot traffic passengers from Picton to 
Wellington. 
KiwiRail 
DAY 6: Saturday 19th November 2016 
19/11/2016 6 Sat 18:00 HMNZS Canterbury departs Kaikōura 




DAY 7: Sunday 20th November 2016 
20/11/2016 7 Sun 18:00 HMNZS Canterbury arrived at Lyttonton.  
Evacuated 186 people. 
Canterbury 
CDEM 
WEEK 2: Monday 21st to Sunday 27th November 2016 
21/11/2016 8 Mon 18:00 HMNZS Canterbury stood down. Canterbury 
CDEM 
20/11/2016 8 Mon 18:00 SoundsAir launches temporary services, 
flying daily between Kaikōura and 
Christchurch and Blenheim (10-person 
flights).  On the first flights SoundsAir 
deliver two tonnes of mail for New 
Zealand Post (Christchurch to 
Kaikōura), and will make deliveries until 





22/11/2016 9 Tue 
 
A limited container service begins from 
Wellington Port following implementation 
of on-ship cranes and mobile cranes on 
the wharf.  The port's container cranes 
are currently non-operational and there 
is liquefaction and substantial 
differentiated settlement across the 
container operations area. 
CentrePort 
22/11/2016 9 Tue 18:13 M5.7 earthquake near Scargill. Canterbury 
CDEM 
25/11/2016 12 Fri 15:00 First Route 70 convoy of 81 vehicles 
from Kaikōura to Waiau (planned). 
Canterbury 
CDEM 
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25/11/2016 12 Fri 
 
Wellington Port receives HMNZS Otago 
to resupply following earthquake 
recovery work in Kaikōura. 
CentrePort 
26/11/2016 13 Sat 
 
Stock trucks pass through Route 70 on 
animal welfare grounds.  Does some 
damage to the road. 
Canterbury 
CDEM 
WEEKS 3+: Monday 28th November to Friday 9th December 2016 
28/11/2016 15 Mon 
 
KiwiRail enters the Coastal Shipping 
market with a new NZ Connect service, 
from Auckland's Wiri Inland Port and 
KiwiRail's Southdown Freight Hub to 
Lyttleton's Midland Port or KiwiRail's 
Christchurch terminal via ANL shipping 
services, in a partnership between 
KiwiRail, Ports of Auckland, Lyttleton 
Port and ANL Shipping. 
KiwiRail 
28/11/2016 15 Mon 19:00 Civil Aviation Authority restricted 
airspace over Kaikōura expires. 
Canterbury 
CDEM 
29/11/2016 16 Tue 
 
KiwiRail's rail-enabled Interislander 
ferry, Aratere, resumes sailing for freight 
customers and foot passengers after the 
link span at Wellington's ferry terminal, 
used to load and discharge vehicles, 
was repaired.  Rail link-span still under 
repair so no rail wagons able to be 
loaded into Aratere. 
KiwiRail 
29/11/2016 16 Tue 07:00 NZ Transport Agency now managing 
and operating Route 70.  Process in 




4/12/2016 21 Sun 12:00 M 5.5 earthquake near Seddon. Canterbury 
CDEM 
6/12/2016 22 Mon  SoundsAir adds additional flights 
between Christchurch and Blenheim for 
the Christmas and New Year period. 
Press 
6/12/2016 23 Tue 
 
The Wellington rail link-span is repaired, 
allowing rail wagons to be loaded on to 
the rail-enabled Aratere Interislander 
ferry, and so resume full service. 
KiwiRail 
Appendix C.  “Kaikōura” earthquake timeline. 
 246 
6/12/2016 23 Tue 
 




6/12/2016 23 Tue 
 
Controlled access for residents and 




12/12/2016 29 Mon 18:00 Picton to Clarence (SH1) reopens. NZ Transport 
Agency 
17/12/2016 34 Sat 16:00 NZ Transport Agency advises delays 
along advised SH1 detour (SH63, SH6, 




21/12/2016 38 Wed 
 
Waiau to Kaikōura open (Route 70). NZ Transport 
Agency 
21/12/2016 38 Wed 14:26 Cheviot to Goose Bay (SH1) open. NZ Transport 
Agency 
21/12/2016 38 Wed 14:26 Goose Bay to Peketa (SH1, via 
Kaikōura) open 6am - 8pm (SH1). 
NZ Transport 
Agency 
21/12/2016 38 Wed 
 
Government announces the North 
Canterbury Transport Infrastructure 
Rebuild (NCTIR) alliance, between NZ 
Transport Agency, KiwiRail, Fulton 
Hogan, Downer, Higgins and HEB 
Construction, led by Duncan Gibb, 
former lead of the Stronger Christchurch 
Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT).  
NCTIR is responsible for managing and 
operating, as well as all recovery, 
rebuild and resilience works, on SH1 
and Route 70. 
Government 
21/12/2016 38 Wed  Crane arrives to remove containers off 
train trapped outside Kaikōura, to be 
delivered by road. 
Press 
22/12/2016 39 Thurs  Christchurch to Picton route (SH7, 
SH65, SH6, SH63) speed limit reduced 
from 100 km/h to 80 km/h.  Wairau River 
township speed limit reduced to 60 
km/h. 
Press 
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29/12/2016 46 Thurs 07:52 Hundalee to Kaikōura (SH1) closed due 
to weather conditions causing an 
increased risk of rockfall. 
NZ Transport 
Agency 
29/12/2016 46 Thurs 09:20 Hundalee to Kaikōura (SH1) reopened 
(6am - 8pm). 
NZ Transport 
Agency 
4/01/2017 52 Wed 14:20 Peketa to Goose Bay (SH1) closed due 
to weather conditions causing an 
increased risk of rockfall. 
NZ Transport 
Agency 
4/01/2017 52 Wed 17:00 Peketa to Goose Bay (SH1) reopened 
(6am - 8pm). 
NZ Transport 
Agency 




9/01/2017 57 Mon 06:00 Stop/go required in various locations 
along SH7 for road pavement repairs.  
Expected to last until 20/1/17. 
NZ Transport 
Agency 
11/01/2017 59 Wed 09:52 Peketa to Hunalee (SH1) reopened 
(6am - 8pm). 
NZ Transport 
Agency 
16/01/2017 64 Mon 
 
The first freight train to leave the 
Blenheim Freight Hub heading south 
successfully completes its journey to 
Lake Grassmere, opening the way for 
commercial goods to run again on this 
section of the South Island's Main North 
Line. 
KiwiRail 
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Appendix D.  Franz Josef participatory governance detailed timeline 
Table 14.  Franz Josef participatory governance detailed timeline. 
 
Appendix D.  Franz Josef participatory governance detailed timeline. 
 249 
Appendix E.  Franz Josef risk governance actor arrangement between 2016 and 2018. 
 250 
Appendix E.  Franz Josef risk governance actor arrangement between 2016 and 2018 
 
Figure 59.  Franz Josef risk governance actor arrangement between 2016 and 2018. 
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Appendix F.  The AF8+ advisory impact scenario maps 
The AF8+ hazard scenario was partially presented in the form of hazard maps, included below.  
These were modified in a series of workshops to create AF8+ impact scenarios.  A disclaimer was 
attached to each of these hazard maps, as follows: 
Disclaimer 
The AF8+ scenario, co-created and used to facilitate discussion and collaboration within the workshops, 
is designed to provide an example of an extreme earthquake for response and recovery planning in the 
South Island of New Zealand, with a focus on the West Coast and Franz Josef township.  It is a realistic 
but extreme-case scenario, detailing earthquakes and their associated ground motions, landslides, and 
transposed real-world aftershock and rainfall sequences.  The AF8+ scenario was compiled using the 
best scientific knowledge currently available (Orchiston et al., 2016).  It is important to stress these 
maps  detail expectations based on individual and collective understandings of the AF8+ hazard 
scenario, which was co-created into an impacts scenario within workshops.  Recovery strategies and 
service levels were estimated in workshops for this AF8+ scenario only. 
It is vital to understand that the AF8+ scenario is NOT A PREDICTION of what will happen during and 
after the next major earthquake that affects the West Coast (which may not be on the Alpine Fault).  
The underlying philosophy is that if we plan for an extreme case, we improve our ability to cope with 
less severe events (“expect the worst, hope for the best”). 
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Figure 60.  The AF8+ hazard map for Franz Josef township (T = 1 day). 
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Figure 61.  The AF8+ hazard map for Westpower electricity poles (T = 1 day). 
 
Figure 62.  The AF8+ hazard map for Westpower electricity poles (T = 1 week). 
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Figure 63.  The AF8+ hazard map for Westpower electricity poles (T = 1 month). 
 
Figure 64.  The AF8+ hazard map for Westpower electricity poles (T = 6 months). 
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Figure 65.  The AF8+ hazard map for Westpower electricity poles (T = 1 year). 
 
Figure 66.  The AF8+ hazard map for Westpower electricity poles (T = 2 years).  
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Figure 67.  The AF8+ hazard map for Westpower electricity poles (T = 3 years). 
 
Figure 68.  The AF8+ hazard map for Westpower electricity poles (T = 4 years).  
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Figure 69.  The AF8+ hazard map for Westpower electricity poles (T = 5 years). 
 
Figure 70.  The AF8+ hazard map for Westpower electricity poles (T = 10 years).
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Figure 71.  The AF8+ impact maps for South Island electricity transmission service levels.
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Figure 72.  The AF8+ hazard map for State Highways and rail lines (T = 1 day). 
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Figure 73.  The AF8+ hazard map for State Highways and rail lines (T = 1 week). 
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Figure 74.  The AF8+ hazard map for State Highways and rail lines (T = 1 month). 
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Figure 75.  The AF8+ hazard map for State Highways and rail lines (T = 6 months). 
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Figure 76.  The AF8+ hazard map for State Highways and rail lines (T = 1 year). 
Appendix F.  The AF8+ advisory impact scenario maps. 
 264 
 
Figure 77.  The AF8+ hazard map for State Highways and rail lines (T = 2 years). 
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Figure 78.  The AF8+ hazard map for State Highways and rail lines (T = 3 years).  
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Figure 79.  The AF8+ hazard map for State Highways and rail lines (T = 4 years).  
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Figure 80.  The AF8+ hazard map for State Highways and rail lines (T = 5 years).  
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Figure 81.  The AF8+ hazard map for State Highways and rail lines (T = 10 years). 
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Appendix G1.  Franz Josef AF8+ earthquake scenario workshop summary 
09:00 – 12:30, Saturday 28th October 2017 
Medical Centre, Franz Josef 
Town resources 
Town already has inventory of people/businesses with resources and contact numbers: tarps, chillers, 
quad bikes, trucks, trailer, fuel, fuel tanker, radios, first aid kits, fire extinguishers, hoses, helicopters, 
heavy tools, building gear, sat phone, tie downs, containers, language speakers, water, tents, BBQs, 
ropes, shovels, welding equipment, ladders, other. 
People 
- Residents = 400 
- Tourists = 2000, 150 on ice, 200 in valley 
Transport 
- 5 helicopters ok 
- Have access to heavy moving equipment – diggers, bulldozers, tractors 
- Cars/tourist vehicles 
- 40 quadbikes 
- 27 horses: 
o 17 Horses at South Westland horse treks 
o 5 south of town 
o 5 north of town 
Fuel 
- LPG (gas cooking): 20,000l (plenty of supply for bbqs) 
- JA1: 50,000l = 420 hours flying (and can use this as diesel, so if can refuel elsewhere, solves 
fuel supply issue for generators) 
- Petrol: 15,000l = 20 days 
o 32 generators @ 10l/day = 6400l 
o 9000l remaining: 
§ Chainsaws x 20 @ 100l [need 2 stroke oil/bar lube] 
§ Quadbikes x 40 x 10l/day (8000l already in quads) 
- Diesel: 18,000l = 7-10 days supply for generators and earthworks/construction 
o 1 x digger/loader = 150l/day 
o 1 x bulldozer = 300l/day 
o 1 x tractor = 40l/day 
o TOTAL = 4900l/day = 7 days 
o Generators = 20 x 30l = 3600l 
o Vehicles = 20 = 4400l 
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o Jetfuel = 50,000l x 400 hours flight 
Power 
- 32 generators: 
o 7 generators in town 
o 13 north of town 
o 12 south of town 
- Potential for hydro power supply 
Comms 
- 3 satellite phones 
- VHF radio to north and south 
Food 
- 4 days for tourists (comfortable) 
- 2 weeks for most locals 
Water 
- Tanks at the top of the town = 100,000l = 20 days (without rain) 
Waste water 
- Not working, will build long drops 
Medical supplies 
- 48 hours triage supplies 
Evacuations 
- Evacuate injured as highest priority 
- Goal: evacuate all tourists within 7 days 
- 3rd priority: evacuate everyone else from town who wants to leave 
- Back-load essential supplies, including medical 
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Infrastructure expectations 
- Expecting to be without road and mains power for at least 6 months 




- Need full inventory of medication needs – priority for stocking, and preparedness for mass 
casualties event 
- Need phone numbers to go with comms.  “List of sat phone numbers”.  “Contact numbers for 
neigbouring towns (Okarito, Fox, Whataroa)”.  “Contact numbers of local volunteers – first aid 
responders (mobile coverage could be ok)” 
- Language cards/”Multi-lingual placards for information on general welfare/comms” 
- User-friendly status codes for Civil Defence (St John – injured, deceased, etc) 
- Would be good to also focus on other towns (not just Franz Josef) 
- Enquire about VHF and Sat Phones in Okario 
- “Info boards around town updating on current water supplies/extra info & updated info” 
- “Regular commitment to scenario training – twice year?” 
- Consider “dealing with media or potential reporter in town” 
- “Resources: Note books, pens, note pads” 
- Consider “drone technology”. 
 
 
Notes relating to workshop 
- Demand from tourists wasn’t discussed much 
- Would be good to run a workshop drip-feeding info into scenario.  “More detailed scenario plot 
with timed injects – this would test our response more” 
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Appendix G2.  Westpower AF8+ earthquake scenario workshop summary 
10:00 – 15:30, Monday 30th October 2017 
Ashley Hotel, Greymouth 
 
Scenario response 
- This scenario will be quite different from previous events Westpower has had to deal with; 
won’t be like wind-storm where they ramp up their response.  This will have no warning AND 
key staff may be at home or need to be getting home to sort their home situation out (staff 
welfare). 
- Lots of lessons from cyclone Eta, where there was a cascade failure, with 12 poles down: 
• Whataroa farmers looked after themselves, transporting a generator around their farms. 
• 2-8 days to restore 30 poles but pressure was off as local generator provided power. 
- There are 2 distinct time periods: 
1. Working out damage and restoration difficulties are highly uncertain for this scenario (time 
of year has a really important influence on the impact & early recovery). 
2. Restoration times far easier to estimate 
 
1. Set up EMT 
• Assuming 2-3 people getting into Emergency Management Team (EMT) on the first 
day. 
• Need team of people to set up (1-2 days) and maintain EMT: 
o Fuel generator can provide 2-3 days power (lights, radio, comms) 
o To source: 
§ Food 
§ Water supply 
§ Toilets (which will also need servicing) 
• CDEM: Group Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) will be gathering data and sharing 
info on other lifelines.  Focus on transport links and telecom repeaters for SCAPA 
(battery & solo). 
2. Recon all assets 
• Recon flight (to record video of asset damage) to be led by West Coast CDEM 
(assumption: CDEM will obtain helicopter or light aircraft for recon on Day 1 or 2 - 
Medical/welfare will be priority for air resources, but lifelines will also be prioritised).  
Preferable to drone due to airspace management and distance needing to be 
assessed. 
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o Recon 1: Greymouth to Hokitika for GXPs 
o Recon 2: Whataroa to Hokitika for sub-transmission. 
• Westpower can capture GPS impact assessment of data online and offline (at 
present would have to be ground-based assessment only as flight would be too fast).  
Every line person has access to GPS mapping to note impacts to poles. 
3. General network restoration 
• Overall priority to restore sub-transmission to Greymouth.  South Westland (Hokitika 
to Franz Josef) wouldn’t initially be prioritised 
• Visit Greymouth, Reefton, Arnold, Rapahoe Transpower Grid Exit Point substations 
(GXPs) first.  These will require civil inspections.  On the West Coast, West Power 
owns most GXPs, unlike the rest of the country, where most GXPs are owned by 
Transpower.  This means West Power can repair them without Transpower, but also 
that West Power does not have the contractor base to draw from to make these 
repairs. 
• Substations have 24-48 hours of battery back-up.  Some sites have solar back-up.  If 
this power runs out, risky to restore substations.  Will first be working to get 
generators to substations.  GXPs are the priority.  Thereafter, will need site visit for 
re-fuelling every 48 hours - the generators will provide around 12 hours of power, but 
will also charge the substation batteries. 
• If the generators are not available, it is better to shut the station down manually, so 
they can be started up manually later.  Requires site access within 24-48 hours. 
• Westpower does not have generators – will need to source these.  All sites have the 
West Coast standard 50 plugs for generators. 
• Major substations = 48 hours battery back-up 
• Remote substations = 24-48 hours battery back up 
• Batteries are replaced through an annual replacement strategy.  If substation battery 
back-ups fail, car/van batteries can be used, so do not need replacement back-up 
battery stock. 
4. Transpower supply restoration 
• Westpower really sceptical about Transpower restoration so quickly. Scenario 
changed: Transpower only gets power to Reefton by Day 5, Dobson and Greymouth 
by Day 10. 
• If Transpower supply weeks to months disrupted, Westpower would focus on 
restoring sub-transmission between power stations. 
• If Transpower was restored from north within days/weeks then the focus would be on 
restoring northern feed and gradually restoring network southwards. 
• So, helicopter recon really key. 
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• In this scenario, Westpower trying to restore both. 
5. Power station restoration 
• Arnold (Lake Brunner) can black start but uncertain it would survive – assumed 
severely damaged. 
• Dillmans (Kumara) expected to survive but cannot black start.  Also cannot supply 
locally alone as it does not have required frequency governor to maintain stability of 
the grid at 50Hz. 
• Kaniere Forks and McKays Creek (Hokitika) offer useful generation but again have no 
frequency governor, so cannot be used alone. 
• Amythyst and Wahapo considered key for power supply without Transpower network.  
Need one of these power stations for a black start in the West Coast region: 
o Amythyst HEP (Harihari) has black start option, as has speed governor, 
(note: located close to fault, potential for damage/blocking of water supply). 
o Wahapo HEP (Lake Wahapo) can black start and can be used to start 
running island network.  Used in Cyclone Eta has 6 days’ worth of water 
(note: probably inaccessible due to Mount Hercules (but can set up isolated 
supply for Franz Josef and Whataroa), potential for damage by lake 
landslide). 
• Black start would happen post inspectors and getting sub transmission grid back up 
and useable. 
• Sub-transmission (33kV) is most useful for allowing and connecting “island grids”. 
• Feeling was that stations would be 1-2 weeks before getting going 
6. Sub-transmission restoration 
• Top/first priority would be to get sub-transmission, so would initially ignore distribution 
except to critical sites, such as Greymouth hospital.  “Many areas aren’t going to have 
distribution networks available for months”.  Priority: sub-transmission between Hari 
Hari and Hokitika (then Kumara), to enable more generation (then Greymouth).  Once 
have this reliable backbone, won’t be reliant on Transpower - Hokitika and 
Greymouth can be fed on the isolated grid. 
• PRIORITY ROADS: Hari Hari to Inangahua (for restorations and substations) 
• Tourist areas least of Westpower’s worries due to evacuation focus. 
• If poles aren’t broken, it is pretty easy to get overhead lines.   
• Currently have 70-80 poles (67 10.6m poles) for sub-transmission.  For this event 
would need more poles than current stockpile.  Wouldn’t consider adding more poles 
to the reserve stock (at present this is a 2 year “normal use” stockpile so they don’t 
want to add more).  Potential to use trees (unlikely).  More likely would scavenge 
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poles from lines that currently provide redundancy or from towns currently without 
distributed power supply. 
• Also require cross arms and other heavy materials to be transported in (too heavy to 
be airlifted). 
• Hari Hari is the main, and southernmost, depot: 6 poles on site.  Other depots in 
Hokitika, Greymouth and Reefton. 
• Need 20-30 ton diggers to straighten poles (will be tough).  Earthmoving gear would 
be commandeered. 
• Fuel will be a major bottleneck. 
• Existing crews are spread out across West Coast (including a few crews between 
Hari Hari and Franz Josef), so Westpower should be able to assess and start repairs 
from almost any point on the network 
• Would also be huge need to get external crews, who also need to provide their own 
equipment, vans, etc.  Need road access.  Conscious that other South Island crews 
may be saturated/exhausted, so may need North Island/overseas crews for this. 
• Supply chain of supplies will be major issue: really will need barge or amphibious 
access bulk supplies (i.e. poles and bulk fuel) into West Coast. 
- General strategy: 
• (Assuming that start at Amethyst with no TP feed in North): 
§ Amethyst (Hari Hari) to Hokitika = 1 week (if can get crane and resources) 
§ Amethyst to Greymouth = 2 weeks 
• (Assuming Transpower restore to north) 
o Reefton = Day 5 
o Reefton to Greymouth = Day 10 
 
Level-of-service through time 
Up to 6 months: Response 




• Reefton has main line 33kV Transpower feed. 
• Greymouth to Hokitika line repaired as much as possible. 
• [Most of South Westland already have back-up generators for reliable power supply] 
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1 month 
After one week, without replenishment of supplies and gear (poles, cross arms, fuel etc.), would run 
out and be unable to continue repairs.  The operation would go backwards as substations would run 
flat and may not be able to be restored.  Wide agreement: Barge into Greymouth would be the most 
useful within 1 week. 
Key constraints: manpower, trucks/diggers, poles, other build materials, fuel, access. 
• Reefton to Greymouth has one 110kV (Day 10) 
• Amethyst restored 
• Sub-transmission to Hokitika (Day 14).  Hokitika would be under reduce load rules if only 
supplied by Amythyst HEP. 
• Restore Arnold zone substation 
• Greymouth Hospital: power restored (between Day 14 and Day 21) 
• Aim to get main town centres’ power distribution restored 
• Expecting severe damage to underground cables in Greymouth and Hokitika (liquefaction) 
and Franz Josef (fault rupture).  40-50% and 90% of properties in Greymouth and Hokitika 
are supplied by underground cable, respectively.  Will take more than 1 month (from Day 1) to 
repair.  Many underground cables will be bypassed by temporary overhead lines in response. 
• Would try to connect Kumura to Hokitika & Greymouth 
• Waihapo may be generating, so should be able to supply Franz Josef and potentially 
Whataroa, but as an island as Mt Hercules & Fox Hills are very hard country 
• Farming communities will unfortunately be ignored at this stage (no power restoration to 
farms) 
 
• [If transmission (110kV) feed between Reefton and Greymouth not restored, Greymouth 
would fed by 11kV feed at reduced load] 
 
6 months 
Fairly confident would have all power restored within 6 months. 
• Assumed road to Fox not open.  Fox has isolated power.  If money no object, would be 
pushing hard to restore supply to Fox and beyond, but if trying to save money, it’s hard to 
justify investment south of Fox due to low population and a large area. 
After 6 months: Recovery 
• Underground cable repairs (to remove temporary overhead lines) 
• Staff: 
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o Asset team: at present (normal), 16 people.  Require 40 people (10 x 4-people crews, 
with at least one current asset team member in each new crew) for assessments and 
repairs. 
o Logistics team to help with scheduling of repairs. 
o GIS team, etc. 
• Westpower has computer network backup on site (and cloud), but will require internet quickly. 
• Standby plan is to head to Electricity Ashburton.  For this to be possible, require: 
o Fibre link between east and west coast or satellite connection (councils trialling a 
system for satellite comms which can provide LAN wifi).  Radio network already well 
integrated with SCAPA networks + internet… can operate anywhere in NZ. 
• Road network restoration decisions may dictate power restoration decisions 
• National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) decisions may dictate power restoration, 
especially for tourist towns (e.g. Franz Josef, Fox Glacier) and dairy: immediately drying off 
the dairy cows for that season would takes a lot of pressure off (stress to cows means milk is 
off for a season anyway). 
• Although not directly, if the West Coast populations change dramatically after this event, the 
long-term financial stability of Westpower may become a problem long-term. 
 
Future actions 
• Key staff must be resilient = can put already identified food/water supplies in trucks (may 
need more supplies).  “Ensure vital staff are prepared at home to get the EMT up running 
quicker”. 
• Plan for EMT set-up pre-event. 
• “A resilient data storage and communication platform considering type and usage of data 
(operation and control) is the main concern for fast restoration.”. 
• Ensure well planned response: don’t want all crews out assessing/repairing (due to later 
fatigue). 
• Pre-plan recon flight routes (West Coast CDEM-led). 
• Ensure tracked GPS-enabled “full motion video” footage is captured on recon flight. 
• Westpower GIS needs to be compatible with CDEM GIS. 
• Need good info from Transpower on recovery time for supply to West Coast. 
• Consider pre-arranged (drone) travel routes with air traffic control. 
• Stocktake and source generators for substations. 
• Design remote shut down switch for substations (particularly for minor, not GXP substations). 
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• Continue South Island power company coordination, and consider coordination with North 
Island (and international) power companies for post-disaster response.  All power companies 
should also stocktake post-disaster resources (needs). 
• Consider planning (including list of resource needs, and where to source from) for barge into 
Greymouth within 1 week for bulk supplies (power poles, fuel…). 
• Consider planning amount of personnel required for repairs, admin, GIS, and other roles. 
• Westpower to investigate satellite comms which can provide LAN wifi. 
• Westpower very keen to pursue industry resilience rating metrics (commerce commission 
collaboration) 
• There is currently no requirement for supermarkets or petrol stations to have back-up 
generators, which would be useful 
• “Need for more public education around the need to be self-reliant for a long period of time”. 
 
Notes relating to workshop 
• Would be useful to have two levels of maps.  They have different levels of importance so 
would be good to show this off: 
o 11kV distribution. 
o Sub-transmission network (33kV). 
• Need West Coast power stations on map 
• Add Mount Hercules to map 
• Need to know fuel availability/level of service (as major limitation) for this scenario. 
• Need ports levels of services. 
• Need telecoms levels of services. 
• Suggestion to split 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 months – will likely restore all power between 1 and 6 
months. 
• Name tags 
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Key scenario outcomes 
Figure 50 shows the co-created AF8+ scenario post-disaster expected levels of service for the State 
Highway network at one day, one week, one month, six months, and beyond six months.  Key outcomes 
include: 
No ground transport access to the West Coast for weeks.   
- Christchurch and Dunedin will likely be the initial foci of response, with no help on the West 
Coast. 
- The overall priority will be to evacuate people from isolated areas using helicopters and boats 
(Hokitika airport is expected to open for emergency access within a day). 
Daytime access via road between Greymouth, Kumara and Hokitika within one week. 
- Emergency road access to Hari Hari may be possible at this point, but would not be a priority 
unless Westpower is attempting to repair Amethyst power station. 
- Within one month, there will be rudimentary, emergency-only daytime ground transport access 
to the West Coast from the east coast of the South Island, including Westport, Greymouth, 
Hokitika, Kumara and Karmea. 
Limited public road access to the West Coast region within six months. 
- Access is expected to be restored southwards to Whataroa, and to Franz Josef around 6 
months.  NZ Transport Agency would aim to keep good progress going on repairing the main 
routes, and so would not look to open other roads, unless the government made these a priority. 
Almost all road access is expected to be restored beyond six months. 
- Including access to Milford Sound 
- Exceptions include Arthurs Pass, Haast Pass to Franz Josef and the Coast Road between 
Greymouth and Westport.  Restoration of these routes would depend on long-term government 
priorities. 
The rail network west of Springfield may be closed permanently. 
- This outcome will depend on government priorities.  Without road access (i.e. through Arthur’s 
Pass), the rail cannot be repaired. 
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Key findings and recommendations 
Below is a summary of the AF8+ scenario key findings (numbered), and some recommendations that 
were discussed in workshops (lettered): 
1. Communication strategies after a major South Island earthquake event remain uncertain. 
a. NZ Transport Agency will need to plan post-event communication links with district 
EOCs in the West Coast region. 
b. West Coast CDEM plans to establish a list of (satellite) phone numbers to call. 
c. Establish protocol of what to do if the satellite phone network is overloaded (with calls 
and/or internet data transfer) (for example, through West Coast CDEM). 
2. Reconnaissance coordination will be required, and has yet to be planned. 
a. Pre-plan and coordinate infrastructure agency reconnaissance flight routes (for 
example, through the West Coast Lifelines committee). 
b. Communicate key routes for infrastructure agency reconnaissance, so, where suitable, 
initial response flights can also gather reconnaissance data.  Fit initial response 
helicopters (for people recovery) with GPS-enabled cameras; use GPS-enabled 
cameras to capture all reconnaissance data. 
c. Pre-arrange for LiDAR and/or satellite imagery to be captured and provided to EOCs 
after major earthquakes to enable a more efficient response, facilitating immediate 
assessments of ground movements which can be used to prioritise response. 
d. Use light aircraft to relieve demand on helicopters. 
e. Pre-event, organise post-event data “clearinghouse”. 
3. Response coordination to anticipate and address both regional needs and capacity to 
contribute has yet to occur. 
a. Prioritise fuel planning (fuel is anticipated as a major limitation in this event, with major 
uncertainties about availability). 
b. Establish community-specific needs (e.g. which communities will require gas for 
household purposes, and the point at which supplies will be exhausted after isolation). 
c. Establish pre-disaster dialogue around the most useful and effective contributions 
communities can make to response and recovery operations. Include safety 
agreements/procedures for “self-helping” after a disaster, and post-disaster Health and 
Safety response advice. 
i. Discuss and establish the emergency surge capacity of contractors based in 
the region. 
ii. Train locally-based contractors to repair airports, airfields and local 
infrastructure (such as water mains) following major events, as opposed to 
attempting to open State Highways. 
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d. Consider and assess the feasibility of adaptive response approaches with relevant 
authorities. 
i. Collaborate with the Civil Aviation Authority and utilities organisations to 
repurpose suitable stretches of State Highway into emergency runways after 
a major earthquake. 
ii. Collaborate with the NZ Navy and freight companies to coordinate the 
transportation of goods (including bridges) and people to and from the West 
Coast by sea after a major earthquake disaster. 
e. Pre-identify and provisionally agree areas suitable for dumping, and areas NOT 
suitable for dumping material (including culturally significant sites). 
f. Engage with the tourism sector and consider impacts on all elements/types of tourist. 
4. Pre-disaster assessment of building alternative routes (e.g. Hollyford or Harper Pass’ as 
alternative access to Haast and Otira, respectively) would enable rapid and effective post-
disaster assessment comparisons between repairing damaged routes and building alternative 
routes, helping response and recovery. 
a. NZ Transport Agency Board should design, cost and formally assess alternative post-
Alpine Fault earthquake routes pre-disaster.   
5. Following the “Kaikōura” earthquake, we have learnt the more road access is opened, the 
slower repair work becomes. 
a. Discuss response and recovery priorities with community members. 
6. It is likely that the level of damage from both the earthquake and subsequent secondary 
hazards (e.g. landslides, river aggradation) will force consideration of managed retreat of 
infrastructure services (including the most vulnerable stretches of road), including settlement 
and business compensation (similar to “red-zoning” following the Canterbury Earthquake 
Sequence). 
a. Establish a communication strategy for discussing managed retreat with communities, 
led by Lifelines committees.  
7. The West Coast tourism “loop” is vital for tourism operation on the West Coast today. 
a. Discuss short- and long-term recovery strategies for West Coast tourism with 
community members and businesses. 
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Workshops 
The ground transport workshop was held between 10:00 and 15:00 on Thursday 2nd November 2017, 
in the NZ Transport Agency offices in Christchurch.  The meeting was attended by representatives from 
NZ Transport Agency, KiwiRail, Canterbury CDEM, the University of Canterbury and the University of 
Auckland. 
The NZ Transport Agency subcontractors workshop was held between 10:00 and 15:00 on Tuesday 5th 
December 2017, in the Fulton Hogan offices in Greymouth.  The meeting was attended by 
representatives from NZ Transport Agency, Fulton Hogan, MBD Contracting, and the University of 
Canterbury.  This meeting was organised independently by NZ Transport Agency to provide an 
opportunity to consult with NZ Transport Agency West Coast subcontractors in order to both inform 
their response to a major earthquake and corroborate or modify the ground transport workshop 
estimates of road service levels for the AF8+ scenario.  NZ Transport Agency decided not to inform 
new participants of the outcomes from the previous workshop initially, in order to allow the contractors 
to estimate road outages independently.  The outcomes from the first workshop were discussed after 
the contractors had made their estimates.  The results presented in this document reflect this combined 
assessment. 
The meetings began with a PowerPoint presentation to outline the AF8+ scenario.  The participants 
were encouraged to quality assess the scenario, based on their expert understanding of the local 
geology, which may be different to the current modelling.  The participants then co-created the impacts 
scenario using their expert knowledge of the network fragility. 
The main focus of the workshops was to discuss response and recovery strategies for the State 
Highway and, in the case of the ground transport workshop, KiwiRail networks.  Participants were 
encouraged to take ownership of the workshops, and to use the time as best suited their desired focus.  
Pre-prepared laminated A0 hazard exposure maps of the State Highway and KiwiRail networks, 
detailing the AF8+ hazard scenario, were used by participants to describe post-disaster network levels 
of service through time.  Due to time constraints before the ground transport workshop, landslides were 
only assessed for the State Highways.  Analysis has subsequently been run for the rail network, but 
was not available for this workshop.  Participants were aware of this constraint, which was in part 
addressed through co-creation of the impacts scenario.  The proximity of the road network to the rail 
network in many parts of the South Island was judged to be adequate to assess the impacts and 
estimate post-disaster service levels through time for the rail network.  At the end of the day, a short 
debriefing exercise was run to summarise key points from the workshop, and highlight areas 
participants wished to explore (further) in the future. 
The response detailed below is the workshops’ participants’ best-case assessment of what may 
reasonably be possible if this AF8+ scenario occurred, based on previous experience, and providing a 
rough order of likely work progression.  This work was detailed to outline the reasoning behind 
prioritisations, which are intended to be discussed (with the opportunity to modify these) with other 
infrastructure stakeholders and communities, in subsequent workshops.  In the event of a real world 
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Alpine Fault earthquake, if there is less damage, response times may be faster, and if there is greater 
damage, response times may be longer.  The work assumed that SH1, which was damaged in the 2016 
“Kaikōura” earthquake, is fully operational at the beginning of the scenario. 
 
Initial response 
A national emergency will be declared, meaning that response will be prioritised by the Ministry of Civil 
Defence & Emergency Management (MCDEM) and regional CDEM Groups.  NZ Transport Agency 
noted they will sit in on the regional EOC (Emergency Operation Centre) but also need communication 
with district EOCs in the West Coast region, as they do not have the resources to sit in on both. 
This response will follow the principles outlined in the National Response Guidelines: life will be the 
priority.  This means that (initially) infrastructure providers will be of secondary importance, as will 
business needs.  Later, CDEM will use industry groups (such as Federated Farmers and Farm Right) 
to incorporate business needs. 
Christchurch and Dunedin will likely be the initial foci of response, with no help on the West Coast.  The 
overall priority will be to evacuate people from isolated areas using helicopters and boats: 
- The event will be of international significance: military partners will offer assistance, which will 
however probably take more than one week to arrive. 
- Milford Sound, Jacksons Bay and possibly other parts of the West Coast may need to be 
evacuated by boats.  Depending on the weather at the time, this could be extremely difficult.  
Co-seismic hazards resulting from aftershocks also present a substantial risk in Milford Sound. 
Most communication on the West Coast will be through satellite phones.  This will facilitate 
communication between Greymouth, Hokitika, Murchison and Franz Josef.  Other possible 
communication links include: NZ Transport Agency, which has radios; KiwiRail, which has a radio 
communication network which follows the rail corridor and will likely keep going for 72 hours, allowing 
communication between Westport and Greymouth; the fire service, which has radios; the Department 
of Conservation (DOC) which has radios; and it is anticipated the military could provide communications 
if required. 
 
Up to 1 day 
NZ Transport Agency and KiwiRail do not anticipate to necessarily have helicopter access immediately 
(for reconnaissance), however, light planes could be used instead.  Flights will be subject to weather 
conditions, which may slow reconnaissance and response.  Reconnaissance would be prioritised for 
SH7, SH65 and SH69 to lower Buller.  It will be critical to identify which structures are broken through 
the response, as this will affect the whole response.  KiwiRail anticipates the need to be using 
helicopters to recover people on their network. 
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The day will mostly be spent with staff checking homes and families, assessing resources (including 
the location of trucks), and undertaking reconnaissance.  NZ Transport Agency will also be considering 
rotation of staff to ensure a consistent approach and points of contact can be maintained through the 
response.  If time is available, priorities would be to help with the reopening of airports and airfields 
(mending runways, opening as much as possible, even if just for emergency access – i.e. Hercules 
aircraft), and opening main routes which have low levels of damage. 
The Ahaura bridge is due for replacement in the next 5 years, and is currently thought to be highly 
susceptible to damage.  It was decided that the bridge was destroyed in the scenario, but it was 
anticipated that the river could be forded along an alternative local road for emergency access when 
reached.  Additionally, more landslides than detailed in the scenario were expected in the Upper Buller 
Gorge and on the northern section of the Coast road.  This was factored into service level estimates. 
Key points 
- Helicopters will be required to evacuate people from the rail network, as well as more 
generally throughout the South Island. 
- No road access to West Coast region and Milford Sound. 
o No road access from east coast beyond Murchison, Hanmer Springs, Springfield, 
Lake Hawea and Te Anau. 
- Reconnaissance prioritised between Murchison, Westport, Hokitika and Hanmer Springs. 
- The rail network west of Springfield would be closed for months, if not permanently.  It is 
anticipated this would come down to a government decision.  Without road access, the rail 
cannot be repaired, and even with access, each bridge repair would take months. 
- Hokitika airport open for emergency access (i.e. Hercules and smaller aircraft). 
 
1 day to 1 week 
Fuel was quickly noted as critical, and a potential major limiting factor in response, both nationally for 
reconnaissance, as well as regionally for network repairs.  In “peacetime”, fuel is supplied using a “just 
in time” model; few reserves are kept in areas isolated in this scenario.  Road access is therefore a 
major constraint for fuel supply.  In particular, getting fuel to major centres (such as Westport, 
Greymouth and Hokitika) and to fuel response and recovery machinery, is key.  Gas supply for 
communities that depend on it for cooking may also be problematic.  The need for and availability of 
fuel could dictate the whole road response, followed by the need for food, then movement of people. 
Road access to Westport may be difficult to achieve for a while, and so may have to rely on shipping 
for supplies.  Emergency road access to Hari Hari may be possible, but would not be a priority unless 
Westpower believes they can repair Amethyst power station. 
NZ Transport Agency notes that where the largest impacts to the population have occurred will likely 
be where the biggest road response effort will be prioritised, under direction from CDEM.  NZ Transport 
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Agency does not anticipate any works to be limited by workforce availability due to their pool of 
contractors, however, basic supplies (including food) may be limiting factors.  Overall, Health and Safety 
will be the main concern.  Both NZ Transport Agency and subcontractors noted they anticipate taking 
greater risks after a major earthquake.  Health and Safety is also a financial concern.  Identification of 
“no-go” areas through reconnaissance helps with this, but the situation can change rapidly.  Ongoing 
aftershocks and landslides may limit response, particularly in mountainous areas, such as the passes 
into the West Coast. 
The major advantage with this event compared to the “Kaikōura” earthquake is that in many places on 
the West Coast, roads/tracks will be able to go around landslides, as the road is not right on the coast.  
NZ Transport Agency anticipates this will allow emergency access to be restored at a faster pace than 
in the “Kaikōura” earthquake. 
Given a number of recent upgrade works, and the performance of bridges in the 2016 “Kaikōura” and 
2010/2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequences (see Palermo et al., 2017), NZ Transport Agency does 
not anticipate unmanageable bridge damage.  Where bridges are damaged, NZ Transport Agency has 
a stock of thirty 100 ft Bailey bridges in Christchurch.  Bridges are not stored on the West Coast (any 
longer) because they are more likely to rust away next to the sea.  The major constraint with Bailey 
bridges also tends to be preparing the groundwork, which takes between 5 days (if building on existing 
abutments) and 2 weeks.  It is anticipated that this preparation time is long enough for NZ Transport 
Agency to transport bridges to site, likely along roads opened for emergency access.  However, West 
Coast contractors raised concerns that not storing bridges in the West Coast means the region is reliant 
on the bridges being transported through the passes.  This may slow recovery because passes may 
still be closed when bridges are required within the West Coast region.  A solution that may be able to 
be explored is shipping bridges to Greymouth. 
Locally-based contractors will be advised to continue to work to open airports and airfields, as well as 
to address local roads, water mains, and other local services, as they will make far slower progress on 
the State Highways than the main response teams (with full resources) but could substantially progress 
social infrastructure, which will also be more important in the short term. 
It is also anticipated that isolated communities will start to self-respond, moving to restore access 
between settlements, especially where four wheel drives and earth-moving machinery are common. 
It may be practical to use State Highways as runways in some locations.  This will require conversations 
with the Civil Aviation Authority and utilities which may need to be removed to enable this (e.g. power 
poles). 
Key points 
- No road access to West Coast region and Milford Sound: 
o Daytime access between Greymouth, Hokitika and Kumara.  Daytime access is 
anticipated to be similar to that used following the Kaikōura earthquake, with speed 
restrictions. 
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o Emergency access possible to Hari Hari for electricity repairs. 
o Started work on SH6 to Lower Buller, SH65, SH69 and SH7. 
o On safety grounds, Mount Hercules and the Fox Hills are closed. 
o Because Selwyn District Council plan to evacuate Arthurs Pass village (by 
helicopter), NZ Transport Agency will not prioritise access to the village.  Access will 
stop at Springfield (no Porters Pass access). 
o No effort further than Te Anau in Fiordland. 
- Reconnaissance continuing to build evidence, now including SH6 Hokitika to Lake Hawea, 
SH67 and SH67A. 
 
1 week to 1 month 
Using reconnaissance information and speed of restoration, NZ Transport Agency would swiftly decide 
which route to prioritise into West Coast: SH6/65 or SH7.  Within a month, it is anticipated there will be 
a rudimentary road open in the daytime along one of these routes, connecting the West Coast to the 
rest of the South Island.  This route would then be focussed on.  This would allow fuel to be brought 
into the West Coast and any remaining tourists and people who wished to leave to be evacuated.  The 
network will remain closed except for emergency access.   
Emergency access to Westport will be restored, but otherwise, NZ Transport Agency would prefer to 
focus on improving access along the emergency routes to two-wheel drive standards, rather than 
opening up new routes.  It may be more beneficial to provide locals with fuel to open up access south 
of Hari Hari, rather than NZ Transport Agency to resource this. 
Diggers will be required for (almost) every river crossing to address river aggradation.  It is anticipated 
a couple of hours work a day at each site will be required to maintain road access. 
With more assessments completed, there will be more certainty, allowing longer term decisions to be 
considered (and perhaps taken) on routes such as the Otira Highway, Haast Pass, and Coast Road 
(Greymouth to Westport).  In this scenario, NZ Transport Agency anticipate the Coast Road collapsed 
into the sea (the road is built on side-cast material).  The possible repair of this road will take a long 
time, especially given environmental considerations that will need to be accounted for (i.e. not 
bulldozing loose material into the sea). 
Key points 
- Emergency access to the West Coast from the east, through SH7: 
o Westport, Greymouth, Hokitika, Kumara, and Karamea have emergency access.  
Response focus is to increase the level of access to Reefton, Westport, Greymouth, 
and Hokitika. 
- Arthurs Pass, Haast Pass to Franz Josef, SH94 between Te Anau and Milford Sound, and the 
Coast Road between Greymouth and Westport remain closed. 
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- Tourism, dairy and ski industries are expected to suffer. 
- Expecting a response alliance similar to NCTIR (North Canterbury Transport Infrastructure 
Recovery alliance) and CERA (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority) to be in place by 
now.  Response camps (similar to NCTIR) may be needed, but if the response is more spread 
out across the West Coast, these may not be necessary. 
 
1 month to 6 months 
Access is expected to be restored southwards to Whataroa within six months.  NZ Transport Agency 
would be working to open road access to Franz Josef, but would aim to not open any further roads, to 
keep good progress going on repairing the main routes.  Response is also likely to be peeled back on 
the West Coast after the critical response period, as additional resources brought into the West Coast 
return to address the longer-term repair needs of other parts of the country. 
Road access will be very restricted, though residents will be allowed some sort of access.  “Convoys” 
may be run.  These will likely be run in the form of a highly-monitored network, with NZ Transport 
Agency/contractor vehicles on hand to help if vehicles get stuck.  Access will be permitted along the 
route, but with decreased speed limits, high levels of network monitoring and only open for 1-2 days a 
week for a few hours each day.  Very special arrangements may be possible with major industry such 
as Westland Milk Products, such as access every other day to transport milk in and out of the West 
Coast.   
NZ Transport Agency will make a decision about how far to push into Arthurs Pass.  This will be guided 
by National Response Guidelines, and driven by CDEM – while it may be possible to proceed, there is 
a risk of being seen to be opening a road for ski fields whilst survival routes are not completed in the 
West Coast region. 
NZ Transport Agency is expecting to implement short-term solutions to ensure access to Westland.  For 
example, through ford access where bridges are damaged.  Due to severe aggradation, road damage 
and low populations, it is anticipated there will be no long-term access to townships including Fox 
Glacier and Haast.  For these locations, it is expected the population will be offered compensation 
similar to red-zoning, with the exception that if they wish to remain where they are without road access, 
this could be possible (of note, is that Haast did not have road access until 60 years ago). 
Key points 
- Daytime road access to West Coast, up to Karamea and Whataroa. 
- Working to open road to Franz Josef. 
- Some settlements may no longer be viable (at least in terms of providing infrastructure 
services).  Compensation options (along the lines of red-zoning) will need to be considered. 
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Beyond 6 months 
Transport operators would now be working to long-term Government priorities.  Given the AF8+ 
scenario (which has no landslide reactivations on the SH94), it was anticipated road access to Milford 
Sound would be reopened, and long-term decisions made as to whether to reopen Arthurs Pass and 
access to Haast.  Fox Glacier and beyond is not expected to have access for at least 10 years, 
especially due to ongoing river aggradation.  NZ Transport Agency believes these efforts would be of 
lowest priority, with a likely decision that access to the West Coast would remain only from the North 
for the foreseeable future.  Other possibilities include restoring the existing road network (possibly with 
private investment, creating a toll road), building an airport at Franz Josef, building a northern rail 
corridor out of the West Coast region, to supplement reduced road capabilities, and constructing 
alternative routes (e.g. Hollyford or Harper Pass as alternative access to Haast and Otira, respectively).  
These projects would likely take 3-5 years to complete. 
It is acknowledged that the West Coast tourism “loop” is vital for tourism operation on the West Coast 
today.  Pre-disaster conversations around the restoration of this loop and other possible short- and 
long-term solutions were noted as potentially very useful. 
Key points 
- All road access restored, with the exceptions of Arthurs Pass, Haast Pass to Franz Josef, and 
the Coast Road between Greymouth and Westport. 
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Future actions: pre-planning opportunities 
Response 
- NZ Transport Agency noted they will be located in the regional EOC (Emergency Operation 
Centre) but need communication into district EOCs in the West Coast region, as they do not 
have the resources to sit in both. 
- Communications prioritisation: (satellite) phone numbers to call, and what to do if the satellite 
phone network is overloaded (with calls and/or internet data transfer). 
- Initial response helicopter flights (for people recovery) could be loaded with cameras and be 
aware of flight paths that would allow them to also gather reconnaissance data.  This would 
save time and helicopters when both are in high demand. 
- Pre-planned and coordinated reconnaissance flight routes using GPS-enabled video cameras 
could be coordinated between infrastructure agencies (for example, through the West Coast 
Lifelines committee).  The use of light aircraft for this purpose would relieve demand on 
helicopters. 
- LiDAR and/or satellite imagery as soon as possible after the earthquake would be of huge 
benefit and enable a more efficient response, facilitating immediate assessments of ground 
movements which can be used to prioritise response. 
- A coordinated “clearinghouse” for data collected after a disaster is invaluable, and could be 
organised pre-event. 
- Fuel is a major limitation in this event, with major uncertainties about its availabilities.  Fuel 
planning should be a major response planning priority in the near future. 
- Recording which communities require gas supply for cooking so this can be prioritised should 
also be conducted pre-event. 
- Surge capacity of contractors who are relied upon in emergency needs greater consideration. 
- The ability to transport goods (up to and including Bailey bridges) and people to and from the 
West Coast via boats, and in particular ports, is one that is often mooted.  However, the viability 
of this is not something that has been assessed.  In this workshop, it was anticipated expansion 
of Greymouth port could be part of recovery enhancements.  However, in the West Coast 
Lifelines Group workshop, this was not thought to be a workable solution. 
- Locally-based contractors can be trained to work to repair airports, airfields and local 
infrastructure (such as water mains) following major events, as opposed to attempting to open 
State Highways, as they will make far slower progress on the State Highways than the main 
response teams (with full resources) but could substantially progress local infrastructure, which 
will also be more important in the short term. 
- There are opportunities to educate people around the usefulness of resources they own in a 
response (including earth-moving machinery).  Coincident with this is the need to educate 
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around safety concerns of “self-helping” (for example, moving to restore access between 
settlements) following a major earthquake (especially if providing fuel and advising locals to 
open roads that are not being prioritised at the time). 
- It is anticipated that isolated communities will start to self-respond, moving to restore access 
between settlements, especially where four-wheel drives and earth-moving machinery are 
available.  Pre-disaster conversations around the most useful and effective contributions 
communities can make would aid response. 
- Both NZ Transport Agency and subcontractors noted they anticipate taking greater risks after 
a major earthquake.  Post-disaster Health and Safety is a “grey area” that warrants pre-disaster 
investigation.  Health and Safety is also a financial concern. 
- Pre-disaster resource consents for dumping materials in major events would be useful.  Areas 
for dumping can be pre-identified, and provisionally agreed upon (as can where NOT to dump 
material, including areas such as culturally significant sites). 
- It may be practical to use State Highways as runways in some locations.  This will require 
conversations with the Civil Aviation Authority and utilities which may need to be removed to 
enable this (e.g. power poles). 
 
Recovery 
- A key learning from the reopening of roads following the “Kaikōura” earthquake is that the more 
road access was opened, the slower the repair work has become.  This may factor in decisions 
being taken around opening roads to different levels of service (e.g. public access, daytime 
access, number of days open, etc).  This is a key point to consider when discussing response 
and recovery priorities with community members. 
- Managed retreat of infrastructure services, and what this means for settlement and business 
compensation (along the lines of red-zoning) is a major future consideration. 
o NZ Transport Agency is keen for a communication strategy around this issue with 
communities, led by Lifelines committees. 
- It is acknowledged that the West Coast tourism “loop” is vital for tourism operation on the West 
Coast today.  Pre-disaster conversations around the restoration of this loop and other possible 
short- and long-term solutions were noted as potentially very useful. 
- Design, costing and assessment (by NZ Transport Agency board) of alternative routes pre-
disaster.  This would allow post-disaster assessment comparisons between repairing damaged 
routes and building alternative routes (including the e.g. Hollyford or Harper Pass’ as alternative 
access to Haast and Otira, respectively). 
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Other feedback 
- More landslides than detailed in the scenario were expected in the Upper Buller Gorge and on 
the northern section of the Coast road.  Further investigation in the modelling of this area may 
be useful. 
- The lack of landslides along the critical link between Hokitika and Greymouth meant NZ 
Transport Agency suggested it might be worth improving the resilience of this route to ensure 
it will stay open.  This section of road remaining open would help response following a major 
earthquake. 
- “Need to consider how to engage with tourism sector and impacts on all elements/types of 
tourist” 
- “Work with utilities for interdependencies” 
- “Need to engage more with Agency staff with knowledge of central Otago and Milford access 
issues and options” 
 
- “Liked the focus on 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 1 year, not just initial response – “long term 
thinking”” 
o Greater focus is needed on recovery planning (almost all resilience planning is 
currently focussed on readiness and response). 
- “Liked workshop focus on communities and people, not just numbers, roads, etc” 
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Appendix G4.  West Coast Lifelines AF8+ earthquake scenario workshop summary 
13:00 – 16:00, Tuesday 21st November 2017 
Westland Milk Products, Hokitika 
Carousel Exercise 
Black: Power& CDEM = Westpower, Buller Energy, CDEM, 3 waters 
Green: Roading = Westland Milk, NZ Transport Agency, Fulton Hogan 
Blue: Civil Servants = West Coast Lifelines/CDEM, MCDEM 
Post-earthquake expectations for recovery 
Require: 
- Road access 
- Fuel 
- Communications 
- Building materials 
- Transpower (important for electricity): 
o communications 
o their status 
- Physical resources – staff, food, Fast Moving Consumer Goods 
- “3” Waters 
- Reconnaissance flights for situational overview (NZTA key post-Kaikoura lesson was the 
need to combine reconnaissance flights) 
- Reopening/status of institutions (schools, etc) 
- Medical facilities and capability 
- Welfare – e.g. Temporary settlements, evacuation centres? 
- Insurance [added later – need more discussion at senior level] 
- Funding – Especially local council [added later – need more discussion at senior level] 
o What is available may only be suitable for smaller event (government grants and 
business support) 
- Rural community expectation: 
- Milk collection 
- Logistical support (isolation) 
- Re-establishing tourism (rural) 
- Business continuity ASAP – “Back in Business” (important: gave examples of schools, eg St 
Margaret’s) 
o Government grant (business) 
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- Support from Central Government – recovery planning 
- Fuel/Food/Resources – essentials < 7 days 
o Tourists 
o Managing 
o Feeding/Welfare – more applicable to response perhaps 
o Evacuation 
- Young people’s welfare – education resumes 
- Would consider longer-term thinking later 
Summary: 
- Comms and access focus initially, then re-establishment of mining and existing and new 
tourism (earthquake-related). 
- Comparisons to Kaikōura in thoughts and discussion in requirements of different agencies 
- Catering for tourists 






o Materials/Bailey Bridges 
o Helicopters/Drones 
- Funding & Political will – National or regional priority 
- Communications 
- People – wellbeing, medical services 
- Leadership/Coordination gaps 
- Transport links/broken  distribution chains 
- Lack of power 
- “3” waters 
- Insufficient/lacking planning 
- Weather – discussed in terms of flights and air access particularly 
- Aftershocks 
- Further landslides – re-blocking roads 
- Dam-break risk (natural dams and Kaikoura comparisons) 
- Tourists – language difficulties 
- Lack of resources held within region 
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- Over-expectation by the public – should educate (Civil Defence changing from scare tactics to 
more “touchy-feely” education, also to stockpile 7 days of resources, but this is still optimistic) 
- Rural communities vs urban communities preparedness – e.g. thoughts Marlborough & 
Canterbury may not be as prepared and resilient (tolerance of preparedness) as West Coast.  
People on West Coast may be more proactive in preparedness – perhaps not so much for 
business owners and transient populations 
- Potential conflict [due to] – in terms of between organisations: 
o Lack of skilled people 
o Competing for limited resources 
o National vs regional vs region [priorities in National event] 
o Managing national transition and new “powers” of people 
o District vs district 
o People vs people 
o Lifeline vs lifeline 
- Unsolicited goods [unwanted “aid”] – ties up people, transport, building – BUT may be able to 
control access to West Coast 
- Phycological impacts on people from isolation 
o Example of Canterbury snow storm where loss of comms was the major concern to 
people 




- Try and assess extent of damage to buildings and civil structures 
- What risk to life is there from damage structures? 
- What is the risk to rescuers from damaged structures? 
- Leadership, communication system & process, plans prepared (Civil Defence response) 
- Local power generation options (generators; local power stations) 
- Westpower and Buller energy are well practiced in dealing with issues 
- Proven “control room” operations and emergency management capability 
- Local networks/contacts – contractors, etc 
- Local knowledge 
- Local relationships [this was added and discussed in detail and pre-existing relationships 
considered highly important for the response] 
- Local knowledge 
- Local networks 
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- Local resilience 
- Capacity to call on overseas resources (e.g. Fulton Hogan is a Multi-National company, so 
can internationally support NZTA) 
- Plant – big gear – mining 
- Mobile comms (milk tankers) 
- Water (milk and brewery tankers) [can be used to transport water] 





o DIY/No 8 wire solutions 
Others’ contributions 
- USAR teams? 
- Medical response? 
- Outside support 
o Building assessors 
o Supplies 






o Parts – power poles, pipes, etc 
- Education of unnecessary people 




1. Private sector 
2. Other support groups – “student army” “farmy army” 
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o Experts 
4. Donations – NZ and other, e.g. “earthquake appeals” 
5. UN; Red Cross 
- South Island Lines Company Group (4-5 years old alliance) (e.g. West Coast electrical 
engineers helped in Kaikoura earthquake) 
- Links between Christchurch and Wellington – shared agreement to provide spare parts for 
three waters infrastructure 
- AF8 Project 
- Transpower 
- NZDF & International 
- KiwiRail 
- Ministry of Health 
- MCDEM stressed everything would go through National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) – 
tell us what you want, and we’ll get it to you. 
- Interest in mining resources – not everyone had thought of this 
- Need more arrangements beforehand on what resources are there – will change based on 
contractors there, etc.  Could be commandeered. 
- People who have gear may not realise how valuable they are – concerns that they may not 
assist if it does not directly benefit them – can be educated.  Pre-existing relationships key 
- Some of these discussions can be had at the West Coast Lifelines level 
- “If the public can understand better, they will prepare better” 
- It’s expected the public will be immediately proactive following an event, and will start to save 
food, etc 
- The event is expected to have a worse impact if it occurs in summer, both for the tourism and 
dairy industries 
Level of service maps 
- Might be good to introduce greater complexity in levels of service for roads level of service 
maps – e.g. truck access at 30km/h 
- Post-its Buller energy = blue post-its with black pen 
- Thin pen on light post-its = 3 waters + Grey District 
- CDEM – blue bold pen on light pink post-its 
Discussions: 
- Emergency power to home medical equipment problem in Christchurch but resolved through 
battery back-up 
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- Recent tsunami evac exercise on West Coast “killed 300 people” in the scenario, due to road 
blockage.  Then included public transport but that encountered the same issues.  Not clear if 
people on foot considered 
- 300,000 litres of milk required to run processing plant 
- Weight of tankers important for road access issues 
- Issues with needing access to more milk trucks if rail across South Alps stops [might be good 
to expand this conversation around brief loss of rail due to fire in 2016] 
- If Southern Alps blocked, difficult to get product to Lyttleton port – may lose international 
contracts to someone else.  Unlikely NZ would lose this business, but Westland Milk would be 
hard hit 
- Difficulties shipping unprocessed milk products due to hygiene issues 
- Mining also challenge to get products to Lyttelton 
- Economics of a new port on West Coast thought to be almost impossible 
- Always challenges transporting product in West Coast compared to Canterbury 
- Problems getting insurance for lines companies – up 50% for Westpower this year.  Can’t get 
insurance in some parts of the upper South Island 
- Fuel supply for everybody important interdependency 
- Temporary accommodation for workers may be a problem (has been in Kaikoura, where a 
“village” took 6 months to set up) 
- More work needed particularly on recovery (as opposed to response) on West Coast 
- Role of group recovery manager massive, and needs to be pre-designated (this is legislated, 
so will be addressed shortly) 
- Who will manage recovery in three districts also needs consideration 
- Roading is the West Coast’s main issue, but exactly how to improve this is not something the 
Lifelines committee has fully thought through – and might want to in future.  Want to tap into 
National Land Transport Fund. 
- Road seen as more important than rail 
- “MERIT should incorporate long-term issues and recovery implications” 
- NZTA planned projects: 
o Resilience of SH7 (pinchpoints etc) 
o Resilience of SH63 
o Also SH6 (probably) 
- Transpower working with Westpower on black starts 
- VHF network allows controllers to talk to each other and connect Emergency Operation 
Centres (EOCs).  At hardware rollout/testing stage atm 
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- Westland Milk relies on overseas contracts to buy milk and remain profitable.  They expect to 
lose these contracts if they cannot supply milk.  Westland Milk doesn’t have insurance for the 
loss of an overseas customer.  This is the same for mining. 
- 1 million tons of coal per year are produced on West Coast 
- Westland Milk will be taking decision whether to repair or close the factory with an insurance 
pay out in this scenario 
- In terms of stress on cows, if they manage to remain milking, they could lobby the 
government about increasing the acceptable level of somatic cell count – which fluctuates 
throughout the year, increasing towards the end of the season anyway.  NZ has among the 
lowest acceptable levels in the world, so the increase caused by stress to cows may not be 
significant internationally. 
- Currently, 180000l/day arrives via train from Christchurch for processing on the West Coast 
- An alternative site is to process milk in Darfield 
1 day 
- First action of controller will be to lock down all fuel and appoint a fuel manager 
- On-farm milk dump 
- Pre-planning – supply agreements, MoUs 
- Emergency power to home and medical equipment  
- What comms available? 
- 3 water, staff welfare “KAOS” 
- Three water talk to WDC [Westland district council] + BDC [Buller District Council] [from Grey 
District Council] – what resources have we all got? 
- Local staff and local institutions check and support 
- Farm animals (e.g. milking) 
- Survey network and “make safe” priority tasks 
- Farmers generators install and servicing 
- Temp accommodation 
- Medical evacuation 
1 week 
- Medical evacuation 
- On-farm contingency – milk dump on farm 
- Fuel FMCG 
- 3 waters pipe materials stocks run out 
- Water supply treatment plants rapid assessment 
- Water potable critical user hospital CD [Civil Defence] welfare etc 
Appendix G4.  West Coast Lifelines AF8+ earthquake scenario workshop summary. 
 299 
- Network survey complete, temp generators arranged and in place (where possible) [Buller 
energy?] 
- 3 water info, state of network, extent and degree of damage 
- Key repairs made (where possible) [Electricity] 
- Key repair and reconstruction resources secured [electricity] 
- Generators installed and securing key local centres 
- Missing persons 
- Water potable distribution points (stand pipes) boil water notices 
- Generators running fuel issue! 
- Initial assessment sewer treatment station and pump stations rapid assessment  
- Portaloos – info on garden alternative 
- Emergency discharges public warnings 
- Emergency housing 
1 month 
- After 1 week, if can’t pick up milk, Westland Milk would advise farmers to dry off their cows.  
This relates to the minimum amount of milk required to run the factory (300,000 l/day) 
- Stock welfare – dry off cows 
- “If this event happened tomorrow, Westland Milk would lose 6 months of income: produce 
180,000kg/day milk solids, which sell at $6/kg = lost direct gross income of $200 million. 
- Generator fuel access 
- Initial priority reconstructions done 
- Potable water – water residential areas 
- Sewer mains CCTV assessments contractor 
- Sewer repairs mains 
- Housing displaced people 
6 months 
- Note solid waste demolition material 
- Final reconstruction activities done [electricity] 
- Need water supply chemicals hold 6 month Lime and Chlonic (?) gas 
- Potable water reinstate majority of supply 
- Stormwater CCTV assess and prioritise flooding 
Beyond 6 months 
- Shut down factory – if milk volume remains below trigger level required for factory to function 
- Large and long-term reconstruction and/or “new build” projects done [electricity] 
- Sewer stormwater continue lower priority areas 
- Displaced persons 
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- Psychosocial support 
Key points 
- “Rail is essential for long-term survivability” 
- “Fuel management” 
- “Access by key personnel and plan” 
- “Pre-disaster planning is continuous – practice = better implementation” 
- “How would our customers respond “look for other suppliers”. Customers need guarantee of 
supply - reassurance” 
- “Impact of a quake on international markets – loss of market and trade, unable to supply”. 
- “Reinstate the road access as soon as possible – to truck standards for food and fuel” 
- “Tipping points – no fuel, road/rail access” 
- “Rail is essential for long-term survivability” 
Future actions 
- “Do more local lifelines and Civil Defence planning” 
- “Need more local resilience” 
- “Share BCPs [Business Continuity Plans] or Emergency Management Plans of local 
businesses/lifelines” 
- “Need better understanding of key agreements with service and resource providers i.e. 
fuel/food/aid” 
- “Rubber bladders on off-road dump trucks to bring in fuel” 
- “Better education of locals with plant throughout district as to how they can assist the 
recovery” 
- “Pre-disaster emergency management plan and practice scenarios” 
- “Fuel supply is a key element that needs more work (planning work)” 
Notes relating to workshop 
- Would be good to show comparative maps for AF8/Kaikōura/Christchurch earthquake 
shaking (MMI, PGA for whole of South Island) 
- Interest in map showing acceleration in G in particular for buildings 
- “Not much discussion heard for airports in particular (although air access issues discussed 
due to weather, etc)” 
- “Recovery prediction, time.  The more accurate this is, the more beneficial it would be to 
business strategy” 
- Invite tourism operators to combined workshop 
- AF8 response planning needs to highlight need for fuel planning
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Appendix G5.  Combined Franz Josef/Lifelines AF8+ earthquake scenario workshop 
summary 
10:00 – 15:00, Monday 12th March 2018 
Medical Centre, Franz Josef 
Limitations 
While attendance was unable to be perfect at any of the workshops conducted during this project, due 
to scheduling conflicts, there were particular difficulties arranging this combined workshop. 
It was the intention to hold this combined workshop (between infrastructure stakeholders and Franz 
Josef community members) shortly after the previous workshops.  However, schedules became busy 
before Christmas in December, and the workshop was then postponed twice in the following months 
due to two major ex-cyclone events on the West Coast.  It remained important to hold the workshop as 
close as possible to the previous workshops, so the workshop was again rearranged shortly after the 
second ex-cyclone event, in discussion with infrastructure stakeholders and community members. 
Unfortunately, once the combined workshop date was agreed, the Westland District Council debrief for 
the ex-cyclone events was rearranged to the same date.  Representatives from all invited organisations 
were still able to attend the combined workshop, so the decision was taken, in discussion with 
infrastructure stakeholders, to proceed with the workshop.  While there were benefits to holding the 
workshop close to the previous workshops and shortly following two major hazard events, due to the 
Westland District Council debrief, some senior figures who had planned to attend the combined 
workshop were unable to attend.  This will have affected, and in some instances limited, discussions 
on the day. 
The focus of these workshops was to create shared understandings and networks.  The workshops 
relied upon the participants remembered knowledge and a thorough understanding of their, or their 
organisations’, response and recovery strategies, in relation to changing priorities from other 
stakeholders, which may not have been previously discussed.  Accordingly, well-meaning participants 
may have incorrectly remembered or speculated what actions may occur – particularly when key 
individuals (who they may normally defer to) were not in attendance.  Therefore, the below notes should 
NOT be taken as fact, but rather as an opportunity to identify where knowledge gaps and uncertainties 
exist.  These can be used to inform future resilience efforts and plans, as part of enhancing the long-
term resilience collaborations. 
 
Activity 1 
Franz Josef community members and Lifelines stakeholders were split are separately filled out tables 
with the below headings.  Identified issues that placed in differing sections by community members 
and Lifelines stakeholders are highlighted in yellow. 
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According to community members… According to Lifelines… 
Community members & Lifelines can… 
- Communicate with each other in our 
communities 
- Set up welfare centre 
- Set up information centre 
- We can hold limited resources 
- Set up communications and post-disaster 
temporary set-ups 
- Report damage 
- Liaison CDEM 
- Set up generators and local facilities 
- Close roads 
- Clear material 
- Minor water repairs/reinstatement 
Community members can, but Lifelines can’t… 
- Access community knowledge 
- Access community resources 
- Act as best we can, as we are not 
professionals 
- Use local access (response) 
- Organise local emergency services 
- Use local resources (e.g. generators) 
- Use controllers network 
- Ration supplies (fuel, food, water) 
Lifelines can, but community members can’t… 
- Make power lines safe 
- Close the roads 
- Open the roads 
- Repair water and sewerage (except 
Okarito for water) 
- Provide professional assistance 
- Hold unlimited resources 
- Declare state of emergency 
- Isolate power and connect power 
- Officially open roads 
- Treatment plants/all waste water 
- Bridges 
- Structural assessment 
- Connect communications 
- Provide restoration and access time 
Community members & Lifelines can’t… 
- Communicate between communities 
- Foresee what’s going to happen 
- Work when risks are too high (Lifelines will stand 
down staff when dark, strong winds, aftershocks) 
- Open roads without fuel 
- Control public: Cannot enforce road closures 
(unless declaration of emergency) 
- Declare emergency 
- Immediately restore powerlines (in an extreme 
event, all lifelines could be out) 
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Activity 2: What is needed for meaningful recovery, and what happens if you don’t get what’s needed? 
A summary of the answers is provided below.  These were prioritised in the workshop, with the “most 
important” answers placed at the top of the lists below.  Bullet pointed answers were not given priority 
ticks. 
1 week 
1. Tourists/visitors evacuated. 
o Don’t have enough supplies to support non-resident population.  Tourists major drain 
on limited resources. 
2. Provision of supplies to last extended period (fuel, food, water, etc). 
3. Communication established.  Including updates on road and power status’, and external 
reassurance that response is occurring and planning is underway for evacuation and 
provision of supplies. 
4. Response planning.  Adequate SIMS structures.  Authority figure for chain of command. 
o Duplication of resources/efforts.  Disorganised response; chaos.  Response keeps 
falling back onto the same people (who also need to look after their own family, etc). 
5. Emergency shelter/housing. 
o Welfare problems, homeless people. 
6. Resources pooled and controlled. 
7. Professional help (Red Cross; LandSAR): search & rescue and medical assistance for 
injured. 
8. Welfare centre for tourists/visitors. 
9. Building repairs. 
• Assessing infrastructure condition. 
o Poor/Unreliable response due to poor data. 
• Situational awareness of whole region for communities and Lifelines. 
• Local roads open, power established, fuel and food supplied. 
1 month 
1. Regular supply of food, water and fuel 
o No fuel = no work (e.g. repairs and lifeline reinstatement).  If progress hasn’t started, 
people will start to leave Franz Josef. 
2. Insurance (claims) 
3. Business support, long-term recovery planning, including future of Franz Josef. 
o Business failure, putting the community in trouble. 
4. Competing with the rest of New Zealand for resources.  Political commitment to Franz Josef.  
National decisions on government priorities. 
o Local, regional and national political arguments 
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5. Establish alliance for recovery (Government-led infrastructure decisions), access to the rest of 
New Zealand, access for fault repairs, and plan and timeline for reinstatement of 
infrastructure.  Bailey bridges.  Reliable power, communications, drinking water, sewerage 
and rubbish removal/waste management (debris, personal and medical waste, etc) restored. 
o If no drinking water, need to bring in water.  Risk of illness. 
o No bridges, no access, especially during rainfall events. 
6. Psycho-social support 
o Psycho-social aspects emotionally intolerable. 
7. Medical centre established.  Restocked emergency services. 
o Health issues 
8. Non-residents (tourists, etc) all evacuated 
9. Proper management of resources – food/water/medical supplies (rationing).  There are also 
limited stocks for repairs, which will impact response and recovery. 
o Poor prioritisation = health/welfare problems 
10. Craft beer 
• Building/structure assessment 
o Welfare (shelter) issues 
• Moving to life in new normal 
o Recover or abandon?  Need to adjust to new reality. 
• Updates on progress 
• Public should be looking after themselves 
6 months 
1. Communicate to appropriate agency or CDEM. 
o Competing with the rest of New Zealand for resources 
2. Skilled workforce available 
3. Communications 
4. Plan for future 
o Economic downturn for region, business closure. 
o Lose volunteers – either leave area or burnt out 
5. Welfare and medical, including counselling services. 
o Long-term increase in rates of stress or depression.  Untreated medical conditions or 
injuries. 
6. Restricted access to Franz Josef. 
o Lone locals will move away.  Lack of employment.  Delay in “opening” region and 
slow recovery. 
7. Locals employed in recovery effort 
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8. Fuel 
o No fuel = no work, no repairs, no power, communication, recovery time longer, 
difficulties for town/personal lives (cooking, etc). 
9. Power, internet/mobile, landline, sewerage, water restored. 
• Reinstate tourist industry to greatest extent possible. 
o Long-term future of Franz Josef in doubt. 
• All services and community working together to rebuild and plan future.  Need community 
buy-in.  Need to work with councils. 
• Insurance and services in place for business 
o Will slow response and recovery. 
• Consent to rebuild – where’s red-zoned? 
Over 6 months 
1. Rebuilding infrastructure 
o If road isn’t reinstated, can’t do the other priorities beyond 6 months.  Short/medium 
term, NZ Inc. struggles 
2. Jobs and employment 
o Tourism downturn for whole country 
3. Counselling services, people affected mentally 
o PTS, increased drug abuse and alcohol, anger and violence etc. 
4. Insurance ‘how to’ help personal and business 
o Loss of income, people not able to leave/get away and relax (holiday from the 
carnage). 
5. Govt. support, new people, adjust to new reality 
o Loss of Franz Josef.  Stop the relocation of township. 
6. Keep families in Franz Josef.  Includes needing to keep schools open. 
o People leaving Franz – less workers, businesses close.  People leaving West Coast 
and even NZ – tourists not wanting to visit. 
o Without schools, families will leave.  But it’s important families stay for the town to 
stay open. 
7. Acceptance of new normal 
o If there are no signs of recovery at 6 months, divisions may form between community 
members; between people wanting access to rebuild, and those wanting their money 
(insurance pay-out) to leave Franz Josef.  Resentment and retreat. 
8. Fuel 
o Can’t do anything or recover 
Activity 3: Discussion 
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Response 
- Couldn’t fly during the ex-cyclones – reality for reconnaissance. 
- Communications were also difficult during the ex-cyclones – an area that remains a weakness 
(Westpower advised they have a VHF radio in Fox substation which can be used in 
emergencies). 
- For large events, Geotechs need to confirm worksites are safe before Lifelines can start repairs. 
- Roads can be closed by Lifelines or the community with good reason, but can’t be officially 
enforced without CDEM declaration of a State of Emergency.  The ex-cyclone showed people 
driving on closed roads slowed repairs (i.e. roads need to be closed to repair powerlines).  
Communities could organise more people on the ground to man road blocks to help speed the 
response. 
- After a major hazard, the township will need resources in quickly; Franz Josef has limited 
resources (including medical needs), particularly during peak tourist season.  For 
supplies/resources to be officially rationed a state of emergency must have been declared.  
However, the community can self-organise rationing of key resources. 
- Low resourcing (no. of trained staff) was noted as a major issue (medical, police, fire, etc): 
professional assistance will be required after major event (e.g. nurse has big area to cover in 
peacetime, so will not be able to assist everyone during a major event). 
o As a multi-national, Fulton Hogan can pull staff from Australia. 
- To get resources and assistance quickly, need to provide situation report quickly: fuel, food, 
generators.  This will help CDEM prioritise where resources need to go (acknowledging 
communications were difficult during the ex-cyclones). 
- A state of emergency cannot be declared only for (e.g.) Franz Josef township, but if the 
community can’t communicate with Hokitika, they can act as if it’s been declared. 
- Community can set up info boards but sometimes social media says something else – can cause 
problems. 
- NZTA is trying to make NZTA website & telephone only source of info for State Highways, but 
this doesn’t include local roads – opportunity for regional council to link in or provide this info on 
website. 
- Volunteers can only do as well as they can.  They are well-meaning, but their knowledge is often 
quite shallow (CDEM might be able to provide this training?).  There may also be issues around 
who leads post-disaster response in townships (e.g. there are no police in Fox). 
- Communicating with tourists can be difficult, especially where there is a language barrier. 
Recovery 
- The closure of the three Alpine passes in this scenario will mean work to provide road access to 
the West Coast will progress at a pace that is unlikely to be increased by using more resources. 
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- The time of year will have an impact on the rate of recovery.  More rain will slow the recovery. 
- Aftershocks will also affect repair and response progress. 
Readiness 
- South Island electricity distributors are now meeting regularly. 
- The importance of electronic communications for commerce needs to be better considered 
- CDEM Group preparing to distribute sat phone directors 
- Need to keep updating skills lists etc, as people move to or leave town. 
Future work 
- ***COMMUNICATE THE WORKSHOPS’ OUTCOMES*** 
o Communicate to locals, and to Wellington. 
o Explain in Layman’s terms, and what they need to do about it. 
- It would be useful to do some pre-planning around post-event advocacy to Government 
o Policy assistance, with economic costings 
- From a business point of view, knowing likely outage times (as shown in the maps used in the 
workshop) is very useful for crisis management.  It would be good to have these resources 
communicated (possibly through Lifelines?). 
o List of things businesses can do to prepare for disasters 
- Capabilities and training and preparation for response and recovery.  Need key prep info to be 
saturated through the communication channels and more training to upskill local response 
capabilities.  Further workshops/exercises (possibly CDEM-led) which would be useful: 
o Loss of communications 
o Business continuity 
o Business planning 
o Crisis planning 
o Insurance 
- List of network weaknesses 
- Estimate transient populations 
- Effective link between lifelines and community post-disaster assessment?  Region/district/local 
CDEM needs to feed this info up/down. 
o Structure to communicate with lifelines needs to be clearly communicated to community 
- Make GIS available to public post-disaster 
- Post-disaster H&S grey area – can we open/self-assist.  Not grey area – as soon as someone is 
directed by an agency, H&S applies. 
- Newer satellite phones would be useful 
- Contractors going through road blocks – should we be registering them in/out of these areas? 
- Whose responsibility is resource management?  If community how/who organises and rations it? 
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- Work with Australian Civil Defence.  Partnership program. 
Activity 4: Workshop feedback 
Community members 
- Great, very informative.  Highlighted some processes that would be helpful.  Getting the 
information out to the public could be problematic 
- Great being able to have conversations with “Lifeline” companies/representatives and see 
from their perspective 
- Group involvement or activities always get good engagement 
- 3rd workshop been to, best combination of community members and lifelines 
- Great getting info from Lifelines especially NZTA, hearing their side of what their plan is in a 
scenario/real life incident 
- Great: 
o Agencies attending.  Transit/Fulton Hogan/Westpower/Rob Daniels 
o Short/Long term expectations surrounding road closures.  Long term Expectations. 
- Workshop was good, would like to see more crisis management planning at a 
community/business level 
- Another useful workshop 
- Good to have these sessions and add academic and community views together 
- Need to have more key players around the table to get more saturation of info and spread of 
input 
- Civil Defence should not rely so much on volunteers and volunteers’ goodwill 
- Getting information out to the public.  Tourism and local is very important for preparedness.  
Always going to have people rebel against info. 
 
Lifelines 
- Good: conversation after lunch to discuss main concerns 
- Improvements: knowledge was not same level by participants - some reading 
- Good: Lifelines and community talking together 
- Need to deliver message to wider community 
- Where to from here.  Positive discussion. 
- Good: opportunity to hear both sides of the story. 
- Always good to get additional input. 
- Good open discussion with community. 
General 
- Workshop timing: key agencies from lifelines and communities may be underrepresented  
- Keep smiling 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